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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine how broad changes in the global 
business environment, in general, and developments in the Omani business 
environment, more specifically, are impacting upon the management accounting 
practices (MAPs) that are used by non-oil-related Omani manufacturing 
companies (NOROMC). The importance of NOROMC in Oman has increased 
over the last three decades, as the country's leaders strategically shift away 
from over-dependence on revenues generated by oil-related manufacturing 
companies.  
The research in this thesis is qualitative, and it is informed by complementary 
socio-political theoretical frameworks - including Burns and Scapens (2000) 
conceptualisation of management accounting (MA, hereafter) change using 
institutional theory, and Hardy’s (1996) notion of power and political 
mobilisation. The empirical work comprises an in-depth case study, but is also 
preceded by a survey and follow-up interviews that have more generally 
explored the management accounting practices adopted by NOROMCs.  
First, the survey results, reinforced also by the follow-up interviews, have 
indicated that a majority of NOROMCs adopt traditional MAPs, rather than more 
contemporary MAPs. The most frequently cited reasons for the non-adoption of 
contemporary MAPs included: lack of affordability, incomplete knowledge, and a 
perception of relative efficiency in traditional MAPs. However, in terms of those 
companies which did adopt newer MAPs, the most common response in 
relation to what drives the adoption of newer MAPs, included: compliance with 
parent company requirements and regulations, and, more generally, the 
changing business environment.  
Having attained these results from the survey and follow-up interviews, it was 
felt that there was insufficient detail and understanding of the processes of new 
MAPs’ (non-) adoption. A case study was therefore also undertaken, to provide 
useful and in-depth understanding. This case study provides new insight into 
the process of the (non-) adoption of contemporary MAPs in NOROMCs which, 
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in turn, supplements, but also extends, previous research, which is mostly 
based on questionnaire-style methods. The case study also reveals complexity 
in employee resistance, and highlights some of the cultural nuances that are 
related to the Omani setting.      
This thesis was undertaken in the context of recent calls for further research 
into MA as a changing process in emerging economies (Hopper et al., 2009). 
As far as the author is aware, this investigation is the first of its kind to be 
conducted in Oman, hence it should instantly contribute to the development of 
knowledge in this important area.  
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
1.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, MOTIVATIONS, AND BACKGROUND 
In broad terms, the main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the changing 
nature of management accounting practices (MAPs) in non-oil-related 
manufacturing companies (NORMCs) in Oman. More specifically, there are two 
sub-aims, as follows: (1) to establish an overview of the general nature of MAPs 
in NORMCs in Oman at the present time, and (2) to understand in more depth 
some of the key issues and challenges facing NORM-Omani organisations in 
respect of the MAPs which they choose (or not) to adopt. In the last few years 
there has been a growing interest in how management accounting practices are 
studied across various contexts that motivated the focus of the current 
research. 
Wickramasinghe and Alawattage (2007) have stated that the commonly held 
view of management accounting is “a unitary universal practice, independent of 
the time and space in which it operates” (p. 4). However, this definition ignores 
the socio-economic1 view of management accounting; and recently there has 
been growing interest in studying management accounting from this latter view 
as will be detailed below. Previous studies have primarily concentrated on 
studying MA as a static phenomenon, premised mainly on survey-based data, 
and adopting a positivistic methodology (Scapens, 1990), as will be detailed 
below in Section 1.2.  
However, during the 1980s, there was a change in the way some MA 
researchers viewed the MA phenomenon. This development has been 
attributed, in particular, to changes in: (1) organisations’ operating environment 
(Brierley et al., 2001; Askarany and Yazdufar, 2015; Elhamma and Moalla, 
2015; Ahmed and Zabri, 2016; Nuhu et al., 2016), and (2) some re-direction in 
MA research methodology (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Modell and 
Humphrey, 2008; Hopwood, 2009; Baldvinsdottir et al., 2010). In terms of 
organisations’ operating environments, much of the recent change has been 
driven by increased competition against the backdrop of (e.g.) globalisation, 
                                            
1
 See Chapter 3 for more details.  
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uncertainty, shorter product cycles, and new technology. Such fast-changing 
operating environments require quick reactions from organisations, so they can 
survive and cope with changing customers’ demands (Joshi, 2001; Malmi, 
2001; Haldmat and Lääts, 2002; Chenhall, 2003; Yazdifar, 2004; Tsamenyi et 
al., 2006; Abdel Kader and Luther, 2008; Kallunki and Silvola, 2008; Askarany 
et al., 2010). Many studies thus suggest that organisations should adopt more 
sophisticated MAPs, rather than traditional ones. As a result, last three decades 
have witnessed the development of more complex MAPs, for instance, activity-
based costing (ABC) and the balanced scorecard (BSC). Advocates of these 
contemporary MAPs claim that such practices will help organisations to react 
faster and more effectively in their evolving operating environment (Kaplan, 
1992; Cooper and Kaplan, 1992; Kennedy and Affleck-Graves, 2001; Kaplan 
and Anderson, 2013). For instance, Johnson and Kaplan (1987) have stated:  
(c)orporate management accounting systems are inadequate for 
today’s environment. In this time of rapid technological change, 
vigorous global and domestic competition, and enormously expanding 
information processing capabilities, management accounting systems 
are not providing useful, timely information for the process control, 
product costing, and performance evaluation activities of managers 
(p.xi). 
These claims about ineffective traditional MAPs have also been accompanied 
by a shift in how some management accounting researchers have explored 
management accounting practice (Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Abu Kasim, 
2004; Dambrin et al., 2007). More specifically, and particularly across Europe, 
more MA researchers have adopted field-based research, rather than the 
traditionally dominant survey-based research (Hopwood 1976; Jones et al., 
1993; Collier, 2001, Abernethy et al., 2001; Malmi and Ikäheimo, 2003; 
Scapens, 2006). As will be explained in more detail later (see Chapter 4), this 
increased adoption of field-based research has promised to facilitate a greater 
understanding of MA as social practices (Brignall and Modell, 2000; Dillard et 
al., 2004; Andon et al., 2007; Sharma et al., 2010). Some of these studies have 
found that organisations may actually prefer to adopt traditional MAPs, while 
maybe also introducing changes in the ways in which MA information is used 
(Drury et al., 1993; Burns et al., 1996; Burns and Yazdifar, 2001); and some 
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conclude that organisations can decline new effective MAPs (Joshi, 2001; 
Sulaiman et al., 2004; Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2006). 
Notwithstanding some of the past literature on the subject of the changing 
nature of management accounting (Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Järvenpää, 
2007; Ma and Tayles, 2009; Norhayati and Siti-Nabiha, 2009), there are few 
investigations in developing countries (exceptions include Wickramasinghe et 
al., 2004; Herath et al., 2010; Tillema et al., 2010; Nimtrakoon and Tayles, 
2015), and even fewer when we consider Middle-Eastern countries. This latter 
fact, in particular, gave me considerable motivation to investigate MAPs in my 
home country, Oman. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is novel to the 
extent that there exist few, if any, qualitative studies of the nature and 
development of MAPs in Oman. Even past studies conducted in emerging 
economies, more generally, have tended to employ contingency theory and are 
mostly premised on quantitative and survey-based research; there is certainly a 
limited number of studies that explore MAPs in emerging economies from an 
institutional and processual approach (Hopper et al., 2008; Mat et al., 2010). 
1.2. RESEARCH APPROACH  
Various theoretical perspectives have been adopted in order to study the 
changing nature of MAPs. First, and as mentioned above, several studies that 
were investigating change in MA focused on the technical aspect, mostly by 
utilising contingency theory, and they are based on questionnaires as a 
research method. More specifically, most of these studies consider which 
factors make MA change outcomes either successful or unsuccessful, as well 
as the key factors which influence organisations to encourage them to adopt 
specific MAPs (or not) (Hoque, 2000; Cagwin and Bouwman, 2002; Al Omiri 
and Drury, 2007). However, viewing MAPs from this perspective ignores the 
socio-economic aspects of MAPs, rather than enabling researchers to seek 
holistic2 understandings of MAPs.  
                                            
2 See chapter 3 for more details  
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Other approaches to exploring the changing nature of MA have explored 
practices, roles, etc., as socially constructed3 phenomena and are mostly based 
on case studies as their research methods. Two such theoretical perspectives 
broadly belong to an institutional theory approach; however, they differ in terms 
of their respective level(s) of analysis. The first of these institutional theoretical 
approaches is that which draws from new institutional sociology (NIS), and 
which particularly highlights the external and society-level factors which 
influence organisations to make changes (e.g., in organisational practices, 
structures, processes). Such external factors may include: markets, government 
bodies, parent companies, regulation, and more (Modell, 2003; Tsamenyi et al., 
2006; Hopper and Major, 2007; Jalaludin et al., 2011). The second institutional 
theoretical approach is old institutional economics (OIE), which investigates MA 
as unfolding processes within organisations (Perren and Grant, 2000; Soin et 
al., 2002; Caglio, 2003; Yazdifar 2004; Major and Hopper, 2005; Caccia and 
Steccolini, 2006; Ammar, 2014). Researchers who adopt this perspective have 
particularly focused on studying the dynamics of the ways in which an 
organisation’s MA unfolds over time. In their seminal paper, Burns and Scapens 
(2000), for instance, developed an OIE/institutional theoretical framework of 
management accounting change which aims to help us to understand how 
MAPs can become routinised, and sometimes even taken-for-granted, within a 
specific organisation4, i.e., it becomes institutionalised. They also argued that 
MA processes shape, and are shaped, by organisational rules, routines, and 
institutions; and they conceptualise the dynamics of change and/or continuity in 
MAPS over time.  
In order to tackle the two aims, mentioned above, a two-pronged research 
agenda was adopted. That is, firstly, in order to ascertain a more general view 
of the nature of MAPs in Omani NORMCs, a survey was undertaken, followed 
by a collection of follow-up interviews. Secondly, a case study was then 
undertaken in an Omani NORMC in order to allow a more in-depth investigation 
of the complex processes involved in changing (or not changing) MAPs. As will 
be explained in much greater detail later in the thesis, for example, the results 
indicate that in the case study there is a significant story to tell relating to 
                                            
3
 See Chapters 3 and 4 for more discussion  
4
 See Chapter 3 for more discussion  
18 
 
resistance towards the proposed MA changes, but also some interesting 
observations around change which can be linked to Omani cultural nuances.  
For the case study, two (complementary) theoretical frameworks were adopted 
to help interpret the findings, and particularly to tease out the processual nature 
through which MAPs changed (or did not) over time, and the various challenges 
and twists during the unfolding journey. The first theoretical framework that has 
an important influence on the interpretation of the case-empirical data in this 
thesis is Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework of management accounting 
change. As mentioned above, Burns’ and Scapens' (2000) framework facilitates 
an understanding of how management accounting change processes unfold 
over-time, and how various change dynamics are shaped, and shape, the 
unfolding of the change process. The second theoretical framework which is 
drawn upon in order to assist with the interpretation of the case study is Hardy’s 
(1996) framework of power and political mobilisation. Although Burns and 
Scapens (2000) have highlighted the importance of power in shaping how the 
MA change unfolds as a process over time, they did not incorporate power into 
their framework. Hardy’s (1996) power mobilisation framework is thus used here 
to complement Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework, and to facilitate a better 
understanding of how different dynamics shape the unfolding of the MA change 
process.  
Several subsequent studies in the field have adopted Burns and Scapens 
(2000) institutional theoretical framework to investigate the phenomena and 
dynamics of MA as an unfolding process. Their findings were in line with the 
main argument of Burns and Scapens (2000). For example, Siti-Nabiha and 
Scapens (2005) adopted this framework in their case study of value-based 
management implementation in a gas processing company, Eagle, and 
considered the decoupling of key performance indicators from the day-to-day 
business activities. They found that although continuity and change are usually 
competing forces, they can also become intertwined over time. The research 
study by Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) also found that differences between 
the newly imposed budgeting system and the embedded existing ways of doing 
things explained resistance to the new accountability system. The above 
findings are consistent with the findings of other studies, including (Granlund, 
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2001; Baker, 2006; Yazdifar et al. 2008), and the results of other studies that 
are in line with these studies will be presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
Other scholars have highlighted different factors that (re-)shape the MA 
processes over time; for instance, Burns (2000) emphasised the importance of 
power and political manoeuvring for facilitating management accounting 
change. Likewise, Ribeiro and Scapens (2006) explained resistance to a new 
information system by the production department of their case study 
organisation with reference to circuits of power, rather than through resistance 
to established ways. Moll et al. (2006) also stressed the importance of power 
relationships and coalitions of interest as key dynamics in processes of 
management accounting change, in their study of the effect of institutional 
factors, as well as socio-political negotiations, in shaping cost allocation within a 
Swedish university. Yazdifar et al. (2008) also demonstrated the importance of 
endogenising power into the understanding and explanation of the dynamics of 
MAPs both in and between the parent and the subsidiary organisations. In the 
same vein, other studies’ findings were in line with the above-mentioned studies 
(Seo and Creed, 2002; Dillard et al., 2004; Scapens, 2006; Nor-Aziah and 
Scapens, 2007; Robalo, 2014; Oliveira and Clegg, 2015). 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that other change dynamics shape the 
ways in which the MA unfolds over time as a process. As Burns (2000) 
concluded, “[a] processual view of accounting, and accounting change, should 
be further developed. Particular effort, it is argued, should be aimed at how 
better to conceptualise accounting as process” (p.592). The following section 
therefore introduces the current research contributions to our existing 
knowledge, including a theoretical contribution which proposes a theoretical 
extension of Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change framework. 
1.3. CONTRIBUTION 
The primary aim of this research is to illustrate the complexity of MA as a 
process of change within an emerging economy context. To date, there has 
been little empirical evidence on the changing nature of MAPs in developing 
countries.  Accordingly, in this thesis, the researcher focused on exploring the 
20 
 
changing nature of MAPs and on understanding the introduction and 
implementation of MA as a change process within an organisation operating in 
a Middle Eastern country, i.e., Oman.  The proposed research can thus be 
positioned in terms of recent calls by some scholars (e.g., Wickramasinghe and 
Hopper, 2005; Ni Putu et al., 2007; Hopper et al., 2009) in order to undertake 
more investigation into the changing nature of MAPs in emerging economies, 
and, even more specifically, there is an especially limited amount of qualitative 
research on MAPs in Middle-Eastern settings, not least in Oman. So, this thesis 
promises not only to contribute towards our knowledge of MAPs in what are 
presently rather unexplored settings, but also to do so in a manner which differs 
significantly from the majority of the studies that currently exist in this area. 
Additionally, in previous studies on the changing natures of MAPs, different 
change dynamics have been found to shape how the MA, as a process of 
change, evolves, including the power, rules, routines, and institutions that are 
involved. Similarly, in previous studies on the changing nature of MAPs in 
emerging economies, power mobilisation has been found to be an important 
change dynamic (Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004; 
Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005).  However, those studies focused on the 
influence of powerful authorities from outside the organisation shaping how MA, 
as a change process, unfolds overtime -i.e., political intervention.  Accordingly, 
this study’s findings emphasise the importance of various dynamics, as 
explained in the existing literature, for instance in relation to the power, routines, 
and institutions, in shaping how MA, as a process of change, evolves.  
Moreover, the empirical findings in this study provide additional evidence in 
respect of the importance of power mobilisation in shaping how MA, as a 
change process, unfolds overtime.  Specifically, the study focused on power 
mobilisation as a change dynamic at the organisational level, i.e., within an 
organisation; not at the political level, as in the previous literature (Uddin and 
Hopper, 2001; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 
2005).    
Furthermore, the current study’s findings add to a growing body of literature on 
the importance of other change dynamics in MA in shaping how the change, as 
a process of change, evolve (Burns, 2000).  In other words, this research’s 
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findings extend the literature to include other organisational and contextually 
based factors, such as: a rewards system and Omanisation, to explain how the 
MA change process unfolds over time (see Chapter 7). 
To sum up, this thesis illustrates the complexity of management accounting as a 
process of change, and, in particular, how the same organisation can 
experience very different reactions from its employees to two change initiatives, 
i.e., the implementation of BSC and ERP systems, due to the role of various 
dynamics in shaping how MA unfolds over time, as a process.  Finally, although 
the thesis’s findings are thus based on only one case study, which is based in 
Oman, hopefully, the general argument will help to raise an awareness and 
understanding of: (1) the extent to which normative claims from survey based 
studies in emerging economies reflect management accounting change in 
practice; and (2) the nature of the change process as an institutionally 
conditioned process (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.726). 
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
The remainder of the thesis consists of seven chapters, which are briefly 
summarised here. The next (Chapter 2), is an overview of the existing literature 
on management accounting change (broadly defined). Through the past 
literature, this chapter considers what is meant by the term ‘change’ in MA, as 
well as the key external and internal factors that have been claimed in the past 
to particularly force organisations to introduce MA change. The MA change 
literature is vast nowadays, and so, in Chapter 2, there is a particular focus on 
extant literature that highlights MA change as processes that unfold over time. 
In addition, the review will concentrate mostly on that part of this literature which 
focuses on the implementation of the balanced scorecard (BSC) and enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) systems. These two choices of focus are inter-related; 
that is, many of the BSC/ERP articles in the literature adopt an OIE theoretical 
approach, and so, naturally, they focus on MA change as unfolding process 
(Granlund and Malmi, 2002; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003; Bianchi and 
Montemaggiore, 2008; Kasperskaya, 2008; James, 2009; Burns and Quinn, 
2011; Agostino and Arnaboldi, 2011; Hoque and Adams, 2011), and thus they 
are consistent with the overall approach taken in this thesis.  
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Chapter 3 describes the OIE-influenced theoretical framework adopted in this 
thesis, which will subsequently be drawn upon to interpret the empirical findings 
and, in particular, those from the case study. As has already been explained, 
the thesis draws primarily on Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) institutional 
theoretical framework of the institutionalisation of management accounting 
practices, as explained above. However, Hardy’s (1996) theoretical framework 
of power and political mobilisation, which, it is argued later, is complementary to 
Burns and Scapens work, is also drawn upon to help to interpret the case 
findings (see Burns, 2000, for a similar co-use of these two theoretical 
frameworks).  
The methodology and research methods adopted for the thesis will then be 
explained in Chapter 4; and this chapter also confirms the ontological and 
epistemological stance taken in the present work. Briefly, this research adopts 
social constructivist views of ontology and an interpretivist case study approach 
is followed in order to investigate the research questions at hand (Perren and 
Grant, 2000; Collier, 2001; Ezzamel and Burns, 2005; Andon et al., 2007). For 
the pilot research, the principal research methods were comprised of a 
questionnaire survey and ‘one-off’ (follow-up) interviews. In the main case 
study, meanwhile, interviews constituted the main source of data, but these 
data were also used alongside the data gathered via informal observation and 
the perusal of archival documentation. 
Chapter 5 is the beginning of the empirical part of the thesis; more specifically, 
this chapter provides a contextual background to the country of Oman. The 
discussion includes general background knowledge about the Sultanate of 
Oman, with a particular focus on non-oil-related-Omani manufacturing 
companies (NOROMCs). Significant changes in the Omani context over the last 
40 years are highlighted, including consideration of the increased importance of 
NOROMCs, in terms of their proportion of the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP). The chapter also explains how the Omani government has motivated 
foreign investment in the country’s non-oil sectors in recent decades, and there 
is discussion, too, of the importance of ‘Omanisation’ within such companies. 
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Chapter Six presents and highlights the main findings of the survey and the 
follow up interviews. In general, the questionnaire survey results indicate that 
the majority of the surveyed NOROMCs adopt traditional MAPs, if compared to 
contemporary MAPs. The chief accountants who were interviewed referred to 
various factors to explain the nature of MAPs in their contexts; for example, the 
role of power utilised by various bodies (either their parent company or 
governmental bodies). Additionally, the survey results reveals other socio-
economic-contextual factors that explain the changing nature of MAPs in Oman 
in general, and within the case study company specifically, including: 
Omanisation, and business competiveness in the Omani context, as detailed in 
Chapters 5 and 7. 
Next, data (e.g., interview transcripts, archival documentation, etc.) from the in-
depth case study is analysed, in Chapter 7. The case interpretation utilises 
thought that is informed by the theoretical background introduced in Chapter 3, 
and, more specifically, the respective theoretical frameworks of Burns and 
Scapens (2000) and Hardy (1996). The findings of the theoretically informed 
case study analysis are in line with the main arguments of Burns and Scapens 
(2000) around the institutionalisation of MAPs and the change process. 
However, the case study findings also propose to extend Burns’ and Scapens’ 
(2000) framework to include other dynamics that effect the ways in which MA, 
as process of change , unfolds over time; including power mobilisation (Hardy, 
1996) and a rewards system. 
The conclusion sums up the thesis, and demonstrates its contributions, 
limitations and some recommendations for further research. In particular, 
although this research is based on a single case study, its findings help in 
generalising the theoretical arguments of Burns and Scapens (2000), as well as 
extending their framework, as mentioned above. 
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1. Introduction  
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the literature on the diffusion and 
changing nature of MAPs, with a particular focus on how MA changes over time 
within an organisation. As the case study focuses on how different change 
dynamics interact and shape the ways in which MA change, as a process, 
unfolds over time within an organisation, and this is based on an institutional 
perspective (Bringnall and Modell, 2000; Coad and Cullen, 2006; Lounsbury, 
2008). As well as supporting the research objectives that are described in 
Chapter 1, a review of the past literature also helps to identify gaps in current 
knowledge that are related to the topic’s area, and the ways in which the 
present study may actually contribute to the literature.  
Section 2.2 of this chapter will refer to how different studies identify and define 
management accounting change as a process. Different factors relating to the 
reasons that organisations introduce management accounting change will also 
be highlighted in this section. Then, the third section will consider studies that 
relate to the diffusion of various MAPs, with a particular focus on new and 
contemporary practices. This is followed by a section that explores the different 
change dynamics that shape how MA unfolds as a process over time. Finally, 
Section 2.3.4 will present extant literature on the changing nature of 
management accounting within different settings and contexts. 
2.2. Management accounting change 
It is argued in parts of the literature that traditional management accounting 
techniques are not applicable as planning and controlling tools in today’s 
changing operating environment (Kaplan, 1983; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; 
Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994; Lucas, 1997; Jones and Dugdale, 2002). 
Different studies have referred to changes in the product life cycle, advanced 
manufacturing technologies, changes in organisations’ structures, globalisation, 
and high market competition, in order to explain why organisations have 
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adopted more contemporary MAPs (Drury et al., 1993; Hilton, 2002; Sulaiman 
et al., 2004; Wiersma, 2009).  
The underlying theme of these studies is ‘management accounting change’. As 
Burns and Scapens (2000) contend, management accounting change has 
become a much-debated topic in recent years. They emphasised that:  
“whether management accounting has not changed, has changed, or 
should change, have all been discussed. Furthermore, the 
environment in which management accounting is practiced certainly 
appears to have changed, with advances in information technology, 
more competitive markets, different organisational structures, and new 
management practices” (p. 3).  
As this research focuses on exploring the changing nature of MAPs, and how 
MA changes as a process that unfolds over time within an organisation; then it 
is important to understand what is meant by change, in a management 
accounting sense, and what forces organisations to introduce a MA change. As 
such, this section discusses the following issues: (1) What is meant by 
management accounting change?  (2) What are the main drivers of MA change, 
according to the literature?  
2.2.1. The meaning of change 
This section focuses on the meaning of change, as presented in the 
management accounting literature. It is important to clarify what ‘change’ 
means, according to the management accounting literature, before discussing 
other issues that are related to it, including the forces for change, the dynamics, 
and the complexities of change.  
Different studies of MA change as a process have referred to what ‘change’ 
means implicitly. For example, Innes and Mitchell (1990) referred to 
management accounting change as “a complex process that involves the 
interaction of several variables” (p.12). Their study revealed that there are three 
variables that are associated with changes in management accounting practices 
and they are classified “based upon the nature and timing of their influence on 
the change process” (p. 12). The factors are: (1) facilitators which are 
“necessary but not sufficient for a change to be introduced”, (2) motivators that 
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are factors which “influence the observed changes in a general manner”, and 
(3) catalysts which “are directly associated with the changes with their 
occurrence corresponding closely to the timing of the change” (Innes and 
Mitchell, 1990, pp.12-13). Accordingly, this research concluded that the 
interaction of these three types of factors result in changes in MAPs. In addition, 
Burns and Scapens (2000) developed a theoretical framework of management 
accounting change5 that explains the complexities and continuous interaction 
between organisational routines and institutions that are grounded in old 
institutional economic theory. This framework does not provide a clear definition 
of change, but instead explains how organisational routines and actions can 
become institutionalised (or taken-for-granted) through institutionalisation and 
the interplay between action and institutions.   
Studies of the changing nature of MAPs have proliferated in the accounting 
literature over the years and they are based on different theoretical perspectives 
(Emsley, 2001; Everaert et al., 2006; Yazdifar et al., 2012; Yazdifar and 
Askarany, 2012; Langley et al., 2013; Chiwamit et al., 2017). Different 
theoretical perspectives have been used to study this phenomena including, for 
example, Briers’ and Chua’s (2001) use of Actor-Network theory to study MA 
change as a process. Other studies have focused on management accounting 
change as a process across different contexts (Lukka, 1994); and some on 
defining ‘success’ and/or ‘failure’ in MA change implementation (Malmi, 1997). 
In general, however, these studies did not explicitly explain what change means 
(Hopper and Quattrone, 2001). Indeed, this absence motivated the paper by 
Hopper and Quattrone (2001), which focused on different issues in order to 
interpret management accounting change and stability. They argue that change 
is a spatio-temporal process, rather than a simple, linear phenomenon. They 
add that change is not simply a move from point 1 (t1) to point 2 (t2), but is a 
more complex process that is based on ‘drifting’:  
[…] the idea of drift is preferred to change for several reasons. First, it 
has no connotation that individuals are sufficiently conscious of space 
and time to transcend the contingent factors facing them. Secondly, 
there is no assumption that people move from well-defined situation A 
                                            
5
 More details related to Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework will be provided in Chapter 3.  
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or B in a linear, predictable and ordered spatio-temporal framework. 
Finally, it recognizes contingent factors that actors may be aware of, 
seek to respond to, but that carry them along in unpredictable ways 
(Hopper and Quattrone, 2001, p.427). 
Burns and Vaivio (2001) have also discussed management accounting 
change, emphasising the importance of differentiating between change 
and progress: 
Often, management accounting change is conceived a priori as a 
positive phenomenon - as something that reforms the present towards 
the better. But change can also become associated with negative 
development, and management accounting change can introduce 
substantial problems instead of the pursued improvement (p.393) 
Similarly, Busco et al. (2007) present the systematisation directions of 
management accounting change as a process, arguing that MA change 
processes are more complex than linear evolution:  
[…] the nature of management accounting change as a process 
cannot be described by a diffusion of a given practice across space 
and time, but by the translation of the MAP, i.e., a process by which 
the aim, nature and goal of the management accounting innovations 
are constantly shifted, mediated and renegotiated: management 
accounting change always entails a difference, a movement, a 
variation, in the nature of what is subject to change (pp.127-8). 
Influenced by the ways that previous studies (above) have defined change, the 
definition of MA as a change process, for the purpose of this study, is therefore: 
a non-linear variation, which can result in positive or negative outcomes, 
depending on the different contextual, economic, political, and social factors. 
2.2.2. Why change? 
Otley (1994) stated that changes in technology, and the social as well as 
political aspects, increase the uncertainty of the environment in which an 
organisation operates. He added that: “the current business environment is 
subject to rapid change which makes the future difficult to predict” (ibid, p.291). 
He continues: “the result is that the world is becoming less rather than more 
predictable, and that organizational control is becoming more rather than less 
complex” (Otley, 1994, pp.291-2). In short, Otley’s (1994) study revealed that as 
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uncertainty increases, organisations need to focus on core competency, due to 
changes in the operating environment. As such, organisations need to adopt 
new management control systems in order to cope with such operational 
changes (Virtanen et al., 1996; Ax and Bjørnenak, 2005; Pavlatos and Kostakis, 
2015; Askarany and Yazdifar, 2015; Abdel-Maksoud et al., 2016; Al-Sayed and 
Dugdale, 2016; Ax and Greve, 2017). Furthermore, Otley adds that the resulting 
changes need to include different control measures than would dominate in 
traditional management accounting control systems – e.g., “control of 
knowledge-based workers where the key resource is time and the key outputs 
include innovation and responsiveness to customer demands” (Otley, 1994, 
p.293).  
This point was emphasised earlier by Johnson and Kaplan (1987), in their 
seminal book, Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting, 
in which they demonstrated how traditional management accounting practices 
are ineffective in measuring an organisation’s performance in the changing 
business environment. Although Johnson and Kaplan’s work has been criticised 
by some (e.g., Drury and Tayles, 1995; Nørreklit, 2000, 2003, Nørreklit et al., 
2012), Relevance Lost represented a milestone in the development of 
management accounting, and it was a catalyst for significant new research and 
for changes in management accounting practices in the developed world. 
Thereafter, new management accounting techniques began to be used in 
conjunction with (or separately from) traditional MAPs (Drury et al., 1993; Drury 
and Tayles, 1995; Al-Omiri and Drury, 2007; Franco-Santos et al., 2012; 
Halbouni and Nour, 2014).  
In studying the changing nature of MAPs, it is important to explore the factors or 
drivers that force organisations to introduce: (a) change(s) (Suzana et al., 
2008). For example, Ezzamel et al. (1996) explored change-promoting factors 
in relation to UK-based organisations. Their findings classified such factors into 
threefold, namely: (1) economic factors, (2) technology factors, and (3) new 
management ideas (Ezzamel et al., 1996, pp.158-160). The next section 
explores in more detail the different factors that may force organisations to 
adopt different MAPs. 
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2.2.2.1. Globalisation and internationalisation  
Globalisation is considered to be one of the main drivers for initiating changes in 
an organisation’s MAPs (Cobb et al., 1995; Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Joshi, 
2001; Waweru et al., 2005; Pavlatos and Peggios, 2008). As it has intensified 
significantly over recent decades, this has brought about more uncertainty and 
competition in an organisation’s operating environment (Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2006; Hopper et al., 2016; van Helden and Uddin, 2016). Such change in global 
environments is not exclusive to Oman, it affects organisations across the 
world, including those in developing nations, as highlighted by Mat et al. (2010): 
“Globalisation has changed external environmental factors in emerging 
economies, which in turn affect the internal operations of organisations as well 
as their management accounting practices” (p.54). So, globalisation can shape 
the management accounting practices which are adopted by organisations; and 
this, in turn, constitutes part of the need for organisations to adjust their 
structure and strategies in ways that reflect such global changes (Anderson, 
1995; Ajami et al., 2005; Sulaiman et al., 2008).  
Fadzil and Rbabah (2012) have studied the adoption of an ABC system in the 
Jordanian manufacturing shareholding sector by using a survey and follow-up 
semi-structured interviews as research methods. They found that the majority of 
managers who were interviewed refer to the globalisation of their consumers as 
a motivating factor for the implementation of an ABC costing system within their 
organisations. Sulaiman et al. (2008) distributed a questionnaire to members of 
CIMA Malaysian Division in order to explore the changing nature of MAPs within 
Malaysia. The study’s results revealed that globalisation is one of the top 
external factors that drives change in management accounting, as a whole, 
within Malaysian manufacturing organisations.  
2.2.2.2. Market Competition 
As globalisation tends to intensify competition in the world markets (Ezzamel et 
al., 1996; Gosselin, 1997; Malmi, 1999; Waweru et al., 2005; Ax et al., 2008), 
this section will consider the importance of market competition as a facilitator for 
MA change.  
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Different studies have cited market competition as being a key driver for 
changing MAPs in organisations (Chong et al., 2005; Jusoh and Parnell, 2008; 
Hoque, 2011; Cuganesan et al., 2012; Krumwiede and Charles, 2014; Armitage 
et al., 2016). Inns and Mitchell (1990) investigated the changing nature of MAPs 
within organisations by conducting seven field studies in businesses operating 
in the electronics sectors. In their study, they argued that competition resulted in 
the implementation of market-orientated practices, e.g., product costing, 
customer satisfaction initiatives, and quality measures. According to this study, 
the changes in market competition were reflected in changes in the 
management accounting systems, particularly in cost systems. Managers, it 
was argued, needed more detailed and timely information in order to “maintain 
competitiveness through achieving cost-effectiveness” (p.10). 
Intensified market competition results in customers demanding a better quality 
of products, and timely delivery at lower prices. As revealed in some of the 
studies, changes in customer requirements have forced organisations to 
introduce changes in their accounting systems. For example, Chenhall and 
Langfield-Smith (1998) examined the importance of MA in the development of 
performance measurement systems within an organisation which introduced 
change programmes, including innovative approaches to organising production 
processes, restructuring work practices and developing new planning and 
control mechanisms (p.361). This was based on a case study that was used as 
a research method. They found that due to the changes in customers’ needs 
within the case study company, a new performance measurement system was 
introduced. Accordingly, responding to such requirements from customers is 
important, since the effect of not responding to those requirements may be vast 
for the organisation’s performance, especially if the customer is a major one 
and the organisation is operating in an intensified competitive market.  
Bjornenak (1997) conducted a questionnaire based research project that aimed 
to examine the level of adoption of the ABC system by big Norwegian 
manufacturing companies. The study’s results revealed that market competition 
affects the type of costing system that is adopted by organisations, and it has 
also forced organisations to shift from a traditional costing system to innovative 
costing systems, such as ABC costing. The study argues that organisations that 
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adopt such innovative costing systems try to avoid the costing errors that are 
caused by using a traditional costing system, and that it  “is beneficial to 
improve the costing systems to avoid competitors taking advantage of costing 
errors” (p.12).  
In a study on the importance of market competition and effective MAPs; Kloot 
and Martin (2000) found that intensive market competition increased the needs 
of local government organisations for more efficient and effective performance 
measurement practices, which help to provide timely and accurate information, 
and that facilitate the better provision of financial and non-financial information 
for decision making. In addition, the study argues that better performance 
measurement practice helps organisations to be more competitive in the 
market. 
In their study, O’Connor et al. (2004) investigated the level of adoption of 
Western based MAPs by Chinese state-owned enterprises. They did this by 
conducting in-depth interviews with 4 state-owned enterprises, followed by a 
survey that included 82 other SOEs6. They found that the enterprises 
interviewed tend to adopt more western-based MAPs as a reaction to increased 
market competition. Which, in turn, improved the decision-making process and 
also provided a better performance in relation to the accountability procedures 
within the interviewed enterprises.  
Finally, recent research has suggested that market competition is a major 
change driver that may force an organisation to adopt innovative contemporary 
MAPs (Khandwalla, 1972; Lamminmaki and Drury, 2001; Haldma and Laats, 
2002). Since the increase in market competition resulted in a need for better 
information for managers in order to facilitate the process of making different 
decisions that are related to, for example, planning, costing, or performance 
measurement (Isa, 2007). 
 
                                            
6
 the survey was developed by refining to the findings from the in-depth interviews 
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2.2.2.3. Fashion and fads 
Fads and fashion are mentioned in various studies as being change factors and 
as facilitators for introducing a change of MAP within organisations 
(Abrahamson, 1991). Malmi (1999) conducted a survey-based study to explore 
the diffusion of the ABC system in Finland. The study’s findings revealed that 
fashion and fads were perceived, by the Finish organisations surveyed, to be a 
major influential factor in the implementation of ABC. In his study, Malmi (1999) 
argued that the supply side presented by: consultants, IT-vendors, academics, 
and publications in the mass-media, promoted the adoption of the ABC system 
in surveyed organisations. Thus, an organisation adopts the ABC system 
because it was recommended by any of the fashion setters who were referred 
to earlier, while, fads explain the diffusion of the ABC system by referring to 
uncertainty. In other words, when an organisation faces uncertainty, it tends to 
imitate other organisations and to adopt similar techniques in order to avoid the 
risk that a competitor will gain competitive advantage.  
Other studies (Bjornenak, 1997; Vaivio, 1999; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; 
Sulaiman et al., 2008) have referred to the role of consulting companies in 
enforcing the adoption of new management accounting practices, such as BSC 
or ABC. For example, Abrahamson (1996) argued that management techniques 
were disseminated among organisations via fashion setters. His study argued 
that organisations follow fashionable management techniques “in a desire to 
learn about management techniques that would help them respond to 
organizational performance gaps opened up by real technical and economic 
environmental changes” (p.255), including an increase in market competition 
and customer requests for better services.  
Madsen and Slåtten (2013) conducted a comparative study in three 
Scandinavian counties to explore the role of fashion in the diffusion of balanced 
scorecard (BSC, hereafter); these were Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. The 
study identified the different diffusion factors of BSC including: consulting firms, 
software firms, management gurus, business schools, and conference 
organisers. The authors argued that the diffusion factors vary across nations, 
due to cultural and institutional specifications. The study results demonstrated 
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that “these actors were considered BSC pioneers and became strongly 
associated with the local “BSC movements”” (ibid, p.125). For example, 
consulting firms’ effect in the diffusion of BSC was rated high in all three of the 
nations, while the effect of business schools in the diffusion of BSC varies from 
low to high among the three nations. 
2.2.2.4. Top management pressure 
Pressure from the top level, e.g., parent company, governmental agency, or top 
management, is considered a major force for change, as different research 
results have illustrated (Vaivio, 1999; Malmi, 1999; Chanegrith, 2008). For 
example, O’Connor et al. (2004) found that pressure from higher level parties, 
such as the holding company or governmental agency, influenced Chinese 
state-owned-enterprises to adopt Western based management accounting 
practices.  
In the same vein, different questionnaire-based studies’ results have shown that 
top management support is an important factor which has an impact on the 
adoption or non-adoption of MAPs, for instance, the ABC system (Shields, 
1995; Aladwani, 2001). For example, Innes et al.’s (2000) study revealed that 
top management support is the most important factor in explaining the 
successful implementation of the ABC system within the surveyed companies. 
On the other hand, other studies’ results have revealed that the lack of top 
management support is a major factor in not introducing a change within an 
organisation. For example, Fadzil’s and Rababah’s (2012) study’s results 
revealed that 50% of the interviewed organisations did not adopt the ABC 
costing system due to a lack of top management support. 
Additionally, in their study, Yazdifar et al. (2008) presented the case study of a 
UK chemical company that imposed its MAS/MIS on a new subsidiary, Omega. 
The study explored how top managers at the parent company mobilised 
different sources of power, including the power of resources, to enforce the MA 
change within Omega (Hardy, 1996), despite the fact that such a MA system 
was inadequate for Omega. The study concluded that power over resources, 
meaning, and decision making, although important in implementing and 
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imposing an MA change within an organisation; it is still the “strength and 
durability of institutions7 at the micro-level, i.e., the power of system” that affects 
how MA change evolves within an organisation (Yazdifar et al., 2008, p.424).  
Youssef (2013) conducted a case study in an Egyptian textile manufacturing 
company (TexCo), where a new computerised business-to-business (B2B) e-
commerce accounting system was imposed by the newly appointed CEO on all 
retailers. The new B2B system was introduced to replace the existing 
traditional, simple accounting method, which had been used by the company 
since it was established in 1950. The findings of the study revealed that 
although the newly imposed B-2-B e-commerce control-based system was not 
congruent with the existing production-oriented institutions8, employees at 
TexCo continued to produce and reproduce the new B-2-B rules. The author 
explained that by referring to how the CEO had mobilised different sources of 
power to impose the MA change within TexCO. Section 2.3.3.1 in this chapter 
will explore in more detail how power affects and shapes the ways in which MA 
unfolds over time as a process of change.  
2.3. Diffusion of management accounting practices 
An increasing amount of literature explores the diffusion of various MAPs 
across different contexts (Lukka and Granlund, 1996; Hutaibat, 2005; Abdul 
Majid and Sulaiman, 2008; McLellan and Moustafa, 2008; King et al., 2010; 
Hansen, 2010; Libby and Lindsay, 2010; Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014; 
ElGammal et al., 2016). As this research’s purpose is about exploring the 
changing nature of MAPs within the Omani context, it is important to explore the 
literature that is related to the diffusion of various MAPs in different contexts, as 
well as the influential role of advanced control systems, such as an ERP 
system, in the diffusion of various MAPs. This section will therefore explore past 
literature relating to the diffusion of various MAPs in various contexts; with a 
particular focus on studies about the implementation of BSC and those that 
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 See Chapters 3 and 4 for more detail. 
8
 See Chapters 3 and 4 for more detail. 
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explore the interdependency between the implementation of ERP systems and 
the changing nature of MAPs.  
Wijewardena and Zoysa (1999) conducted a comparative study of Japan and 
Australia to explore the various management accounting practices that were 
applied by manufacturing organisations in both contexts. The study results 
show that there are differences in terms of the MAPs adopted by the 
organisations surveyed. Such differences can be understood in the context of 
their respective operating conditions:  
[…] the concentration of Japanese companies, particularly on target 
costing, indicates their greater attention to cost management. Since 
cost management places a heavier emphasis on cost reduction 
relative to cost control without jeopardizing product quality and other 
desirable characteristics” (p.66) 
Juhmani (2007) conducted a study of BSC implementation in Bahraini 
companies, and this was particularly focused on the main driving factors for 
implementation, as well as the usefulness of BSC. His study concluded that all 
of the respondents believed BSC to be a useful system, but its implementation 
was not universal, due to its costliness, and to a need to improve employees’ 
knowledge and understanding of the BSC. Juhmani’s (2007) study also 
revealed that those companies which did adopt the BSC considered it to be a 
useful strategic tool which enabled senior managers to translate organisational 
strategies into a coherent set of performance measures.  
To determine the effect of different change dynamics, including context 
specifications, Abu-Kasim (2004) conducted a case study of budget 
implementation during the process of the corporatisation of a Malaysian public 
utility organisation. In his study, Abu-Kasim tried to understand the process of 
implementing the new imposed budgeting rules and how the change context 
shaped the unfolding of change as a process that was based on new 
institutional sociology (Meyer and Rowan, 19779). He concluded that “the 
effectiveness of the prescribed accounting change cannot be assumed without 
understanding how it is implemented in a specific context” (p.42). In other 
                                            
9
 More highlights of new institutional sociology are offered in Chapter 3. 
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words, what may seem to be effective and workable in a specific context may 
not be effective and/or workable in another context.  
As the supply side are considered to be the fads and fashion diffusors (see 
Section 2.2.2.4, above), Nassar et al. (2011) conducted a survey of 58 
Jordanian manufacturing companies so as to explore the influence of the supply 
side on the diffusion of management accounting practices (MAPs), including: 
ABC, ABM, benchmarking, BSC, and target costing. The supply side, in this 
study, included local consulting companies, accounting educational, 
professional accounting bodies, accounting research, co-operation between 
universities and professional bodies, and conferences, seminars, and 
workshops. The study’s results showed that benchmarking was the most 
adopted MAP among the companies that were surveyed, followed by target 
costing, then BSC, ABC, and, finally, ABM. The findings of this study also 
revealed that the effect of the supply sides was apparent on the diffusion of 
MAPs. More precisely, the study’s findings reveal that consulting companies 
and accounting education were the most important supply side factors needed 
to motivate the implementation of the surveyed MAPs, followed by the effect of 
professional accounting bodies and specialist management accounting journals 
as motivating implementation factors.  
Similarly, in their study, Fadzil and Rababah (2012) explored the adoption of 
ABC within the Jordanian context by surveying manufacturing companies. The 
study found that around 20% of the surveyed companies have implemented and 
adopted an ABC system. There were different reasons for which those 
companies had implemented ABC; including: top management support, a 
shortage of an existing system, globalisation, intense competition, and growing 
operating costs. However, the participants interviewed referred to fads and 
fashion as the most influential of the factors that motivated their organisation to 
adopt ABC. In addition, interviewees mentioned a lack of software packages, 
high consultation costs, and difficulties in identifying cost drivers, as problems 
that might delay the process of ABC implementation.  
Due to the changes in the organisational operating environment, as highlighted 
in the previous section, new management accounting practices thus emerged 
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and different studies explored the diffusion of such new MAPs (Cooper, 1992; 
Brown et al., 2004; Baird et al., 2004; Dugdale, 2005; Abdel-Kader and Luther, 
2008; Daniel et al., 2012). In addition, some of these studies have concluded 
that there is a need to incorporate financial and non-financial measures for the 
better monitoring of organisational performance. For example, Otley (1994) 
stated that the usage of budgeting systems to control organisations’ operations 
in this changing operating environment is insufficient. Instead, there is a need 
for organisations to implement different control techniques, such as the 
balanced scorecard. New MAPs, such as: BSC, ABC, JIT, and TQM, were 
therefore promoted based on the criticism of traditional MAPs and their ability to 
produce accurate information for organisations (Al-Omiri and Drury, 2007).  
In their study, Innes and Mitchell (1995) explored the diffusion of ABC system 
within large UK companies. The surveyed companies adopted ABC systems 
due to changes in their operating environment, and, in particular, “the 
recessionary environment of the early 1990s and the pressures which this 
brought for cost containment at the level of firm” (p.150). Innes and Mitchell 
(1995) argued that adopting an ABC system should enable the organisations 
surveyed to better respond to the changing nature of the operating environment, 
as well as helping the surveyed organisations to make accurate decisions.  
The studies referred to, above, concentrated on the diffusion of contemporary 
MAPs with no detailed explanation of why and how such contemporary MAPs 
are used in practice, and how contextual factors shape the way that  the 
implementation of those MAPs evolves as a process within organisations 
(Scapens, 1994; ; Yazdifar and Tsamenyi, 2005; Kamal Hassan, 2005; Ezzamel 
and Burns, 2007; Busco and Scapens, 2011; Zainun and Smith, 2011; Ogata 
and Spraakman, 2013; Hiebl et al., 2013; Endenich, 2014; Makrygiannakis and 
Jack, 2016; Francioli and Quagli, 2016). As the purpose of this study is to 
explore how MAPs change as a process, i.e., the implementation of the BSC 
and ERP systems within PackCo, unfolds over time. The following two sub-
sections therefore concentrate specifically on studies of BSC and ERP systems. 
They present extant research that relates mostly to the changing nature of 
MAPs, and why/how the MA change as a process unfolds over time in particular 
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organisational contexts. This focus on BSC and ERPs is because such (MA-
related) changes are relevant to the case study which is presented in Chapter 7. 
2.3.1. BSC  
As mentioned above, different studies have argued that traditional MAPs are 
inefficient in providing the information that is needed to make timely decisions in 
such an evolving business operating environment (Andon et al., 2005; 
Kasperskaya, 2008; Ashfaq et al., 2014; Mat and Smith, 2014; Angelakis et al., 
2015; Leite et al., 2016; Nuhu et al., 2016). New MAPs were thus introduced, 
including the balanced scorecard. The BSC, as proposed by Kaplan and Norton 
(1992), is “a strategic performance measurement system (PMS) that overcomes 
the weaknesses of a conventional PMS by: integrating financial measures with 
non-financial measures; and linking performance measures to corporate 
strategy” (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007, p.271).  
Hoque (2014) reviewed the historical development literature related to BSC 
from 1992 to 2011, arguing that it developed from being a performance 
measurement practice that combines both financial and non-financial measures 
(in 1992) to “a more comprehensive strategy map approach to measure, 
monitor, and manage the performance and operations of an organisation in 
order to survive in today’s rapidly changing business landscape” (p.35). Such 
developments came mostly from Kaplan’ and Norton’s (1993, 1996, 2001, 
2004) field-research in this area.  
Since the introduction of the BSC concept by Kaplan and Norton, literature has 
proliferated through studies exploring BSC from different aspects (Hoque, 
2014); including studies about the relationships between different organisational 
characteristics and the implementation of BSC (Hoque and James, 2000; Ahn, 
2001; Park et al., 2005), criticism of BSC (Nørreklit , 2000; Laitinen, 2003; 
Nørreklit, 2003; Nørreklit et al., 2012), and studying BSC in different contexts 
(Malmi, 2001; Carmona and Granlund, 2003; Paplexandris et al., 2004; Kraus 
and Lind, 2010; Humphreys and Trotman, 2011).  
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For example, Braam and Nijssen (2004) explored the implementation of the 
BSC in a financial organisation in the Netherlands, revealing that the 
organisation made three attempts to implement the BSC, judging it to be a 
success only on the third occasion. Different factors were cited for the lack of 
success for its implementation in the first two attempts, including: top-down 
management pressure at the first attempt, and unsuitable IT infrastructure at the 
second attempt. However, the third attempt was a successful implementation, 
due to the involvement of employees at the early stages of implementation, as 
well as a bottom-up approach alongside management support. 
By distributing questionnaires to chief accounting and finance officers in 60 
companies that are listed on the Dhaka stock exchange, Khan et al. (2011) 
examined the use of BSC in Bangladeshi companies. The study’s results 
revealed that only 10% of the organisations included in the study had 
implemented the BSC. Different factors explained why organisations 
implemented BSC, including: company size, the uncertainty of the operating 
environment, and intense market competition. On one hand, ambiguity about 
the expected benefits of BSC, the domination of family owners and the 
imposition of their choices over top level management, as well as the 
automation of production processes, explained the low adoption level of BSC by 
the companies surveyed. 
Hoque and James (2000) conducted a survey of 66 Australian manufacturing 
companies to examine the link between organisational size, the product life-
cycle stage, the market position, BSC usage and organisational performance as 
dependent variables (p.1). The study results reported that organisational size 
does affect the level of BSC use, i.e., the bigger the company in size the more it 
will use BSC for performance measurement. In addition, Hoque and James 
(2000) found that the surveyed companies tended to use BSC as a 
performance measurement technique when a new product was introduced to 
the market. More precisely, the analysis “indicates that firms that have a higher 
proportion of new products have a greater tendency to make use of measures 
related to new products” (ibid, p.11). While the organisation’s market position, 
measured by the organisation’s market revenue share compared to the leading 
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firms, did not seem to have an effect on the usage of BSC as a performance 
measurement technique. 
This view is supported by Malmi (2001), who conducted research in Finland to 
explore the application of BSC within Finnish organisations, and to consider 
why companies adopted BSC. Malmi (ibid) conducted semi-structured 
interviews with 17 organisations which had adopted BSC. Based on the 
interview results, Malmi (2001) identified five different reasons that explained 
why Finnish companies adopted BSC. First, according to the interviewees, 
“BSC translates strategy into action” by tying up yearly strategy plans with 
operations (ibid, p.213). Second, quality programmes, like total quality 
management, encourage the adoption of BSC to gain accreditation. Third, other 
changes within some organisations explained the adoption of BSC, including: 
the introduction of the value chain concept and changes in company structure 
due to emergencies. Fourth, managerial fads and fashions explained the 
adoption of BSC within the interviewed organisations. Fifth, some companies 
adopted BSC as they realised there was a need to abandon the traditional 
budgeting system; since “companies have found budgeting laborious and 
regard it as an inaccurate estimate of the future, even when it is completed” 
(Malmi, 2001, p.214). 
Consequently, and according to Hoque (2014), of the 114 articles that relate to 
BSC and that have been published in accounting journals, only 12 (10.5%) 
articles were conducted in manufacturing companies, and the majority of these 
studies were descriptive. Only 9 articles utilised an institutional theoretical 
perspective to analyse research findings, while 6 of the 67 articles published in 
business and management journals employed institutional theories as analytical 
lenses. Hoque pointed out that the majority of the BSC studies surveyed were 
premised on quantitative research methods, and that “more qualitative field-
based studies could in future capture actual usage of the balanced scorecard in 
practice in a variety of contexts” (p.43). He also emphasised the importance of 
conducting more of these studies in developing and emerging countries: 
  
[…] some developing nations might be implementing the balanced 
scorecard primarily to comply with the requirements of external 
institutions such as funding agencies, government policy reforms or 
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professional bodies […] these studies could provide some 
explanations for the commonalities and/or differences in balanced 
scorecard practice and its effectiveness in different types of settings 
across the globe (p.46). 
 
Overall, these studies highlight the need to conduct more studies of BSC within 
emerging economy contexts, based on institutional perspectives, to enhance 
our understanding of different political and contextual factors which may shape 
the ways in which MA changes as a process that unfolds overtime. 
 
2.3.2. ERPs  
Past studies have explored the effects of introducing ERP systems on the 
adoption of contemporary MAPs (Spathis and Constantinides, 2004; Spathis 
and Ananiadia, 2005; Rikhardsson et al., 2006; Grabski et al., 2009). According 
to Rom and Rohde (2007), the non-availability of advanced information systems 
(IS) was amongst the key factors that explained the low adoption rates of 
contemporary MAPs, such as ABC and BSC in the 1980’s (see also Chenhall 
and Langfield-Smith, 1998). Later, with more advanced technology and 
integrated IS technology, such as ERP systems, it might be reasonable to 
assume that the contemporary MAPs’ adoption levels would increase. However, 
various studies have actually concluded that the introduction of an ERPs 
system does not result in the higher adoption rates of contemporary MAPs 
(Maccarrone, 2000; Malmi, 2001; Granlund and Malmi, 2002). Yet those studies 
did not explain the interdependency between the introduction of an ERP system 
and the adaptation of contemporary MAPs. As the purpose of this research is to 
explore the changing nature of MAPs, and how MA change, as a process, 
unfolds over time within an organisation,   this section refers to studies about 
interdependency and the complexities that arise between the introduction of an 
ERP and the type of MAPs that is adopted by an organisation, based on 
different theoretical aspects with a focus on studies that are based on 
institutional perspectives10.  
Different studies have been undertaken on ERP systems, and specifically on 
how the introduction of such a system has impacted (or not) on the type of 
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 See Chapter 3 
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MAPs adopted by organisations (Fahy and Lynch, 1999; Granlund and Malmi 
2002; Spathis and Constantinides, 2004 and 2005; Granlund 2011; Sánchez-
Rodríguez and Spraakman, 2012). For example, Granlund and Malmi (2002) 
conducted exploratory case studies in Finnish organisations, examining the 
impact of ERPs on MAPs, as well as on the management accountants’ roles. 
Their results revealed that ERP implementation had no effect on the type of 
MAPs used by their case organisations; in most of the case studies, all MAPs 
were used in stand-alone systems and were not integrated into the ERP 
system. Granlund and Malmi (2002) gave two main reasons for the low effect of 
ERP technology on MAPs, namely, (1) most of the case study organisations 
were in the early stages of ERP implementation, and (2) there was a perceived 
efficiency and effectiveness of the existing accounting systems (p.313).  
An earlier study by Libby and Waterhouse (1996) explored the relationship 
between changes in management accounting and control systems (MACS) and 
several organisational and contextual variables in a sample of Canadian 
manufacturing organisations. Those organisational and contextual variables 
included: (1) decentralization, (2) size, (3) competition, and (4) the capacity for 
change (ibid, p.138). Change in MACS was, in this study, “… measured as the 
sum of the reported number of changes during the period 1991-1993” (Libby 
and Waterhouse, 1996, p.139). The study’s results revealed that change was 
present in different components of the MACS of surveyed companies, including: 
planning, control, costing, directing and decision making. While more frequent 
changes were seen in the decision support and control components, if 
compared to product costing, planning and directing. Libby and Waterhouse’s 
(1996) study also claimed that changes in MACS tended to be evolutionary, 
rather than revolutionary: “it appears that change occurs not by adding or 
deleting systems wholesale, but incrementally, by adding, deleting or 
substituting to or from existing systems” (p.147). 
Surveys, such as that conducted by Hong and Kim (2002) to investigate the 
successful implementation of an ERP system within 34 surveyed organisations, 
has shown that the successful implementation of an ERP system depends 
significantly on its organisational fit, which is defined as “the congruence 
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between the original artefact of ERP and its organizational context”11 (p.27). 
The results of the study revealed that as “the organizational fit of ERP was 
found to have a significant effect on ERP implementation’s success, project 
managers, before embarking on an ERP implementation project, must evaluate 
the organizational fit of ERP and plan for an appropriate type and level of 
adaptation” (ibid, p.36). Hong and Kim argue that it is important to evaluate the 
ERP system and how it fits with the organisational context prior to the 
implementation of an ERP system, so as to avoid unsuccessful implementation 
of the ERP system. 
Scapens and Jazayeri (2003) conducted a case study in a European subsidiary 
organization of a US multinational, investigating how ERP implementation 
played a ‘stabilising’ role, rather than changing existing MAPs. This study also 
demonstrated that ERP implementation was an evolutionary change process: 
“[ERP] facilitated incremental changes to the existing ways of working (i.e., 
evolutionary change), rather than fundamentally challenging them (i.e., 
revolutionary change)” (p.229). Scapens and Jazayeri’s (2003) research has 
suggested that the four key characteristics of ERP systems (namely, 
integration, standardisation, routinisation, and centralisation) had four 
implications for management accounting, as follows: (1) the elimination of 
management accountants’ routine jobs, (2) supplying line-managers with 
accounting knowledge, (3) offering more forward-looking information, and (4) a 
broader role for management accountants (p.225). They also argued that those 
implications of ERPs in management accounting are accompanied by ERP 
implementation, and not by considering ERP to be a driver of change. In other 
words, Scapens and Jazayeri (2003) have stated, “We are not necessarily 
claiming that the implementation of SAP was the driver of management 
accounting change in BM (Europe). It is very difficult to know what would have 
happened had SAP not been implemented, as changes in the management 
accounting practices of BM (Europe) were already taking place prior to the 
implementation of SAP” (p.204). However, “the implementation of [ERP] did 
play an important role in reinforcing and facilitating” those changes (p.229). By 
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 Organisational context measured by the interdependence between different units, organisational; 
strategy, structure, size, operating environment, existing technology, and individual characteristics (Hong 
and Kim, 2000, p.26) 
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studying the process of ERP implementation, therefore, Scapens and Jazayeri 
concluded that ERPs played a stabilising role in relation to existing MAPs.   
Rom and Rohde’s (2006) investigation in this area revealed that: “Strategic 
Enterprise Management (SEM) systems are better at supporting management 
accounting tasks, such as data processing, reporting, and decision-making, 
than are ERP systems” (p.59). In addition, their results suggested that SEM 
systems facilitate the introduction of modern management accounting tasks, 
such as non-financial measures, external and ad hoc management accounting, 
and the allocation of costs. On the other hand, Rom and Rohde (2006) also 
concluded that ERP systems play a stabilising role in relation to existing 
traditional management accounting tasks, a claim which is consistent with 
others (above). They concluded that: “ERP and SEM systems are 
complementary systems: ERP systems seem to be the primary enablers of 
change in data collection and the organisational breadth of management 
accounting, while SEM systems seem to be the primary enablers of change in 
reporting and analysis, budgeting, non-financial, external and ad hoc 
management accounting, and the allocation of costs” (p.62). 
To better understand the effect of introducing an ERPs system to MAPs, Malinić 
and Todorović (2012) conducted a study in Serbia to explore the effect of 
implementing an ERP system on the nature of MAPs adopted through 
surveying organisations (that included 9 big Serbian industrial organisations). 
The authors were testing whether the implementation of an ERP system 
resulted in the introduction of advanced MAPs, such as ABC or BSC. They 
found that no contemporary MAPs were adopted by the organisations in their 
survey following the implementation of an ERP system. The results of this study 
were also consistent with Scapens and Jazayeri (2003), in that ERPs were said 
to play a stabilising role for existing MAPs, rather than challenging existing 
practices. In addition, Malinić and Todorović’s (2012) research emphasised the 
importance of organisational culture for successfully implementing ERP 
systems, saying that the “[…] orientation of the system towards the whole of the 
business, and not the individual functions, can cause rigidity” (p.746). 
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The majority of past studies, discussed above, concluded that the 
implementation of an ERP system results in the standardisation of existing 
MAPs, the provision of more detailed information; and, usually, in an 
evolutionary (rather than revolutionary) way.  
Some past studies have called for the exploration of ERP systems’ 
implementation from a ‘processual’ angle, to better understand how the change 
process evolves (Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003; Spathis and Constantinides, 
2004; Rom and Rohde, 2006). More specifically, some writers have called for 
greater focus on how different change dynamics (e.g., power, politics, routines) 
shape the unfolding of MA change as a process over time (Granlund and Malmi, 
2002; Burns and Quinn, 2011). Survey-based research would be limited in 
teasing out the nature and complexities of change processes (Guilding et al., 
2000; Haldma and Lääts, 2002; Modell, 2005; Van der Stede et al., 2005; Lillis 
and Mundy, 2005; Mat et al., 2010). As Scapens and Jazayeri (2003) 
suggested, there should be more effort: “to explain the outcomes of 
implementing ERP systems, we need to study the processes of change and to 
be sensitive to the evolutionary and path-dependent nature of those processes” 
(p.230). The next section refers to studies that explore MA from a processual 
approach12. The focus will mainly be on studies that refer to power, institution, 
and employees’ rewards, as change dynamics that shape how MA change 
evolves as a process (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Given that, as will be 
explored later in this research, such factors are those which most shape how 
the MA change as a process unfolds within the case study organisation (please 
see Chapter 7). 
2.3.3. Processual-based management accounting change studies  
The previous section concluded with the importance of conducting more 
research based on processual longitudinal case studies, in order to understand 
how MA, as a process of change, evolves within an organisation (Gomes, 2007; 
Modell et al., 2007; Youssef, 2013; Contrafatto and Burns, 2013; Claude 
Mutiganda, 2013; Mundy, 2013). Additionally, different studies have stated that, 
although focusing on the technical aspects of an MA change is important; it is 
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 See methodology chapter for more details relating to the processual approach  
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not enough to achieve a successful implementation of that change (Burns et al., 
2003). In their study, which set out to investigate the challenges of MA change, 
Burns et al. (2003) argued that “selecting and implementing the ‘right’ 
accounting systems and techniques and the technical aspects of 
implementation are important, but change implementation and change 
management also involve important behavioural and cultural issues that must 
be understood and addressed” (p.vii). Shields (1995) contended that 
organisations which focus primarily on the technical aspects of ABC systems’ 
implementation, and, for example, overlook how implementation might affect 
human behaviour, will usually experience unsuccessful implementation, or at 
least delays in the implementation of the change, and this may create 
considerable challenges. His argument is premised on a theoretical model 
developed by Shields and Young (1989, 1994), the main assumption of which is 
that management accounting change is not a technical change but an 
administrative change. It continues, with “administrative change, the fate of the 
change depends on how well it matches the preferences, goals, strategies, 
agendas, skills and resources of dominant or powerful coalitions of employees, 
particularly top management” (Shields, 1995, pp.149-50). This, however, is not 
to say that the technical aspects of MA change are unimportant, but, rather, that 
generally it “is not sufficient for the general or long-term success of a change” 
(ibid, p.148).   
In addition, Burns (2000) maintained that: “change managers need to be able to 
deal with the unfolding (unplanned, unexpected) consequences of change 
arising from external and internal influences, as well as the planned and 
expected” (p.589). The unexpected folding of MA change, as a process, can be 
explained by the interplay between different change dynamics; including: power, 
institutions, and context. In their study, Angonese and Lavarda (2014) identified 
different resistances to change factors, including: institutional power, ontological 
security, trusting consultants and experts, inertia to change, lack of knowledge, 
acceptance of routines, and decoupling. They emphasised the importance of 
the force embedded in those resistance factors in stopping or resisting change. 
In particular, they argue that understanding resistance factors may facilitate the 
implementation of change and minimise the resistance to change. Angonese 
and Lavarda (2014) claimed that “knowing the sources of possible resistance to 
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change beforehand enables organizations to adopt strategies to mitigate that 
factor and significantly increase the likelihood of successful change” (p.215). 
This section thus explores the extant literature, which covers different change 
dynamics that can shape MA change processes. The focus is particularly on 
three aspects of change dynamics, namely: (1) power, (2) institutions, and (3) 
employee rewards. The reason for this focus here is because they constitute 
the important change dynamics in the case study that is presented later.  
2.3.3.1. Power and change  
Power is an important aspect when a strategic change, such as the introduction 
of a BSC or ERP system, is introduced within an organisation (Alawattage et al., 
2007; Van Peursem and Balme, 2010; Lapsley et al., 2011; Rautiainen and 
Scapens, 2013; Oliveira and Clegg, 2015; Abdalla and A.K., 2015; Kraus and 
Strömsten, 2016). As will be explored in more detail later in this thesis, Hardy 
(1996) identified four sources of power that can be mobilised by top managers 
to put strategic changes into action. Initially, this section explores different past 
studies that have referred to power as an important dynamic in the MA change 
as a process and the ways in which it can shape how the change as a process 
unfold over time. 
Burns (2000) conducted a case study that explored the interplay between new 
accounting practices, routines, institutions, power and politics within the product 
development department (PDD) in a UK chemical manufacturer. His study 
stressed the importance of power mobilisation for providing the “energy and 
momentum necessary for implementing and facilitating accounting change” 
(p.587). The managing director (MD) in this case mobilised different sources of 
power, including: power over resources, meaning, and decision making (Hardy, 
1996) to impose a new accountability system within PDD. Interestingly, despite 
some aspects of the new accountability system becoming routinised within 
PDD, overall, the department continued to engage in traditional ways of thinking 
and doing, which would not achieve the performance-related results that were 
expected by the MD. Burns (2000) concluded that, in the absence of 
questioning taken-for-granted existing ways (i.e., institutions), then “all the 
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politics and power in the world cannot guarantee the intended institutional 
change” (Burns, 2000, p.591; Hardy, 1996; Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Aladwani (2001) also refers to the importance of employees understanding and 
being fully aware of the benefits that are expected from a new accounting (ERP) 
system, before its introduction. This resonates with Hardy’s (1996) notion of 
power over meaning. Similarly, Tsamenyi et al. (2006) explained the 
implementation of a new accounting system in a Spanish telecommunications 
organisation, with reference to coercive pressures from regulatory agencies and 
its head office, and this aligns closely with Hardy’s (1996) notion of the ‘power 
of resources’.  
Another study was conducted by Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) in a Malaysian 
public utility body, showing that the introduction of a new budgeting system was 
subject to substantial resistance from the operations team. Operations 
managers resisted the change, since it would involve an increase in the 
monitoring and control of the behaviour of operations managers. Nor-Aziah and 
Scapens (2007) attributed the resistance to an incompatibility between the new 
budgeting systems and ‘settled ways’ (i.e., institutions). In addition, a lack of 
power over decision making (Hardy, 1996) amongst the accountants was also 
explained as being an important reason for the change being resisted by the 
(relatively more senior) operations managers.  
In their paper, Agostino and Arnaboldi (2011) aim to understand “how the 
reasons behind the adoption of the balanced scorecard (BSC) and the 
approaches undertaken during the entire change process influence the 
outcome, both in terms of BSC structure and use” (p.99). They found that three 
patterns of change process emerged, based on the different reasons for 
introducing the BSC within the case study organisations. The first pattern13 was 
a process of introducing BSC as a consequence of coercive compliance, where 
subsidiaries have to use similar MAPs to those applied by their parent 
company, so as to facilitate comparison between reports. Under such 
circumstances, the design of the BSC mostly involves senior managers, while 
                                            
13
 The second pattern corresponds to the need to introduce the BSC to synthesise the business. The third 
pattern occurs when the BSC is introduced because of a voluntary decision concerning strategic 
translation (Agostino and Arnaboldi, 2011, p.110) 
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line managers play a more or less passive role in executing what is required by 
those senior managers (ibid, 2011). This finding is consistent with several of the 
studies (above), which have also stressed the importance of top managers in 
introducing change (Innes et al., 2000; Connor et al., 2004; Fadzil and 
Rababah, 2012).  
Ammar (2014) conducted a case study in a manufacturing organisation in Libya, 
focusing on MA change as process over time. More specifically, he investigated 
the process of ‘institutionalising’ a new cost accounting system that was 
imposed by the parent company, as well as resistance that emerged with the 
later implementation of an ERP system. Interestingly, the study found that the 
introduction of a new cost accounting system was not resisted, although the 
previous system was highly institutionalised14 within the organisation. When an 
ERP system was introduced, however, employees resisted, despite the fact that 
the pre-ERP system was only marginally institutionalised in the organisation. 
Ammar (2014) explains the change processes and different reactions through 
reference to power and politics; for example, when the new cost accounting 
system was introduced, it was important that it was imposed by the head office. 
Secondly, employees drew on political relationships with key decision makers to 
resist the ERP project. 
Interestingly, power is said to be embedded within the BSC; for instance, 
according to Modell (2012) “a key theme that gradually crystallized through 
these works is the need to devise performance measurement systems tightly 
coupled to the strategic visions and objectives of organizations with the ultimate 
aim of aligning organizational resources and processes and employee 
behaviour with what is deemed strategically important” (p.476). So, senior 
management power is key to explaining how the BSC is implemented in an 
organisation, while the views of lower-level managers and employees is “[…] to 
be reconciled with over-riding strategic objectives through training and 
continuous feedback”, which can create tension and conflict between managers 
and employees (Modell, 2012, p.477).  
                                            
14
 See Chapter 3 
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According to Kaplan and Norton (2001), the agreement of senior management 
on strategic properties is essential for BSC implementation. Moreover, they 
argued, continuous support from top management for middle-level managers is 
also vital for a successful implementation of BSC, as most middle-level 
managers tend not to understand organisational strategies; “this suggests that 
Kaplan and Norton are aware of the risks of inertia and resistance to strategies 
communicated in a top-down manner, but that they implicitly assume that such 
barriers can be overcome through sufficiently concerted pushes from above” 
(Modell, 2012, p.477). Modell (2012) went further, to argue that BSC diffusion 
could be as much related to political factors (e.g., to coercive pressures from a 
parent company, rather than to economics and imperatives).  
2.3.3.2. Institutions and change 
In their study, Kloot and Martin (2000) stated that managers and policy makers 
need to consider the existing “[…] way people work and the attitudes and beliefs 
they hold while performing their work” for a genuine improvement to take place 
(p.249). In addition, according to Burns and Scapens (2000), settled ways of 
thinking and doing, i.e., institutions, affect how management accounting change 
as a process evolve, as will be detailed in the empirical chapter. This section 
describes different studies that have emphasised the importance of institutions 
(Hassan, 2005; Guerreiro et al., 2006; Katsikas, 2013) in shaping the unfolding 
of MA as a process of change.  
Burns (2000) discussed the importance of considering the local (i.e., the intra-
organisational) institutional context prior to implementing MA change; since, 
without considering existing ways before implementing MA change, this might 
result in difficulties as the change process unfolds. Burns (2000) demonstrated 
that:  
“[…] localised institutional contexts within organisations create 
boundaries to accounting change, though such boundaries can 
change and are themselves part of the political process. It is within 
such boundaries that ``facilitating'' factors of change such as politics 
and power mobilisation, can have an impact on intended outcomes” 
(p. 591). 
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Scapens and Roberts (1993) conducted a case study of the engineering 
division of a large-UK based multinational and, in particular, they explored the 
implementation of a new accounting system. The purpose of introducing this 
new accounting system was to “control the activities of the unit companies, with 
particular emphasis on profitability and cash flow” in such a global competitive 
environment (p.10). However, there was resistance to change, which delayed 
the implementation of the project, and it was eventually abandoned. Scapens 
and Roberts (1993) explained that the resistance emerged more at the level of 
units, rather than at the divisional level, and they particularly highlighted an 
ignorance amongst the agents for change towards the existing shared 
meanings and norms. Scapens and Roberts (1993, p.30) concluded: 
“It is important not to dismiss resistance as illogical and emotional. 
Such resistance is probably informed by a whole variety of very real 
concerns and fears, and attempts to use coercion to overcome them 
may lead to contests for control and yet further resistance. It is only by 
exploring the organisational and historical contingencies which 
influence the process of accounting change that the resistance can be 
understood”. 
Tsamenyi et al.’s (2006) study explored employees’ resistance to a new 
accounting system and also referred to institutional and market forces as the 
main change dynamics that explained how the change, as a process, unfolded 
in the case study company. They argued that employees resisted the new 
accounting system because they were concerned about losing organisational 
autonomy and the ‘paternalistic culture’ which existed within the organisation 
prior to its acquisition by its parent organisation (p.428). Resistance was “higher 
among older than younger employees”; which resonates with Burns and 
Scapens (2000) argument that the longer-established and more widespread an 
institution, the less vulnerable to challenge and more likely to influence action 15. 
Tsamenyi et al. (2006, p.425) also found that employees in the acquired 
organisation resisted the new accounting system largely as a consequence of 
senior managers’ primary focus on technical (formal) aspects of change, in 
                                            
15
 More details relating to Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as a process framework are provided in 
Chapter 3 
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ignorance of informal aspects, such as employees’ roles and future employment 
prospects (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.1816). 
In Yazdifar et al.’s (2008) case study, senior management drew on different 
sources of power to impose the implementation of a new accounting system. 
However, in this case, the employees of a newly acquired subsidiary 
organisation did not resist the change, because the acquiring (parent) company 
spent 6 months understanding the existing settled ways of the newly acquired 
subsidiary, and then introduced the new accounting system. Yazdifar et al. 
(2008) argued: 
“CC’s successful implementation of its plan was mainly because of its 
attention to the values and taken-for-granted assumptions in Omega 
and its attempts to achieve congruence between the institutional 
context and the new systems and practices”. 
Because the parent company thus knew the embedded ways within the 
subsidiary better, it was then able to convert the intended strategic change into 
the organisational routine. Yazdifar et al. (2008, p.423) reported that: 
“The emphasis was on facilitating institutional change by means of the 
mobilisation of power over meanings. Namely, by affecting the manner 
in which organisational members perceive things, or by moulding their 
preferences in such a way that the taken-for-granted assumptions and 
beliefs were increasingly questioned. Consequently, the parent 
company systems and rules gradually became embedded in the 
subsidiary routines”.  
In his study, Aladwani (2001) referred to the resistance framework, which was 
developed by Sheth (1981), to explain why employees may resist a new ERP 
system. The framework identified two key sources of resistance, (1) perceived 
risk and (2) habit; and it is argued that the senior management need to visualise 
these sources in order to be able to employ appropriate strategies for reducing 
employees’ resistance. Aladwani (2001) argues that it is important to promote 
positive attitudes, and to achieve buy-in from employees before the 
implementation of an ERP system. In other words, senior management should 
not “introduce an ERP when a critical mass of their employees feels threatened 
by the system or feels forced to accept the new system” (p.272). This, again, 
                                            
16
 See Chapter 3 for more details  
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resonates with the argument of Burns and Scapens (2000), who stressed the 
importance of introducing new accounting ‘rules’ that were congruent with 
existing and settled ways. 
Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005) conducted a case study in the subsidiary of an 
East Asian gas processing company, where a value-based management (VBM) 
system was imposed by the parent company on its subsidiary (referred to, 
hereafter, as Eagle). The purpose of this new system was to formulate key 
performance indicators (KPI), to be used for management control within Eagle, 
and to give its operations a more strategic orientation. Although the new system 
(or rules, cf. Burns and Scapens, 2000) in the subsidiary was more or less 
incompatible with Eagle’s institutionalized setting, new routines did eventually 
emerge. Two aspects explain this, namely: (1) the new rule was imposed by 
senior managers in the parent company, and (2) “the way in which new rules 
were implemented and ultimately became routinised was largely ceremonial17 
and shaped by the existing norms and values within the company” (Siit-Nabiha 
and Scapens, 2005, p.62). 
Finally, Burns and Quinn (2011) conducted a case study on the implementation 
and automation of new management control systems within a corrugated-
container manufacturing organisation. The study focused on how new rules 
pertaining to automation in production were introduced, and became routinised, 
and, eventually, were even spread to other companies across the corrugated 
container sector. This study emphasises the importance of change agents 
(Jack, 2005; Englund et al., 2011) and, particularly in this case, his/her 
awareness of existing ways of management control in the corrugated industry, 
an “ability of the change agent to recognise and counter potential resistance to 
change” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 19), and to facilitate the design of a 
system that encoded existing routines (Burns and Quinn, 2011). 
2.3.3.3. Employees, rewards, and change  
This section now explores the existing literature on the effect of a rewards 
system on employee performance and, in turn, the effects that reward systems 
                                            
17
 Check Chapter 3 for an explanation of ceremonial change (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
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can have in shaping MA change as a process. As will detailed later in this 
dissertation, linking MA change to performance evaluation and rewards may 
result in the unexpected evolvement of the change process to something other 
than what had been planned, please see Chapter 7 (Alexandra Albersten and 
Lueg, 2014). 
Otley (1994) argued that changes in technology can open the path towards 
more global competition, which makes the management of change a continuous 
occurrence, and usually involves not only senior managers, but employees from 
a variety of levels:  
“[…] the process of organizational change becomes embedded in the 
normal operating practices of the enterprise. […] In short, adaptation 
to change will require the active involvement of many more people 
than has been traditional, and the mechanisms for control of such 
activities will necessarily involve increased levels of self-control and 
group accountability” (ibid, p.292).  
Following on from this earlier work, Otley (1999) then developed a performance 
measurement framework based on five central issues, namely: (1) objectives, 
(2) strategies and plans for their attainment, (3) target-setting, (4) incentive and 
reward structures, and (5) information feedback loops. He used three control 
techniques to test his framework’s applicability: (1) budgeting control, (2) 
economic value added, and (3) the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). His results 
revealed that the rewards issue is not suitably addressed in the BSC (see also, 
Hoque, 2014), and he stated that not addressing this issue will “have the 
potential to destroy the impact of an otherwise well-designed scorecard” (Otley, 
1999, p.376). In other words, although some organisations implement the BSC, 
they still link bonus schemes to budget targets. On the other hand, other 
organisations that implement BSC strictly link bonus payments to the 
achievement of all BSC targeted measures, and not to achieving one of the 
BSC-targeted measure result, which means no bonus will be paid, despite the 
high achievement of other BSC-targeted measures.  
Bonner et al. (2000) reviewed the past literature which had focused on the 
relationship between financial incentives and task performance, concluding “that 
financial incentives often do not improve task performance” (p.38). They 
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examined the relationship between the types of task and of incentive scheme, 
on the one hand, together with task performance. Adopting experimental 
methods, the study revealed a positive relationship between these variables; 
and also concluded that, as task complexity increases, “it is less likely that 
financial incentives will improve performance” (p.38). However, Bonner et al. 
(2000) have stressed that although such results may have implications in terms 
of the design of effective financial incentives schemes, their study was 
conducted in a controlled environment that does not really reflect the real-world. 
And so, in the real-world, different factors can affect the impact which financial 
incentives might have on employees’ performance.  
Next, Shields (1995) examined the effects of various behavioural and 
organisational variables in the success of ABC implementations; which included 
linking MA change with employees’ performance evaluations (and rewards). 
Shields argued that linking the implementation of ABC with employees’ 
performance evaluations and compensation (rewards) will motivate them to 
focus on the change implementation and to use it, especially when it is 
combined with other behavioural and organisational factors:   
“the combination of top management support, linkage to competitive 
strategy and linkage to performance evaluation and compensation 
provide a powerful and coherent package to indicate to employees that 
ABC information is important to their own and their firm's success” 
(pp.150-1).  
Shields’ results indicated that there is a correlation between the ABC system’s 
successful implementation and employees’ performance evaluation and 
compensation; i.e., statistically significant. Shields’ study stressed the 
importance of further research into the changing nature of MA, exploring how 
and why such change differs between organisations, where:  
“particular emphasis should be put on how organizational culture, 
competitive strategy, learning and incentives provide a context in 
which employees, particularly powerful coalitions such as top 
management, decide which administrative innovations will be 
adopted” (p.164).  
Such recommendations would seem to acknowledge the importance of 
incentive schemes in shaping how MA change evolves as a process. 
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Furthermore, this is an area that is not as fully theoretically developed as it 
might be, particularly in the Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework – see later 
in the thesis. 
Burns (2000) has argued that “on occasions, though not always, momentum in 
change is enhanced by the deployment of incentives for those most affected” by 
the change implemented (p.590). In his study, Burns questioned whether 
providing incentives to employees (i.e., financial incentives, or offering a 
different job title, or improving the work place) may result in different employee 
viewpoints. In other words, the provision of incentives might (or might not) 
facilitate MA change implementation via a lowering of resistance by the 
employees affected. 
Burns and Quinn (2011) have argued that routines can be associated with 
incentives, in that (e.g.) bonuses may bolster the replication of a routine. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that employees reproduce a routine in 
the best interests of an organisation; instead, they may be seeking to maximise 
self-interest through higher bonuses. On the other hand, Burns and Quinn (ibid.) 
also stated that:  
“there can be situations whereby if the incentives in place are ever 
deemed inappropriate, then groups might decide that they wish to do 
something different to what might be expected. That is, incentives fail 
to sufficiently support the triggering of a routine, and a change in 
behaviour will emerge followed possibly by displacement of old 
routines” (p.21). 
Albertsen and Lueg (2014) also recently conducted a literature review around 
the linkages between BSC implementation and employees’ compensation. Their 
study found that of the 117 empirical studies published in leading academic 
journals between 1992 and 2012, only 12 studies set BSC-compensation 
linkage as either the main or the coequally important research objective (Lipe 
and Salterio, 2000; Ittner et al., 2003; Speckbacher et al., 2003; Feliniak and 
Olezak, 2005; Decoene and Bruggeman, 2006; Bassen et al., 2006; Lee and 
Lai, 2007; Greatbank and Tapp, 2007; Griffith and Neely, 2009; Ding and 
Beaulieu, 2011). The findings of these studies were divergent in terms of how 
BSC-compensation linkage affects employees’ performance. For example, 
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Ittner et al.’s (2003) study investigated the use of subjectivity weighting 
measures in reward systems, i.e., combining financial and other subjective 
measures, including: non-financial ones; to evaluate employees’ performances 
and to determine their bonuses, based on the BSC-bonuses plan of US retail 
banking operations. The study’s results revealed that using subjectivity in 
weighting the measures of the BSC-bonus plan allowed supervisors to 
manipulate the measurement of employees’ bonuses. This resulted in 
unsatisfied employees, due to favouritism and uncertainty about the criteria 
used for bonus measurement. Accordingly, that forced the organisation to 
eliminate the BSC and to replace it with the old formula-based bonus plan, 
which is based mainly on revenues. On the other hand, Greatbanks’ and Tapp’s 
(2007) study of BSC implementation and its effect on compensation, i.e., 
bonuses, in a public service city council in New Zealand revealed contrary 
results. In the case study unit: the Customer Service Agency (CSA), prior to the 
introduction of the BSC, strategic and operational measures were used to 
calculate employees’ bonuses. Those measures were not tailored to individuals, 
nor were they used frequently for bonus calculation. In 2003, BSC was thus 
introduced to improve the staff’s and managers’ performance evaluation; and 
the BSC-performance indicators were individually tailored to the staff and the 
managers. Precisely, “they are monitored on performance by an individual 
scorecard which reflects key strategic, financial, customer, operational, and 
personal development measures as appropriate to their position and 
responsibilities” (pp.856-7). The study results found that tailoring BSC-
performance indicators to individual capabilities has had a positive impact on 
the CSA performance, since scorecards have made the individual and team 
targets clear and uncomplicated (p.864). Additionally, the implementation of 
BSC provided better and more objective performance indicators that are used in 
bonus calculation; which, in turn, motivated staff and managers to focus on 
those indicators and so get higher bonuses. In this case study, staff and 
managers were thus satisfied with the ways in which BSC measurement 
indicators are linked and used for bonus calculation. Accordingly, two 
contradictory conclusions about BSC-compensation linkage have been reached 
by the two studies, above. It is therefore possible to state that the production 
and re-production of new roles that are associated with the introduction of BSC 
may be affected by compensation plans, i.e., a rewards system.  
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In conclusion, this section has presented, from a review of previous literature, 
why organisations should consider reward systems when introducing MA 
change. Put differently, it has been argued that managers should try to 
understand the (potential) effect of reward systems on how MA change might 
evolve over time (see Chapter 7). 
2.3.4. Context and management accounting change  
In previous studies on MA as process of change, different change dynamics 
have been found to be related to shaping how the process of MA change 
unfolds over time, which includes the importance of the change’s context. For 
example, in his study Kasurinen (2002) described an accounting change model 
that is based on a revision of the work of Cobb et al. (1995). His study stressed 
that context is critical in any organisational change, and that overlooking the 
importance of context can lead to a delay in, or even failure of, MA change 
implementation. Kasurinen (2002) argued that to: 
 “not pay enough explicit attention to the context of change 
implementation” may “lead to the understatement of the structural 
barriers (such as organizational culture) and may be one reason why 
change attempts do not always lead to successful implementations, 
regardless of how skilfully they are managed” (p.340).  
There has been considerable literature on the importance of context in MA 
research (Amat et al., 1994; Carr and Tomkins, 1998; Granlund and Lukka, 
1998; Joshi, 2001; Williams and Seaman, 2001; Carr, 2005; Alawattage et al., 
2007; Kallapur and Krishnan 2008; Jeacle, 2009; Moore, 2013; Elharidy et al., 
2013; Alsharari et al., 2015; Messner, 2016; Hopper et al., 2016). As Alsharari 
et al. (2015, p.479) have stated;  
“… management accounting is a set of social and institutional 
practices that must be studied and interpreted through what is actually 
happening in relation to the interplay between the organizations and 
their wider socioeconomic contexts”.  
This section will thus review the literature related to the importance of context in 
shaping how MA change, as a process, unfolds over time, with focus on 
management accounting studies conducted in developing countries; since the 
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present research concerns MA change in an emerging economy (Oman) 
(Hopper and Wickramasinghe, 2007; Halbouni and Nour, 2014).  
Commenting on the importance of context in shaping how MA, as process of 
change , evolves, Pettigrew (1997) argued that:  
“social processes are deeply embedded in the contexts that produce 
and are produced by them. Part of the interactive field is the analysis 
of how outer and inner contexts surrounding firm level processes 
shape this process” (p.340).  
So, context can either be outer or inner to the organisation; the  
“outer context includes the economic, social, political, competitive and 
sectoral environments in which the firm is located. Inner context refers 
to the inner mosaic of the firm; the structural, cultural and political 
environments” (p.340).  
Consequently, explaining MA change in an organisation should be linked to the 
operating contexts as “processes are embedded in contexts and can only be 
studied as such” (ibid, p.340).  
In the same vein, Busco et al. (2007) have pointed out that:  
“it is commonly argued that extensive and longitudinal case studies 
enrich our understanding of the field (MA change as a process) by 
providing detailed accounts of the intertwined relationships between 
organizational contexts and the functioning of accounting.” (p.139)  
Their study demonstrated that the process of implementing a MA change, 
cannot be similar for organisations operating in different contexts, as the 
organisational operating context always affects how the change process unfolds 
over time. Busco et al. (2007) thus argued that consultants must pay attention 
to the differences between various contexts before transferring MA techniques, 
like BSC, between those contexts.  
A comparative study by Chanegrith (2008), conducted across four different 
nations (i.e., Singapore, Canada, France and Malaysia) found that the rate of 
MA change varies according to the respective economic context(s). The author 
stated, for example, that: “companies operating in a difficult economic context 
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are under pressure to improve efficiency. This creates internal demand for MA 
information with a resulting tendency to change MA techniques more frequently” 
(p.282). 
Similar findings were reported by Lamminmaki and Drury (2001), when they 
conducted a comparative study between New Zealand and British 
manufacturing companies, in order to explore the respective adoption(s) of 
product costing systems. In this study, Lamminmaki and Drury used two 
samples, unmatched and matched samples, as follows, respectively: “(a) large 
UK manufacturer and a large NZ manufacturer, (b) a subsample of those 
companies drawn from both countries satisfying a particular size criterion” 
(p.332). The study results revealed that when there was a holistic view between 
the matched samples, no differences in the type of product costing used by the 
surveyed companies is evident. While, when analysing the unmatched sample 
results, differences are evident between the surveyed companies. Such 
differences were explained by the authors through the respective operating 
context, i.e., either the UK or New Zealand. Lamminmaki and Drury (2001, 
p.344) concluded: “it should be evident that the desire to control for size should 
not be construed as an inference that size can capture cross-country cultural 
difference, however”. 
In their paper of 2007, Kholeif et al. conducted a case study of the 
implementation of a new ERP system within an Egyptian state-owned company. 
Their study found that the new ERP system was resisted by employees within 
the organisation, and the implementation of the ERP system failed. Kholeif et al. 
(Ibid.) argued that various change dynamics might help in explaining the failure 
to implement ERP systems. First, the inability of the new ERP systems to be 
customised in order to produce reports according to the requirements of the 
controlling authority, represented by the Central Agency for Accountancy, since  
the controlling authority requires all state-owned companies to produce 
accounting reports according to a uniform accounting system. Second, during 
the 1990s, the privatisation of the public sector was undertaken in Egypt due to 
losses sustained in it. The share of the public sector of the case study company 
was therefore transferred to a holding company. Due to these “changes in the 
regulatory environment in Egypt [this] created market and competitive 
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pressures” for the case study company (ibid. p.262), and this resulted in the 
company losing a large part of its market share, which caused it to sustain huge 
losses. Consequently, the ERP system was not implemented, especially 
because of the huge investment needed to implement it. 
So far, this section has reviewed previous literature which highlights the 
importance of context in shaping change processes. The remainder of this 
section will review literature that focuses on the changing nature of MAP, and of 
MA as process of change in emerging economies (Graham et al., 2009). 
According to Hopper et al. (2008), overall, the quantity of MA research in less 
developed countries (LDCs) is growing; however, they add, there is no 
extensive research in any one particular country, apart from China. They added 
that “many contextual factors and issues are not unique to LDCs - it is wrong to 
ghettoise LDC research as exotic and irrelevant to mainstream accounting 
research” (pp.495-6). LDCs, argued Hopper et al. (2008) are distinctive, owing 
to their residual traditional culture, and therefore study is recommended to 
better understand the importance of the LDCs’ context, and thus  
“ primary management accounting system’s research aim must be to 
foster understanding to facilitate local choice rather than dictating 
systems from rich countries premised on possibly alien values, to 
improve material conditions and quality of life, especially for the most 
disadvantaged” (ibid, p.496).  
Organisations operating in developing countries adopt MA practices; usually by 
‘importing’ them from developed countries, either when a foreign organisation 
invests in an LDC organisation, or when an LDC organisation has a foreign 
senior manager. However, little is known in relation to the adaptation of different 
MA practices across developing countries, including Oman (Nor-Aziah and 
Scapens, 2007; Mat el al., 2010).  
El-Ebaishi et al. (2003) conducted a survey in Saudi Arabia, to explore the type 
of MA practices adopted by wholly-owned Saudi manufacturing companies. The 
survey results revealed that the majority of the companies surveyed adopted 
traditional MAPs, as opposed to more contemporary MAPs (e.g., ABC, JIT, 
BSC). In explaining the results, the authors put a lot of weight on the importance 
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of contextual factors. First, Saudi society is both closed and conservative, and 
therefore the adoption of new MAPs will take time. Second, most of the 
surveyed Saudi companies operated in a low-competition environment and that 
is “perhaps due to vast oil revenues that have allowed both individual 
companies and government to neglect the importance of management 
accounting”; while market competition is a major factor that facilitates the 
introduction of a change in the type of MAPs within an organisation, as 
highlighted in Section 2.2.2.2 earlier in this chapter.  
To determine how uncertainty in external factors affects the design and 
implementation of MA systems Kattan et al. (2007) undertook a case study of a 
Palestinian organisation. The results confirmed that the use of MA systems 
does indeed vary according to external environmental uncertainty, in particular, 
when the external environment is more politically-turbulent, when MA systems 
tend to become more organic18; whereas, if the external environments are 
politically stable, MA systems tend to be used more mechanistically. 
Additionally, the Kattan et al. (2007) study explains that the main emphasis of 
accounting will vary according to the external environmental conditions. So, 
focus will increase towards financial accounting during periods of political 
turbulence and uncertainty, while stable and more certain periods will see 
greater emphasis on management accounting. Importantly, this study 
concluded that the implementation and use of MA within the LDC context 
should not be measured only by the (rate of) adoption of formalised MA 
techniques or systems. Instead, the authors argue, it is important to consider 
the broader (political, cultural, and economic) contexts of LDCs.  
By utilising Kasurinen’s (2002) model of barriers to accounting change, Thuy 
(2013) conducted a case study in a Vietnamese audit firm in order to explore 
the process of BSC implementation. The study found that different factors could 
explain the gaps between the implemented and the intended BSC systems. 
Those factors were divided into three types, using Kasurinen’s (2002) model, 
namely: (1) confusers, (2) frustrators, and (3) delayers. Thuy (2013) suggested 
                                            
18
 Organic MACS are characterised by a low emphasis on budgets, a lack of clear procedures or manuals 
to prepare budgets and to make decisions. Political uncertainty was considered when making decisions, 
financial issues were ignored in making decisions, and the intuition of the owner was the main input for 
decision making, there is no emphasis on costing or cost budgets (Kattan et al. 2007, p.244).  
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that two factors confused (confusers) the employees about the nature of BSC. 
These included: BSC’s purposes, how it works and how it affects their 
performance. Thuy (2013) explained such confusion by the lack of employee 
training and the lack of a spreading of awareness about the importance of the 
BSC and explaining to the employees how their performance is evaluated 
based on the BSC, and this confused the employees. In addition, the lack of top 
management support also confused the employees about the importance of the 
BSC to the firm. The embeddedness of Vietnamese culture in the informal 
communication between employees and their managers also frustrated the 
implementation of the BSC. Specifically, managers may not formally report that 
an employee did not perform well in the BSC feedback reports; instead, the 
manager will prefer to have a word with the employee about their bad 
performance and provide good formal feedback. Thuy (2013) therefore stated: 
“the preference for informal communication and the routine of relying on 
personal relationships are two frustrators” of BSC implementation (p.49). The 
above-mentioned factors thus delayed the effective implementation of the BSC 
within the case study firm. Despite that, employees and managers continued to 
implement the BSC in an improper and ineffective manner for nine years, i.e., 
with little awareness of the importance of the BSC and also with the embedded 
Vietnamese informal communication culture.  
To determine the effects of context in shaping MA change, as a process, 
Wickramasinghe et al. (2004) conducted a case study of a state-owned 
telecommunications organisation operating in Sri Lanka. This study investigated 
the process of introducing a new MA system, following the organisation’s partial 
privatisation. Before this partial privatisation, the accounting system was 
described as: “a technically sound system which is a component of state central 
planning” (p.113). The system was not used for decision making, but, instead, 
politicians controlled decisions in a rather bureaucratic way. Wickramasinghe et 
al. (2004) described how a newly appointed Japanese CEO was able to replace 
the old accounting system in the Sri Lankan organisation and was able to 
introduce several changes, including: the accountability, customers’ services, 
and employees’ rewards systems. According to the study, the Japanese 
commented about the old accounting system, saying: “the CEO’s main 
challenge was changing the 100-year-old bureaucratic management control 
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system, which he believed was inappropriate for SLT’s uncertain and 
increasingly competitive environment” (p.96). Despite such a successful 
implementation of the new management accounting system, the current 
Japanese CEO had to leave to his home country due to clashes with the 
telecommunications Chairman; thus a new Japanese CEO was appointed. With 
the appointment of the new CEO, who was very bureaucratic in the way he 
managed the organisation, he was described as: “ 
“…he always asked about rules and regulations when judging 
individual’s work, and he was calm and quiet: he rarely chased people 
for results or investigated alleged transgressions. He was slow and 
predictable and did not strive for ambitious targets” (Wickramasinghe 
et al., 2004, p.108).  
The Chairman was able to gradually gain greater power, especially as the new 
CEO’s style did not conflict with the pre-privatisation ways of doing things, as “it 
became evident that the new CEO had no intention of accelerating changes not 
within established rules and regulations” (ibid, p.108), and thus, “with the 
agreement of the new CEO, the chairman decreed that the rules and 
regulations that had dominated the enterprise for decades, but which were 
abolished by the former CEO, should be restored” (ibid.). Wickramasinghe et al. 
(ibid.) concluded that when conducting management accounting research in 
less developed countries where political backing is considered more effective 
than modern management accounting practices in controlling modern 
enterprise, then it is not possible to consider MA change as an organisational 
phenomenon, instead, it is important to consider the cultural factors for a better 
understanding of the change process. As a result, “the case illustrates and 
extends a cultural political economy of accounting” (ibid, p.114). 
Wickramasinghe et al., (ibid.) concluded that the case:  
“illustrates how in many LDCs the transformation between modes of 
products and cultures and the activities of the state render the practice 
of controls different to that intended. It remains to be seen whether 
Japanese management can eventually resolve problems of cultural 
and political dissonance. Despite their best efforts to date, they have 
failed to do so. The somebodies that dominate Sri Lankan politics 
have, apparently, restored vestiges of patronage politics” (p.116). 
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In a literature review study, Hoque (2014) found that the number of studies 
conducted in emerging economies’ contexts related to BSC implementation are 
few (only five in accounting and three in business and management). He stated 
that more research is required in order to understand how context affect sthe 
implementation of BSC in different organisations. The study calls for more 
research based on an inter-country-survey or in-depth field studies, so as to 
understand the different issues relating to the balanced scorecard, including: 
why and how BSC is implemented within an organisation in an emerging 
country. He added: “these studies could provide some explanations for the 
commonalities and/or differences in balanced scorecard practice and its 
effectiveness in different types of settings across the globe” (p.14).  
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed prior literature in relation to the changing nature of 
MAPs and management accounting change as process (Yazdifar, 2004; Siti-
Nabiha, 2000), as opposed to the more conventional view of management 
accounting change as a static and linear phenomenon. More specifically, the 
chapter has explored different themes in the literature, as follows. Firstly, 
section 2.3.5.1 explored how the mobilisation of power can be undertaken by 
managers (or by other means) to shape how MA, as a process of change 
evolves. For instance, all of the studies reviewed in the chapter have 
emphasised the importance of ‘power over resources’ in influencing change 
through action, especially top-down change which is imposed by senior 
managers or parent companies (Hardy, 1996). Other extant studies have 
highlighted how the ‘power of the system’ influences change processes and 
that, in the absence of any questioning of such embedded power, other sources 
of power are unlikely to achieve institutional change (Burns 2000). Many of the 
past studies covered in this chapter recommend longitudinal case studies to 
understand the importance and role of power in shaping how MA change, as 
processes, unfolds over time (Burns and Scapens, 2000). As Burns and 
Scapens (ibid, pp.22-3) concluded,: “in studying the ways in which management 
accounting change can influence organizational behaviour, it is important to 
recognize the role of power in processes of change”. 
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Second, the literature review highlighted a gap in knowledge in relation to the 
effect of rewards systems in shaping the processes of MA change. Existing 
literature conveys contradictory results in this respect; some studies show a 
positive relationship between change and the rewards system; while other 
studies have argued that rewards are not always positively related to change. 
Furthermore, the majority of this past literature is premised on studying variable 
relationships, rather than being process-oriented research; and more focus is 
needed in relation to how reward systems shape MA change processes over 
time. 
Third, as explained in Section 2.4, it is not possible to ignore the effects of the 
broader context in shaping the processes of MA change. Different prior studies 
have identified the importance of conducting more MA research in developing 
countries (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Mat el al., 2010, Hoque, 2014), where 
the operating environment is dissimilar to that of developed countries, and 
MAPs that may be ‘workable’ in a developed national context are not 
necessarily so in a developing country’s context. Aligned to this, it was 
explained that Burns and Scapens’ (2000) institutional framework of MA change 
should (and will be) used here to explore MA change as a process in a 
developing country context (i.e., Oman) 
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CHAPTER 3 : THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, literature relating to the changing nature of MAPs was 
reviewed. It was concluded there that many studies called for more research in 
this area. Specifically different studies called for the conducting of research 
based on field research in order to get a deeper understanding of the 
complexities and interdependency between MAPs as organisational routines 
and as existing institutions within an organisation. This chapter thus introduces 
the theoretical framework used to interpret the empirical findings of this 
research. As the main research purpose here is to explore the changing nature 
of MAPs and the ways in which management accounting, as a process of 
change, evolves within an Omani non-oil-related manufacturing company 
(Packco); and how different change dynamics, including: rules, routines, and 
institution, shape and are shaped by the evolvement of management 
accounting as a process of change. Then, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
management accounting change framework will be used, mainly as a lens 
through which to explain the case study findings. Moreover, Hardy’s (1996) 
framework of power and political mobilisation will be drawn from to accompany 
Burns and Scapens (2000) theoretical ideas. It is important to state here that 
Burns and Scapens management accounting change framework is the primary 
theoretical lens for this thesis, and the utilisation of Hardy’s (1996) power 
framework is considered to be a supplement to Burns and Scapens (2000) MA 
change as process framework. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: the next section will introduce the 
core assumptions of old institutional economics theory (OIE hereafter); which is 
the broader theoretical frame that informs Burns and Scapens (2000) 
perspective on management accounting as process of change, Following that, 
the use of OIE theoretical assumptions in MA research will be introduced in 
Section 3.2.2. Then the process of institutionalisation, according to Burns’ and 
Scapens’ (2000) framework, will be covered in the following section with types 
of management accounting change. After that, Hardy’s power and political 
mobilisation (1996) framework is introduced, as well as explanations of why and 
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how this complements Burns and Scapens (2000) management accounting 
change framework. 
3.2. Institutional theory- a main focus on OIE 
There are different strands of institutional theory; three of them have exerted the 
most influence on accounting research, namely: (1) old institutional economics, 
OIE (Veblen, 1919; Nelson and Winter, 1982), (2) new institutional economics, 
NIE (North, 1978; Coase, 1984; Williamson, 1987), and (3) new institutional 
sociology, NIS (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983). This section thus gives a general 
view of these three strands, with a focus on OIE theory. As the main findings of 
this research can mostly be related and explained through the OIE theory’s 
lens, this will be detailed later in this chapter.  
Although the three stands of institutional theory do differ in terms of defining 
institutions, they share a common concern that institutions matter and should be 
endogenised into our theoretical and empirical research. As such, “Institutions, 
according to the NIE approach, essentially exist where their benefits exceed the 
costs involved in creating and maintaining them” (Moll et. al., 2006, p.186). 
While NIS theory argues that organisations are operating in a very highly 
institutionalised environment. NIS has defined environment, in this sense, as 
the “cultural rules and social norms that are reflected in specific formal 
structures and procedures of the organisation”, rather than “merely as a source 
of task constraints or a relation network that poses demands for operational 
coordination and control on an organisation” (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006, p.96). 
Finally, according to OIE theory, institution, as explained by Walton Hamilton 
(1932, p.84) is “a way of thought or action of some prevalence or permanence, 
which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people”. As 
such, and as this research focuses on how different institutions within an 
organisation shape, and are shaped, by change as a process; then the 
assumptions of OIE theory will be utilised to explain the empirical nature of this 
research, instead of the other two strands of institutional theory (Adams, 1994; 
Guerreiro et al., 2006; Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). 
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3.2.1. Core assumptions of OIE  
The origins of OIE theory can be traced back to the works of the social theorist, 
Thorstein Veblen (e.g., Veblen, 1898, 1899). In his works Veblen (1899, 1919), 
tried to develop an economic theory based on institutional evolutionary 
assumptions. Veblen’s work “shares common features with some of the 
attempts made by other economists, like: Alchian (1950), Friedrich Hayek 
(1988), to use evolutionary metaphors from biology” to develop an economic 
theory (Hodgson, 1998, p.167). Additionally, his work is based on rejecting the 
rational economic man assumption that is based on neoclassical theory (ibid, 
p.167). OIE differs from the neo-classical theory in the sense that the former 
focuses on the process of change, rather than on the outcomes of the process, 
while the latter focuses on executive summaries to conduct statistical 
comparison between different outputs (Veblen, 1919; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Though OIE does not reject the assumption of utility maximisation within 
organisations; OIE mainly explains the process by referring to the 
institutionalised rules and routines, instead of depending on the rational thinking 
of individuals (Rutherford, 1995). Precisely, institutions, habits, rules, routines, 
and their evolution, represent the core ideas of institutionalism and economic 
analysis (Hodgson, 1988; Nelson, 1995; Nelson and Winter, 2002; Hodgson, 
2006). This section therefore explores the main assumptions of an OIE 
approach. 
Veblen (1919) defined habit as “an acquired proclivity or capacity, which may or 
may not be actually expressed in current behaviour” (Hodgson, 2004, p.652). 
Hodgson (1998) stressed the importance of deploying rules and habits in socio-
economic theory. In OIE, habit is a core concept and it is central to the 
formation of institutions (Hodgson, 1998, p.180). In other words, “habits are the 
constitutive material of institutions, providing them with enhanced durability, 
power and normative authority. In turn, by reproducing shared habits of thought, 
institutions create strong mechanisms of confirmation and normative 
agreement” (Hodgson, 2006, pp144-145). According to Hodgson (1998), habit 
develops by repeated application of rule. Consequently, Hodgson (ibid.) defined 
rules as “conditional or unconditional patterns of thought or behaviour which can 
be adopted either consciously or unconsciously by agents. Generally rules have 
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the form: in circumstances X, do Y” (p.185). Unlike habits, rules do not 
necessarily have a self-actuating or autonomic quality; but by applying rules 
repeatedly, a rule can become a habit. Habit is thus established by repeated 
behaviour and repeated behaviour is important for that, but they are not the 
same, i.e., habit and behaviour. Habit, to Veblen (1919), is a propensity to 
behave in a particular way in a particular class of situations; and as such it is 
not necessary to use the acquired habit all the time.  
In contrast to the key assumption of neo-classical theory19, non-rational human 
behaviour in economic decision making can be explained by institutional 
economics as the “thirst of power and adventure, a sense of independence, and 
habit” which may represent “powerful motivations of economic behaviour” 
(Wilber and Harrison, 1978, p.72). Moreover, according to Hodgson (1998, 
p.169), “an institutionalist would stress the need to show how specific groups of 
common habits are embedded in, and reinforced by, specific social institutions”. 
He added that institutionalists, in OIE theory, enforced the importance of 
individuals and their preferences by stating that “individuals interact to form 
institutions, while individual purposes or preferences also are moulded by socio-
economic conditions; the individual is both a producer and a product of her 
circumstances” (p.177). Hodgson (1998) emphasises the importance of 
deploying rules and habits and analysing their evolution even with the pecuniary 
rationality of agents in a market economy and this “should be installed at the 
core of economics and social theory” (p.185). 
According to Adams (1994), it is thus important to put individual behaviour in a 
social context in order to understand how people will respond to changes in that 
social context. Accordingly, OIE based studies believe that individuals’ 
behaviour is shaped by institutionalised rules and values within the social 
setting in which they are operating (Soin et al., 2002; Ribeiro and Scapens, 
2006; Länsiluoto and Järvenpää, 2008; Ter Bogt, 2008; Johansson and 
Siverbo, 2009; Mbelwa, 2015). Consequently, “the concept of the rational, 
maximising individual does not make sense to the institutionalist, since the 
                                            
19
 The key assumptions of neo-classical theory will be briefly described in Section 3. 
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individual does not exist separately from his or her environment” (Siti-Nabiha, 
2000, p.60). 
While habit is related to an individual propensity to act at the individual level, 
routine is analogous to habits, but at the organisational level (Quinn, 2011; Jack 
and Mundy, 2013; Börner and Verstegen, 2013; Oliveira and Quinn, 2015). 
Specifically, “when habits become a common part of a group or a social culture 
they grow into routines or customs” (Hodgson, 1998, p.180; Commons, 1934). 
According to Hodgson (2006), the habit concept is therefore needed in order to 
understand the concept of routine, for two reasons. First, “routines operate 
through the triggering of individual habits. Second, routines are the 
organisational analogue of individual habits” (p.203). In their book, Nelson and 
Winter (1982), have used the term ‘routine’ in two different ways, sometimes 
they refer to routine as ‘dispositions’, and at other times as ‘behavior’. However, 
later, Winter (1995), distinguished between a “routine in operation at a particular 
site” and a “routine per se – the abstract activity pattern” (pp. 169-70; Quinn, 
2011; p. 341). Although different definitions of routine are provided by Winter 
(1995), it is not applicable to use the term routine to represent both definitions, 
and it should thus be represented by one of the two definitions (Hodgson, 
2006). Accordingly, Hodgson has argued that “the essence of what an entity is 
cannot be conflated with what an entity does”, and a definition of routine cannot 
donate both to potentiality and actuality (p.206). Hodgson thus refers to 
routines, and has stated “routines are not behaviour; they are stored behaviour 
capacities or capabilities” (Hodgson, 2004, p.7). Hodgson (2006) has also 
mentioned that habits and routines are rule-like potentialities or dispositions, 
rather than behaviour. Similarly to habit, the reproduction or replication of the 
same behaviour within a socio-economic context develops routine in an 
organisation (Hodgson, 2004; Quinn, 2014). Nevertheless, “the replication of 
routines must involve the replication of the generative structures and capacities 
that are additional to the habits of the individuals involved” (Hodgson, 2006, 
p.212). Put precisely, the replication of routines involves not only the transfer of 
skills from a master to an apprentice, but it involves the transfer of tacit and 
codified knowledge. Which is “transferred as a result of repeated practice, often 
with similar stimuli and constraints” (Hodgson, 2006, p.212). Habits and routines 
thus preserve knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge in relation to skills, and 
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institutions act through time as their transmission belt (Hodgson, 1998, p.180). 
Below, more details are provided in relation to the institution, and its importance 
in old institutional economic theory. 
According to Hodgson (1998), the basic unit of analysis in OIE theory is the 
institution, as institutions portray a long standing stability if compared to an 
individual’s habits. This was explained by Hodgson as follows: “the fact that 
institutions typically portray a degree of invariance over long periods of time, 
and may outlast individuals, provides a reason for choosing institutions rather 
than individuals’ habits as a basic unit” (p.172). In addition, institutions exist 
before the individuals that relate to them, and therefore institutions and their 
specific features are a core concept for economic institutionalists, rather than 
focusing on building a general and ahistorical model of the individual agent20 
(Hodgson, 1998). Accordingly, the father of economic institutionalism, Veblen 
(1919), defined institution as: 
“…settled habits of thought common to the generality of men” (Veblen, 
1919, p.239).  
Later, (1932), Hamilton elaborated on Veblen’s definition of institution, and he 
saw institution as: 
 “..a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, 
which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people” 
(p.84) 
Although an institution is the main unit of analysis in OIE theory, it cannot be 
understood without reference to the role of habits, rules and routines in 
explaining how institutions evolve, thus “both individuals and institutions are 
mutually constitutive of each other. In others words, institutions shape and are 
shaped by human actions” (Hodgson, 1998, p. 181). Alternatively, “institutions 
both constrain and enable behaviour. The existence of rules implies constraints. 
However, such a constraint can open up possibilities; it may enable choices and 
                                            
20
 However, the proposed alternative is not a methodological collectivism where individual behavior is 
entirely explained by the institutional or cultural environment. Complete explanations of parts in terms of 
wholes are beset with problems of equivalent stature to those of the inverse procedure. Just as structures 
cannot be adequately explained in terms of individuals, individuals cannot adequately be explained in 
terms of structures (Hodgson, 1998, p.172). 
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actions that otherwise would not exist” (p.139). As an illustration, different rules 
such as, traffic and language, allow individuals to interact within some 
restrictions, but “regulation is not always the antithesis of freedom; it can be its 
ally” (Hodgson, 2006, p.139).  
In economic institutionalism, human activity is perceived of as being 
evolutionary, dynamic and in a constant process of change. More precisely, 
economic institutionalists perceive economic phenomena as evolving, ongoing 
and developing entities, and they are not seen as starting from, and moving 
towards, conditions of equilibrium. The analysis of economic phenomena based 
on economic institutionalism is therefore processual and evolutionary (Wilber 
and Harrison, 1978; Gruchy, 1990; Hodgson, 1998; Siti-Nabiha, 2000). 
According to Gruchy (1990, p.365) understanding the factors that contribute to 
change is important in economic analysis.  He stated that: 
“It is clear that the most significant feature of a processual paradigm is 
its emphasis upon change and development over historical time. Since 
the processual concept is based on historical time, and history is 
continuously changing, one must inquire into the significance of the 
factors leading to change in the economic system.” 
As such, the processual paradigm is a way of perceiving the nature of economic 
reality in old institutional economics (Gruchy, 1990). This paradigm21 argues 
that the economic reality has substance and structure. Institutionalists perceive 
the substance of economic system as an evolving, ongoing, and developing 
entity. Over time, “the structure of the economic system functions in response to 
political, demographic, and climatic factors, and to scientific advance and 
technological change” (Gruchy, 1990, p.364). For Gruchy (1990), Veblen (1898) 
stated the need to develop a theory formulating the concept of evolving process 
in the economic system; and different institutionalists, for example Clark (1936), 
made attempts to develop such a theoretical formulation, but they were unable 
to fill such a gap. Adams (1994), tried to develop a theoretical concept which 
takes into account the nature of institutions as a means of investigating 
individual actions, while also not ignoring individual ideas and values; instead of 
translating any biological evolutionary theory and using it to explain social 
                                            
21
 More details of the processual approach will be provided later in the methodology chapter 
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evolution phenomenon. Moreover, Dawson (1997) argues that processual 
research helps the researcher to explain how the change process unfolds, and 
how the different change process dynamics, substance, context, and politics, 
interact and shape the change process. As such, “this type of research can 
question many of the taken-for-granted assumptions about change and allow us 
to see issues which have previously remained hidden” (p.1). Section 3.2.3 
explores how Burns and Scapens (2000) developed a management accounting 
change processual framework that is based on the core assumptions of OIE.  
As mentioned above, the core concepts in economic institutionalism relate to 
rules, habits, routines, and institutions, and how they evolve. However, there is 
no single general model built by economic institutionalists that is based on 
those core concepts. Instead, “these ideas facilitate a strong impetus toward 
specific and historically located approaches to analysis” (Hodgson, 1998, 
p.168). And institutionalists employ those limited core concepts to explain and 
analyse complex economic phenomena (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005). 
Hence the core assumptions of OIE having been introduced, above, the 
following section will explore the utilisation of OIE assumptions in MA research.  
3.2.2. Use of OIE theory in management accounting  
This section explores the use of OIE theory core assumptions in conducting 
management accounting research.  Section 3.2, above, explored briefly three 
different streams of institutional theory, with more focus on OIE core 
assumptions. As the purpose of this research focuses on exploring how MA, as 
a process of change, evolves within an organisation, then assumptions of old 
institutional economics will be consulted here by referring to the argument of 
Scapens (1994), and Burns and Scapens (2000), in relation to the usage of OIE 
theory in management accounting research. 
The utilisation of social theories for accounting research emerged as a result of 
the rejection of neo-classical theory’s ontological and methodological 
assumptions that are based on the rational thinking of individuals within 
organisations in terms of profit maximisation. Neoclassical economics considers  
accounting “as an objectively neutral set of measurement techniques" 
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(Humphrey and Scapens, 1996, p.89), grounded in assumptions of rational 
behaviour and optimisation; that are concentrating on finding the optimum 
solution for organisations and which define management accounting as a set of 
measurement techniques that help organisations to achieve such profit 
maximisation goals (Williamson, 1975; Baiman, 1990; Wilson and Chua, 1993; 
Lucas, 2003; Bromwich and Scapens, 2016). Moreover, based on neoclassical 
economics theory, “custom and habit ignored; competition was glorified and the 
changing nature of technology, business organization, and the role of the state 
was totally omitted” (Wilber and Harrison, 1978, p.64). Specifically, neoclassical 
economics theory is premised on the following key assumptions:  rationality, 
utility maximisation and markets as structure for equilibrium (Tomkins, 1990; 
Spekle, 2001; Lambert, 2001; Covaleski et al., 2003). 
In his study, Scapens (1994) identified a gap between management accounting 
theory,22 and management accounting in practice, and argued that there is no 
comprehensive theoretical framework with which to study management 
accounting in practice. He stated that such a framework should differ from 
theories that are based on the neoclassical assumptions of economic rationality 
and market equilibrium, i.e., costly contracting economics and transaction cost 
economics, as mentioned above. As such, Scapens (1994) demonstrated that 
accounting researchers “are encouraged to study the practice of management 
accounting as the outcome of institutional processes in which habits and 
routines evolve to give coherence and meaning to organizational behaviour” 
(p.316). In his study, Scapens (1994) proposed a framework that should provide 
a useful starting point for case studies and that was designed to give us better 
understandings of management accounting practices (p.305). Consequently, 
Scapens (1994) found OIE an avenue for the analysis of social institutions and 
processes which govern economic activities within an organisation. He 
proposed an alternative approach to studying management accounting based 
on OIE theory’s assumptions, as explored above. Scapens (1994) argues that 
conducting management accounting research based on OIE theory’s 
assumptions “encourages researchers to look seriously at the nature of all 
                                            
22
 Management accounting theory here refers to the theoretical material in management accounting 
textbooks, which was intended to show practitioners how management accounting should be done 
(Scapens, 1994, p.301) 
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management accounting practices, and not to dismiss those practices which do 
not conform to some theoretical ideal” (p.301). 
As neoclassical theory helps researchers to predict behaviour at the macro-
level, i.e., the industry or the market, and not to predict the behaviour of 
employees within organisations, i.e., the micro-level (Scapens, 1994); 
researchers therefore proposed the use of institutional theory in accounting in 
order to explore accounting as a social phenomenon that is produced as a 
result of the interaction between different people within the organisation, as well 
as the interaction between the organisation and the outside environment (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000; Scapens, 2006; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). As such, 
there has been a shift in the way research is conducted in the field of 
management accounting, from descriptive-approaches-based to other 
alternative approaches that are used so as to have a holistic (see below) 
understanding of how management accounting practices and systems evolve in 
their social context (Johnson, 1996; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). According to 
Wilber and Harrison, 1978, p.71: 
“Institutional economics can be characterized as holistic, systemic, 
and evolutionary. The process of social change is not purely 
mechanical; it is the product of human action, but action which is 
definitely shaped and limited by the society in which it has its roots. 
Thus, institutionalism is holistic because it focuses on the pattern of 
relations among parts and the whole”. 
 Accordingly, based on a holistic view of management accounting change as a 
process, the utilisation of universal laws is not applicable for reality 
explanations; instead, such a phenomenon “is explained by identifying its place 
in a pattern that characterizes the ongoing processes of change in the whole 
system” (ibid, p.73). As such, when research’s purpose is to predict economic 
behaviour at market level, then neoclassical theory is suitable for such research 
purposes; but if the research purpose is to focus on individual behaviour within 
organisations, then neoclassical economic theory would not be applicable to 
such research (Scapens, 1990, Vaivio, 2008; Burns, 2014; Nørreklit et al., 
2016). Moreover, research based on the neoclassical approach is able to 
answer questions related to how two variables can affect each other when 
everything else is frozen, as mentioned above. As this research is more related 
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to finding answers to questions about how and why an individual organisation is 
applying specific management accounting practices and to explore how MA, as 
process of change , evolves. Neoclassical economics theory is not applicable 
to, and  therefore, Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as process 
framework will be consulted here as a theoretical lens through which to explain 
how management accounting change as a process has evolved within the case 
study company, as will be explored in Chapter (7). Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) 
framework basic assumptions are derived from OIE’s core assumptions, and it 
explores how the management accounting change process unfolds, and how 
management accounting becomes institutionalised within an organisation over 
time. The following section introduces Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change 
as process framework. 
3.2.3. The institutionalist framework of change- focus on Burns’ and 
Scapens’ (2000) management accounting change framework  
As mentioned above, in Section 3.2.1, different researchers of OIE theory have 
tried to develop a theoretical framework through which to explain the process of 
institutionalisation in order to illuminate the social evolution of the phenomenon 
(Clark, 1936; Gruchy, 1990; Adams, 1994). Consequently, and drawing on OIE 
theory’s main assumptions, Burns and Scapens (2000) developed a framework 
through which to study the changing nature of MA as a process, and how it 
unfolds over time. According to Burns and Scapens (2000), institutionalised 
practice is a practice that, as time passes, comes to “underpin the taken-for-
granted ways of thinking and doing in a particular organisation” (p.5). 
Organisations are governed by different institutions, and those institutions can 
shape management accounting practices and also be shaped by MAPs. This 
section focuses on Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) management accounting 
change process framework and demonstrates the development of this 
framework, based on the main assumptions of OIE that were explained in the 
previous.  
Different definitions of institutions are used in OIE, but the most common one is 
the definition developed by Hamilton (1932), as mentioned above: “a way of 
thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in 
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the habits of a group or the customs of a people” (p.84). Based on this definition 
of institutions, it is argued by Burns and Scapens (2000) that institutions impose 
and create coherence in human activity, “through the production and 
reproduction of settled habits of thought and action” (p.6). However, at the same 
time, the routinisation of human activities is what creates institutions. Hence, 
"there is a duality between action (human activity) and the institutions which 
structure that activity" (ibid, p.6) 
Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework, tries to explain the relationship between 
institutions and actions by exploring the role of rules and routines of developing 
such relationship. They refer to rules as the formally recognised way in which 
things should be done, and routines, for them, are defined as the way in which 
things are actually done. While institution is defined as “the shared taken-for-
granted assumptions which identify categories of human actors and their 
appropriate activities and relationships” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.8). As 
such, institutions comprise the taken-for-granted assumptions which inform and 
shape the actions of individual actors. However, at the same time, these taken-
for-granted assumptions are themselves the outcome of social actions. 
Accordingly, institutions are the structural properties which define the relations 
between, and the activities of, the members of particular social groups or 
communities (ibid, p.8). Habits and routines become institutionalised through 
the production and reproduction of them through time, "which is a gradual and 
in some sense natural process through which specific patterns of thought and 
action become widespread and taken-for-granted as the way things are done" 
(Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006, p.98, Burns and Scapens, 2000; Scapens, 2006). 
According to Scapens (1994), institutions thus can be explicitly analysed as 
dynamic and active instruments which can facilitate or prevent change; i.e., 
institutions have both constraining and enabling qualities. Institutions constrain 
individual actions as institutionalised routines develop a fixed pattern for human 
action, and institutions enable human actions, as they provide information which 
enables individual to act in an uncertain environment (Scapens, 1994,p. 305-
p.306; Boland, 1979).  
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Consequently, the following section introduces the ways in which rules become 
routinised, and then institutionalised, based on Burns and Scapens (2000) 
management accounting change process framework.  
3.2.3.1. Process of institutionalisation  
As mentioned earlier, this research’s purpose is to explore how MA, as process 
of change, unfolds over time, and how different dynamics, including: rules, 
routines, and institutions; shape the ways in which the change process evolves 
within an organisation. Consequently, this section introduces the process of 
institutionalisation, based on the seminal paper of Burns and Scapens (2000). 
Drawing on the main assumptions of OIE, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
developed a framework that explores the complexity and interdependency 
between actions and institutions, and that “demonstrates the importance of 
organizational routines and institutions in shaping the process of management 
accounting change” (p.3).  
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Figure 3-1: The Process of institutionalisation (Source: Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.9) 
In Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework, there are thus two realms, which are: 
the institutional realm and the actions realm and, in between, rules and routines 
explain the relationship between those two realms (see Figure 3-1 above). 
There are differences in the time effect of each realm, "whereas institutions 
constrain and shape action synchronically, actions produce and reproduce 
institutions diachronically" (ibid, p.9). The synchronic processes are represented 
by arrows (a and b), while the arrows (c and d) represent the diachronic 
processes (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.10). All elements of the framework are 
“ongoing in a cumulative process of change in time, but from time-to-time new 
rules (and new routines) may be introduced (or emerge) in a more discrete way” 
and the separate boxes demonstrate this (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.10).  
A new rule, for instance, the adoption of a new MAP, could emerge within an 
organisation for different reasons; which could include pressures by head office 
on branches to adopt similar MAPs to that used by the head office. As such, 
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and according to Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework, a newly emerged rule 
may be modified, either deliberately or unconsciously. Deliberate change may 
occur due to resistance to the new rule, while unconscious change may occur 
when the new rule is misunderstood. Accordingly, a routine will emerge through 
the production and reproduction of a new rule, over time. A new rule can 
emerge from an organisational routine; either in the case where the routine 
deviates from the original rule, or when it has never previously been set out as a 
rule. The formalisation of such routine into a rule thus helps to avoid losing 
organisational knowledge. Hence, "there can be a two-way relationship between 
rules and routines" (ibid, p.7).  
Each arrow represents a process, and the whole change process is explained 
by the interaction between those four arrows. According to Burns and Scapens 
(2000), arrow (a) represents the first process in the framework; in this process 
the existing/new rules and routines encode the prevailing organisational 
institutions. This encoding process will form new rules; those new rules will 
result in the formation and/or reformation of ongoing routines. Enacting the 
routines (rules), that encode an institutional principle, by the actors, is 
represented by (arrow b), which is considered to be the second process in the 
framework. The enactment process is mostly a process of reflection on tacit 
knowledge about how things are done, though conscious choice may be 
involved in this process. If the enacted routines (rules) conflict with (or 
challenge) the existing institutions, then those routines (rules) may be subject to 
resistance, especially if the actors have enough power to interfere with the 
enactment process. However,  
“…in the absence of external changes, such as advances in 
technology, or a take-over-crisis, there is unlikely to be a reopening of 
previously agreed arrangements and therefore routines may become 
somewhat resistant to change. Nevertheless, change can take place” 
(Burns and Scapens, 200 0, p.10). 
In the third process (arrow c) in this framework, routines are reproduced due to 
repetition of the same behaviour, and this can involve conscious or unconscious 
change, as stated above. When actors are able to question the existing rules 
and routines by using resources and rational thinking, then conscious change is 
expected to follow. However, the lack of systems to monitor the implementation 
82 
 
of the routines, and in cases where rules and routines are not fully understood 
and/or accepted by actors, this may then mean that unconscious change may 
occur (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.10)  
Institutionalisation of rules and routines which are reproduced by the behaviour 
of individual actors are represented by (arrow d) which is the fourth process in 
the framework. Due to institutionalisation, rules and routines take a normative 
and factual quality because they are disassociated from their historical patterns; 
which gives an unclear relationship between different actors and those routines 
and rules. By being the way things are done, rules and routines represent 
institutions; which are encoded again in the existing rules and routines, and 
which produce new rules, as in the process represented by arrow (a), above, 
and so on (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.11). 
In summary, new rules can emerge from existing routines, or they can be 
imposed, implemented over time and become a routine. In both cases, the 
process of enacting and reproducing rules and routines is an ongoing process, 
and  “more discrete changes may take place-as represented by the movement 
form the first to the second box of rules and routines” in Figure 3-1, above. 
Having said this, it is important not to ignore the role of existing institutions in 
shaping new rules and routines (dotted horizontal lines between the two rules 
and routines boxes represent this) as “institutions always exist prior to any 
attempt by the actors to introduce change” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.11). 
Accordingly,  
“…institutions are the structural properties which comprise the taken-
for-granted assumptions about the way of doing things, which shape 
and constrain the rules and routines, and determine the meanings, 
values, and also powers of the individual actors”. Institutions exist only 
on the tacit knowledge of individuals and are more abstract than rules 
and routines, as they are disassociated from the historical 
circumstances which developed them. The process of 
institutionalization is an ongoing process, and not a distinct identifiable 
movement. Finally, the more widely and deeply the institution is 
accepted; the more likely it is to influence action and to resist change" 
(ibid.).  
Based on Burns and Scapens management accounting change as a process 
framework, management accounting practices are thus considered 
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organisational routines, which may be institutionalised and became the taken-
for-granted ways of doing things. Such routines emerge, either consciously or 
unconsciously, as explained above. Burns and Scapens (2000) argued that 
different change dynamics shape how the change process evolves, including: 
institutions, rule, and routines. The following section will introduce the different 
types of management accounting change processes that were introduced by 
Burns and Scapens (2000). 
3.2.3.1.1. Types of management accounting change processes 
Three dichotomies were found in the OIE writings, which provide ways of 
classifying and distinguishing between the different types of change processes. 
Burns and Scapens (2000) mentioned those dichotomies briefly, and they are: 
(1) formal versus informal change; (2) revolutionary versus evolutionary change; 
and (3) regressive versus progressive change. Below, those three dichotomies 
are explored in some detail. 
• Formal versus informal management accounting change as a process 
According to Burns and Scapens (2000), formal change occurs by conscious 
design. For example, a parent company may force its subsidiaries to introduce 
a new management accounting practice that is similar to the one it is adopting, 
through the mobilisation of power. While informal change occurs at a more tacit 
level; for example, through the process of enacting and reacting to routines; 
routines may be adapted to changing operating conditions and can then be 
introduced as a new rule (ibid, 2000).  
Accordingly, to achieve a successful implementation of formal change, informal 
change should not lag behind formal change. Since, if formal change introduced 
without paying attention to employees’ ways of thinking, then tension and 
anxiety may arise. This could lead to resistance to the change and, eventually, 
to failure to implement the change (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Having said 
that, when a change agent possesses sufficient power, such formal change can 
be imposed, even if the change is incompatible with established ways of 
thinking (Guerreiro et al., 2006; Spraakman, 2006; Moilanen, 2008; Hassan, 
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2008; Jabbour and Abdel-Kader, 2016). On the other hand, “if other key 
individuals or groups have sufficient power, for instance, through the control of 
resources required in the implementation process, they may be able to resist or 
subvert the change process” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.19; Burns, 2000; 
Kholeif et al., 2007; Claude Mutiganda, 2014; Alsharari et al., 2015). 
To understand the differences between formal and informal change, Burns and 
Scapens (2000) compared them to intentional and unintentional change, as 
explored earlier in this chapter. In other words, intentional change can be linked 
to the introduction of a new rule, while rules which evolve at a tacit and more 
subconscious level can be described as unintentional change. In view of that, 
intentional change is easier to observe than unintentional change; and both 
types of change are important, since accounting change, as a process, is a 
mixture of both (ibid). According to Burns and Scapens (2000) the level of 
difficulty in investigating formal versus informal management accounting change 
as a process, differs, as it is more difficult to explore the informal management 
accounting change compared to the formal, since  the formal management 
accounting change is easy to observe and follow. To explore informal change in 
accounting research it thus is argued, by Burns and Scapens (2000), that to 
look for change in other aspects of organisational activity, then one should 
explore such change’s impact on management accounting practices. 
However, at a more practical level, imposed or top-down management 
accounting change is expected to be formal change, and it has a direct effect on 
formal rules, i.e., the introduction of a new management accounting practice; 
but limited effect, or an indirect one, on the existing ways of thinking and doing 
things, at least initially, for example, the introduction of the BSC at PackCo 
represents a formal top-down management accounting change23. Whereas, 
informal change can be described as bottom-up change; where organisation 
members who use management accounting practices on a daily basis initiate 
such a change, which impacts on the tacit level of employees and shapes both 
informal and formal management accounting change as a process. As an 
example, the implementation of the new ERP system within PackCo can be 
                                            
23
 See Chapter 7 for more details  
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described as being an informal bottom-up MA change, as will be detailed in 
Chapter 7 (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.19) 
• Revolutionary versus evolutionary management accounting change as 
a process 
The second type of management accounting change as a process, as 
described in Burns and Scapens (2000), is ‘revolutionary versus evolutionary’ 
change. Accounting researchers can differentiate between the two types of 
change as a process through identifying the degree of disruption caused by the 
change to existing routines and institutions, since when the disruption is 
fundamental that will be considered a revolutionary change, and if it is 
incremental and minor, then it will be an evolutionary change (Edwards et al., 
2002; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Sharma, 2009; Busco and Scapens, 
2011; Leotta and Ruggeri, 2012). Unlike revolutionary change, which 
challenges existing institutions, evolutionary change introduces changes which 
are mainly consistent with the existing ways of thinking about and doing things. 
It is important for the management accounting researcher not to be confused 
about the content of the change, i.e., the introduction of specific management 
accounting practices or systems. Instead, they should focus on the effect of 
such change on existing ways of thinking, and that is what determines whether 
the change is revolutionary or evolutionary. Whilst “in practice, it is possible for 
an apparently quite minor management accounting change to have major 
institutional consequences, while what appears a rather more significant 
management accounting change may have only a limited impact on existing 
routines and institutions” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.20) 
• Regressive versus progressive management accounting change as a 
process 
The third type of management accounting change as a process is ‘regressive 
versus progressive’, Burns and Scapens (2000) referred to the work of Bush 
(1987) and Tool (1993) to explain this type of change process. Tool (1993), 
differentiated between ceremonial and instrumental behaviour by stating that  
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“ceremonial behaviour emerges from a value system which 
discriminates between human beings and preserves existing power 
structures, whereas instrumental behaviour emerges from a value 
system which applies the best available knowledge and technology to 
problems and seeks to enhance relationships” (Burns and Scapens, 
2000, p.20).  
As such, any behaviour which reinforces ceremonial dominance and restricts 
institutional change has been labelled by Tool (1993) as being regressive; while 
progressive change describes instrumental behaviour, which replaces 
ceremonial behaviour. Even if there is this ceremonial dominance, progressive 
change can thus take place, “because new technology can incite the 
questioning of previously dominant, ceremonial values” (Burns and Scapens, 
2000, p.20). When conducting management accounting research, it is important 
to discern whether management accounting routines are ceremonial (Dillard et 
al., 2004; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Hopper et al., 2008; Norhayati and 
Siti-Nabiha, 2009; Kholeif, 2010). If that is the case, then those routines 
“preserve the power of particular vested interests and potentially hinder the 
development of new organizational activities”, such as the introduction of new 
production techniques (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.20). This would help the 
researcher to explore the effect of the power dimension in institutionalised 
management accounting routines. 
3.2.4. Limitations of Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) MA change as process 
framework 
It is certain that drawing insights from Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework is 
supportive in exploring process of the institutionalisation and introduction of MA 
change, e.g., introducing a new performance evaluation system. Their 
framework explains how management accounting change, as a process, 
evolves. This seminal work focuses also on resisting a change and explains 
how and why management accounting remains unchanged and becomes 
institutionalised, i.e., taken-for-granted assumption. Despite that, and having 
dealt with the core assumptions and general nature of Burns’ and Scapens’ 
framework, this framework is not without limitations (Scapens, 2006; Ribeiro 
and Scapens, 2006; Ammar, 2014).  
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The first limitation is related to incentive schemes and the effect of such 
schemes in shaping how MA change as a process unfolds over time (Hoque, 
2014). Although Burns (2000) indicated that “on occasions, though not always, 
momentum in change is enhanced by the deployment of incentives for those 
most affected” (p.590). However, the Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as 
a process framework did not dealt with this issue in detail. In particular, the 
framework did not consider incentives schemes to be an important dynamic 
which may shape the MA change process differently than planned. Specifically, 
and as will be explored later in this research, Burns and Scapens (2000) MA 
change as process framework had limitation in explaining how to link new MAP 
rules with employees’ performance evaluations, i.e., incentives; since these 
shaped the implementation of the BSC within PackCo differently than had been 
planned by Dubai head-office. This forced the head-office and the top managers 
at PackCo to adopt the new rules according to the existing accountability 
system, as well as in line with the requirements of top managers, either at the 
Oman unit or in the Dubai head-office. This therefore preserved the existing 
ways of doing things, i.e., accountability according to the number of customers 
served; but with a twist that ensures managers that things are done in 
accordance with the new ways of doings things, i.e., emphasising the 
importance of on time response and delivery to customers.   
Second, although Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework credits the 
importance of power and powerful individuals in their framework but only does 
so implicitly. This also represents a limitation of the framework. Specifically, the 
framework has a limitation in explaining why the implementation of BSC within 
PackCo that was forced on them by the Dubai head-office, was not resisted by 
the Omani unit’s employees, despite such an initiative being inconsistent with 
the existing accountability institution, see Chapter 7 (Yang and Modell, 2012). 
As Ribeiro (2003) has argued, management accounting rules and routines were 
held in place by power rather than by taken-for-granted assumptions, and thus 
power, and different sources of power, explained the lack of resistance to the 
newly imposed MAP, rather than the institution (Hassan, 2005; Ribeiro and 
Scapens, 2006; Länsiluoto and Järvenpää, 2010; Kerttula and Takala, 2012; 
Youssef, 2013; Claude Mutiganda, 2014; Francioli and Quagli, 2016) 
88 
 
Such limitations can be dealt with by drawing insights from the existing 
management accounting literature on incentive schemes and management 
accounting change as a process,24 and by drawing insights also from Hardy’s 
(1996) power mobilisation framework, as will be explored in the next section, 
which proposes an extension to Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework. 
3.3. Power and politics, Hardy’s (1996) power framework  
Though OIE theory emphasises the importance of power and politics in shaping 
organisational change as a process (Wilber and Harrison, 1978), and although 
Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework acknowledges, and only highlights, the 
effect of power on the management accounting change as a process, and since 
Pfeffer (1992) emphasised the importance of power and influence and their 
social consequences in organisations. It is therefore important to explore the 
power dimension and its effect on organisational change as a process, in some 
detail. By ignoring “issues of power and influence in organizations, we lose our 
chance to understand these critical social processes” (Pfeffer, 1992, p.30). 
Additionally, Burns (2000) has stated that power mobilisation is an important 
element in shaping the ways in which management accounting change as a 
process unfolds over time. As politics and power mobilisation are assumed to 
be central to studying management accounting change as a process, as 
mentioned earlier in the literature review chapter (Van Peursem and Balme, 
2010; Lapsley et al., 2011; Rautiainen and Scapens, 2013; Oliveira and Clegg, 
2015; Abdalla and Siti-Nabiha, 2015; Kraus and Strömsten, 2016), the notion of  
power will be explored by drawing insights, mostly from the management 
literature, since management literature is rich with studies that focus on the  role 
of politics and power in the change process, e.g., Pettigrew (1987). In particular, 
this section will consult the power mobilisation framework that was developed 
by Hardy (1996) to support the analysis of the empirical findings, in addition to 
Burns and Scapens MA change as a process framework, which is the main 
theoretical framework. Utilising Hardy’s (1996) power mobilisation framework 
thus helps to explore how and why the introduction of BSC and the ERP system 
within PackCO unfolded through time in the way it did. Similarly, to Burns 
                                            
24
 See Chapter 2 
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(2000), “although Hardy’s (1996) work explores change in organisational 
strategy, Hardy’s contribution can justifiably be applied to unravelling the 
complexities of processes of accounting change” (p.570). As such, Hardy 
(1996) power mobilisation framework is adopted in this research to complement 
the theoretical analysis that is based on Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework. 
Accordingly, this section introduces the power mobilisation framework of Hardy 
(1996), with some details. 
According to Dugger and Sherman (1994), the power relationship is central to 
OIE, and this relationship was defined as “the ability to get others to do what 
you want them to do, even when it is not in the interest of the dominated group 
or individual” (p.103). Such a power relationship, based on enabling myths, was 
the principle focus of early institutional economists, for example Veblen (1919). 
According to Pfeffer (1992), “power and political processes in organizations can 
be used to accomplish great things” (p.35), he defined power and politics (p.33) 
as follows: 
Power is defined as the potential ability to influence behaviour, to 
change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get 
people to do things that they would not otherwise do. Politics and 
influence are the processes, the actions, the behaviours though which 
this potential power is utilized and realized  
In her study, Hardy (1996) tried to examine the role of power in putting strategic 
change into action. She gave a neutral definition to power, if compared to other 
studies; as those studies focused on the meaning of power as power over 
someone else. Although using power in such a way gives results, it hinders 
researchers from studying the deeper effect of political dynamics (ibid). To 
Hardy (1996) power is thus a “force that affects outcomes, while politics is 
power in action” (p.S3). Defining power in such a way helps in studying its 
productive side, which helps to achieve goals that could not be achieved 
individually. In consequence, “power can, then, provide the energy for strategic 
change. Without it, we face strategic paralysis because we lack a mechanism 
with which to make change happen” (ibid, p. S3) 
Accordingly, Hardy (1996) developed a power mobilisation framework, which 
has four power dimensions that help to explain how power is mobilised by 
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different employees, especially by top managers, during strategic change. 
Figure 3-2, below, is reproduced from the original study and gives a summary of 
the three dimensions of power, which "can be used to combat the power 
embedded in the system to influence strategy-making processes in ways that 
help prevent opposition to strategic change" (p.S6). While the fourth dimension 
will be explored later in this section. 
 
Figure 3-2: Three dimensions of power (Source: Hardy, 1996, p.S7) 
The first source of power, according to Hardy (1996), is the power of resources, 
which “is exercised by actors to influence decision outcomes and bring about 
the desired behaviour through the deployment of key resources on which others 
depend”; these may include: information, expertise, political access, and 
credibility (p.S6). This source of power is used to adjust behaviour and it has 
limited effect, since it is task-oriented; as it employs the concept of either carrot 
or stick. This source of power is important for sustaining the deployment of 
desired behaviour, i.e., forcing branches to implement similar MAPs to those 
adopted by the head-office. However, it is important to notice that using the 
concept of carrot and stick in an excessive manner may cause a strong reaction 
from the people on whom the power is exercised (Hardy, 1996, p.S7), since it 
may result in resistance to the newly imposed MAPs, as was the case within 
PackCo, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
The power of processes is the second dimension of power in the model 
developed by Hardy (1996). This source of power is exerted by a dominant 
group over subordinates through using procedures and political routines to 
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prevent those subordinates from participating in the decision-making process. 
This helps the dominant group to achieve the desired outcome from behind the 
senses through the use of procedures and political routines. General and long-
term changes in behaviour can be produced by using such power, if compared 
with the power of resources, but those changes in behaviour that are in line with 
the current values and norms in the system will be sustained, while any new 
behaviour that clashes with the current system will fail (ibid, p.S7-S8).  
The power of meaning is the third dimension of power in the model. It “is 
influencing actors perceptions, cognitions and/or preferences in order that they 
accept the status quo (failing to recognize alternatives) or, become convinced 
that change is desirable , rational , and/ or legitimate ” (Hardy, 1996, p.S7; 
Yazdifar et al., 2008, p. 409).  Using this dimension of power can lead to 
profound changes in the system, but it is difficult to trace the effect of this power 
dimension in behaviour (Hardy, 1996). The findings of this research, detailed in 
Chapter 7, will demonstrate how the PackCo General Manager utilised this 
source of power when he introduced the ERP system within his unit. 
The fourth dimension of power in Hardy’s (1996) power model is the power of 
the system, or institution, as in Burns and Scapens management accounting 
change framework (2000). It is difficult for organisational members to grasp and 
change this power, as it is embedded in the way people in an organisation think. 
This “power is the backdrop against which all organizational actions and 
decisions take place. Since it is vested in the status quo, it is unlikely to lead to 
change in absence of any countervailing power” (Hardy, 1996, p.S8). This 
source of power is crucial when it comes to implementing strategic change, as it 
is “against this dimension of power that managers must employ the other three 
dimensions if they are to bring about strategic change” (ibid, p.S9). Similarly, 
the findings of this research are in line with Hardy’s (1996) argument in relation 
to the power of the system and its effect on shaping how MA change as a 
process evolves. In Chapter 7 we will see how the head-office in Dubai adapted 
the new BSC-rule two years after the implementation of BSC, due to the 
employees’ resistance to it, as the new rules conflicted with the existing ways of 
doing things, i.e., the power of the system (Burns, 2000).  
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In short, Hardy’s (1996) main argument in relation to a power framework is that 
these sources of power, and the politics underpinning them, can both be key 
facilitators and/or prohibitors for the process through which strategic change 
evolves. When managers attempt to introduce strategic change, they should 
thus utilise the first three dimensions of power in order to modify those parts of 
the existing system that prevent new behaviour, i.e., the power of the system, 
from emerging, based on the strategic change. On line with the argument of 
Burns and Scapens (2000), therefore, the power of the system, or institutions, 
do matter when introducing strategic change, and it is not possible to ignore this 
source of power when putting strategic plans into action. This is related to the 
fact that the first three power dimensions, mentioned above, have limitation(s). 
Consequently, this implies that not all of the power dimensions that are included 
in Hardy’s (1996) framework have equal strength, and the power of the system 
is the most significant power dimension and should be given more attention. As 
such, Hardy (ibid) argues that when putting strategies into actions it is important 
to understand the power of the system by examining the existing values, 
customs and organisational culture. Moreover, she has added that “a 
coordinated approach that encompasses all three dimensions to influence 
actions, awareness and values, and avoid both inertia and confusion” must be 
undertaken (p.S10). Equally, Burns & Scapens (2000) give attention to “the 
power embedded in the institutionalised routines, which shape[s] the actions 
and thoughts of members of the organisation” (p. 23). Finally, and in the same 
vein, Zaleznik and Kets de Vries (1975) argue that to implement change within 
organisations, power is vital, as power “transforms individual interests into 
coordinated activities that accomplish valuable ends” (p.109). Hardy (1996), 
also emphasised the importance of power for implementing strategic changes, 
and stated that managers may need power while implementing strategic 
change, either the employees will support such change implementation, or they 
will not. As power is a vital element when it comes to strategic change, as 
explored above, power can be considered a way to align conflicts and combat 
resistance to strategic change, and if employees are united by common goals, 
then power is required to facilitate collaborative actions (Hardy, 1996, p.S6). As 
mentioned above, Hardy’s (1996) power mobilisation framework is therefore 
utilised in this research to support Burns and Scapens MA change as process 
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framework (2000) in order to achieve a better and deeper understanding of how 
MA as process of change unfolds over time within PackCo as illustrated in 
figure 3-3 on the next page. 
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Figure 3-3: Process of institutionalisation, extended framework of Burns and Scapens (2000)
Institution, Power & 
Politics Mobilisation 
within the 
Organisation, & 
Rewards System  
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3.4. Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates the theoretical framework that is used to ascertain 
the answers to the research queries outlined in Chapter One. Specifically, the 
purpose of this research is to understand how the management accounting 
change, as a process, evolved in the case study company (PackCo), and to 
study why resistance/lack of resistance to a change occurs.  There is thus a 
need for a framework that takes into account the complexities of change and 
resistance. As explored above, Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as a 
process framework takes into account such complexities of the processes of 
change, and it is therefore suitable for this research. Moreover, additional 
insights will be drawn from Hardy’s (1996) power mobilisation framework, since 
Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change framework did not emphasise the 
importance of power, and the ways in which mobilising different sources of 
power may affect how MA change as a process evolves. The main arguments 
of both frameworks are thus combined in order to address the main themes that 
emerge from the empirical findings of this research as follow. 
First, Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change framework will be utilised in this 
research to explain how MA change, as a process, evolved within the case 
study company (PackCo, see Chapter 7). As management accounting change, 
as a process, research that is based on an OIE framework mainly focuses on 
the micro inter-organisational level for analysis, and also emphasises economic 
change, instead of economic equilibrium, this makes it potentially very beneficial 
in understanding the evolution and reproduction of accounting practices 
(Scapens, 1994). Additionally, studies based on OIE-theory try to open the 
black box of organisations and explore the processes of change, and resistance 
to change, inside organisations. OIE-theory based studies thus usually take into 
account why/how a behaviour or a specific structure emerges, is sustained 
and/or changed over time, by utilising the ideas of rules, routines, habits, and 
institutions (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006, p.97). In other words, the resistance to, 
or acceptance of, new rules by individuals within organisations is explained by 
the level to which the prevailing institutions are challenged. If new rules do not 
question the existing institutions, then the new rule will not be resisted, and the 
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opposite is also true (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns, 2000; Ribeiro and 
Scapens, 2006). Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as process framework 
will therefore be used in this study to explore how the MA change as process 
evolved in the case study company. More precisely, Burns’ and Scapens’ 
(2000) framework facilitates the explanation of the MA change as a process in 
the case study company, and the ways in which new rules emerged, adjusted, 
and routinised over time, see Chapter 7.  
Second, to develop a better understanding of how different dynamics, including 
power, affect and shape the management accounting change as a process 
within an organisation; insights from Hardy’s (1996) power mobilisation 
framework are utilised in this research to enrich the analysis process and to 
extend Burns and Scapens (2000) management accounting change framework. 
Hardy’s (1996) power mobilisation framework helps to explain how top 
management impose change within the case study company, although new 
rules that emerged with the change introduced challenges the prevailing 
institution. In addition, the research draws on the different types of powers, as 
classified by Hardy’s (1996) framework, to understand how a combination of 
different sources of power by top managers at the early stages of the change 
process, enabled them to impose the change within the case study company, 
despite the fact that new rules were challenging existing institutions. Moreover, 
Hardy’s (1996) framework will also help to explain how different employees at 
different organisational levels have utilised different sources of power to resist 
the new rules that were imposed by top management.  
Finally, although Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework has its limitations, as 
mentioned above, their framework aligns well with the purpose of this research. 
This study is therefore similar to other studies (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; 
Lukka, 2007) that draw on Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework as a primary 
framework, and suggest an extension to it. In other words, although Burns and 
Scapens (2000), and Burns (2000), refer to incentives schemes, as mentioned 
above25, and how such schemes can somehow affect the change process, they 
did not thoroughly discuss how exactly such a scheme could influence and 
                                            
25
 See Section 3.2.3.1 
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shape the change process. This theme emerged from the findings of this 
research and, as mentioned above, it will be discussed by referring to existing 
literature. There is therefore a need to develop this concept and to expand 
Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as process framework. In other words, 
and as will be explored in Chapter 7, this thesis proposes an expansion of 
Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework by demonstrating how top management 
in the case study organisation tried to draw on, and mobilise, power through the 
incentive scheme in order to affect the ways in which their employees perceived 
change and, at the same time, how such power mobilisation shaped the change 
process. Specifically, it is quite reasonable to take Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) 
framework for the BSC-case, and to conceptualise the process of change over 
time; mainly in terms of the persistence of the new rules and the existing 
institution. However, it is not the institutionalised taken-for-granted assumptions 
that necessarily and primarily influence the change process, instead there are 
other dynamics that are not so explicitly dealt with in the Burns’ and Scapens’ 
(2000) framework; namely: power and incentive schemes as figure 3-3 above 
demonstrated. 
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CHAPTER 4 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
4. Introduction  
The purpose of this research is to explore how the process of management 
accounting change evolves over time, and how different change dynamics 
shape the change process. This chapter therefore outlines the philosophical 
assumptions underpinning the research methodology that has been chosen to 
investigate the research questions outlined in the introductory chapter.  
4.1. Research Philosophy  
This section explores the philosophy that underpins this research by setting the 
research paradigm. The philosophical assumptions underpinning accounting 
research have been developed by different writers, for example, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), Hopper and Powell (1985), Chua (1986), and Laughlin (1995). 
Hopper and Powell’s (1985) philosophical accounting assumptions will be 
adopted in this research because they suit the nature of this research, as will be 
explored later in this chapter. Although the work of Hopper and Powell (1985) is 
not free from criticism, for example, Laughlin (1995) has stated that the 
collapsing of different philosophical dimensions into a single continuum 
simplifies the discussion (Ryan et al., 2002).  
According to Hopper and Powell (1985), “in any research it is suggested that 
individual values, philosophical assumptions, theoretical backing, and research 
methods should all be related to each other and to the aims of the research” 
(p.430). They criticised the way that Burrell and Morgan (1979) classified the 
different philosophical assumptions of accounting research within two 
dimensions. However, they utilised this framework “as a tool to aid the 
understanding of a very complex area […..] and to direct attention to what are 
thought to be very important underlying issues behind accounting research” 
(pp.430-1). Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework consists of two independent 
dimensions; the first is related to the nature of social science, while the second 
is about the nature of society. Four distinct but related assumptions constitute 
the social science dimension, which are: ontology, epistemology, human nature 
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and methodology (Hopper and Powell, 1985). The second dimension of Burrell 
and Morgan’s (1979) framework identifies two different approaches to society, 
namely: regulated society and radically changed society. Figure 4-1, below, 
summarises Hopper and Powell’s (1985) accounting schools and sociological 
paradigms, as adopted from the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979). Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) combined the two dimensions to form “four mutually exclusive 
frames of references”, namely: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and 
radical structuralist (Hopper and Powell, 1985, p.432). 
Figure 4-1:Hopper and Powell’s taxonomy of accounting research (Source: Ryan 
et al. 2002, p.40; originally adopted from Hopper and Powell, 1995) 
The following sub-sections give more detail about the social science dimension 
of Hopper and Powell’s (1985) philosophical framework, with connections to the 
existing research.  
 
Radical change 
 
Critical accounting 
research  
 
Radical humanism  
Interpretive  
Radical structuralism  
Functionalism  
Objectivism  Subjectivism  
Regulation  
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4.2. The nature of social science  
This section will demonstrate the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
of social science research in management accounting, and how they are related 
to the current research. As this dimension represents the ways in which 
researchers perceive the nature of social sciences; which reflects how the 
researcher decides what theory to use in his/her research, as well as the level 
of theorisation prior to any examination of the social phenomena (Laughlin, 
1995). 
4.2.1. Ontology 
Research ontological assumptions pursue the nature of reality (Humphrey and 
Scapens, 1994; Scapens and Yang, 2008; Bisman and Highfield, 2012). Ryan 
et al. (2002) referred to the work of Morgan and Smircich (1980), which 
identified six ontological assumptions about the reality of the world according to 
different social science schools, as is made clear in Figure 4-2, below. There 
are two extremes of the six assumptions about viewing the world, with “(1) 
reality as a concrete structure being the most objective and (6) reality as a 
projection of human imagination being the most subjective” (Ryan et al., 2002, 
p.36), while the remaining four assumptions of world reality, between numbers 
(1) and (6), represent intermediate points in the objective-subjective continuum, 
please see Figure 4-2 below.  
 
Figure 4-2: Six ontological assumptions (source: Rayn et al., 2002, p.36; 
originally from Morgan and Smircich, 1980, p.492) 
Six ontological assumptions  
 
1 Reality as a concrete structure (naive realism) 
2 Reality as a concrete process (transcendental realism) 
3 Reality as a contextual field of information (contextual relativism) 
4 Reality as a symbolic discourse (transcendental idealism [Kant]) 
5 Reality as a social construction (social constuctionism [socially mediated idealism]) 
6 Reality as a projection of human imagination (idealism [Berkeley]) 
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Management accounting change can either be resisted, or not resisted, when it 
is introduced into an organisation (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Different 
dynamics explored in Chapters 2 and 3 may explain how the MA change as a 
process evolves, and why a change might be resisted in one organisation and 
not in another. Based on the table above, there are therefore different 
perspectives that are possible when looking at management accounting change 
as process, and how this unfolds over time. Prior studies look at accounting 
change as a process from a technical aspect, i.e., considering that management 
accounting change introduces a new machine (Cooper et al., 1992; Hankinson 
and Lloyd 1994; Argyris and Kaplan, 1994). This approach showed an 
inadequacy in understanding how management accounting change as a 
process evolves. This is not to say that the technical aspect is not important, but 
it “is not sufficient for the general or long-term success of a change” (Shields, 
1995, p.148). Moreover, according to Pettigrew (1997), social processes, such 
as accounting, are “deeply embedded in the contexts that produce and are 
produced by them”; and explaining change in an organisation should be linked 
to changes in the operating contexts, as “processes are embedded in contexts 
and can only be studied as such” (ibid, p.340).  
Accordingly, the ontological assumption adopted in this study is social 
constructivism; with a focus on the context within which management 
accounting change as a process evolves (Nørreklit et al., 2006; Jönsson and 
Lukka, 2006; Ahrens et al., 2008; Ammar, 2014). This is also in line with the 
theoretical framework that is presented in Chapter 3, as, unlike previous 
technically-based-studies, the assumptions adopted in this study look at 
management accounting change, e.g., introducing BSC, or an ERP system, as 
a process, and not as a linear relationship between different factors (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000; Abrahamsson and Gerdin, 2006; Akroyd and Maguire, 2011; 
Busco and Scapens, 2011; Hoque and Chia, 2012). In other words, while the 
introduction of a change, like BSC or an ERP system, could drive change in the 
existing ways of doing things within an organisation, existing ways of doing 
things may also shape how BSC or an ERP system is implemented within an 
organisation, and how the change as a process unfolds over time. According to 
Ryan et al. (2002), there may be a need for different methods of gaining 
knowledge, according to different ontological assumptions, which help to gain a 
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deeper understanding of the studied phenomena. Adopting a social construct as 
an ontological assumption for this research facilitates the understanding of how 
different change dynamics shape, and are shaped, by the MA change as a 
process, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 7.  Accordingly, the following sub-
section introduces the epistemological assumption adopted in this research, 
which is based on the ontological assumption discussed above.  
4.2.2. Epistemology  
An epistemological assumption “is concerned with the nature of knowledge- 
what forms it takes and how it can be obtained and transmitted” (Hopper and 
Powell, 1985, p.431). Similarly, to an ontological assumption, there are two 
ends of the epistemological assumptions continuum, “this ranges from 
interpretation when the knowledge of the world is essentially of a personal 
nature, to observation when there is a concrete external world” (Ryan et al., 
2002, p.39).  
Based on the ontological assumption adopted in this research, the underlying 
epistemological position is that of social constructed reality, i.e., an ‘interpretive’ 
approach. Based on this approach, the researcher acquires knowledge through 
relying as much as possible on the participants’ views of the situation, while 
considering the social and historical setting of the participants (Creswell, 2007, 
p.20). As argued by different studies, for example, Parker (2012), the 
interpretive approach is considered to contribute fundamentally to knowledge. 
As research based on an interpretive approach does not seek the 
generalisability of results, as in an economics-oriented approach26 it instead 
focuses on the black boxes of process, and addresses issues at the micro-level 
in order to explore the processes within organisations that formulate strategies 
and policies (Parker, 2012, p.911). As outlined above, this research’s purpose is 
to explore what the different change dynamics are that shape how MA change 
as a process evolves, including: power, institutions, and employees’ rewards 
system, which may result in resistance to, or adaptation of, the MA change and 
                                            
26
 See Chapter 3 
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its new rules. Accordingly, an interpretive approach suits this research, for he 
following reasons.  
First, an interpretive approach allows the researcher to explore an accounting 
phenomenon by benefiting from accumulated knowledge; which facilitates the 
understanding of accounting change as a process within its social, cultural, and 
political context (El Karouni, 2009; Jansson, 2013; Burns, 2014). In relation to 
this research, interpretive accounting research (IAR) thus facilitates the 
explanation of management accounting change as a process, i.e., BSC and 
ERP system implementation, as a socially constructed process (Ahrens in 
Ahrens et al., 2008). In other words, an interpretive approach facilitates the 
understanding of how different contextual factors, including Omani 
governmental rules relating to investment, local, as well as international, 
competition, and existing institutions within PackCo, have affected how the 
process of implementing BSC and an ERP system within PackCo unfolds over 
time. Second, according to Burns (in Ahrens et al., 2008), IAR researchers 
should focus on building existing theory, instead of inventing more new theories, 
and also should consider how accounting concepts evolve and change through 
time (p.843). Specifically, IAR allows the employment of a processual lens 
(history and path dependency matters, see Chapter 3) by which MA change as 
a process is explored, based on the social, economic, institutional, culture, and 
political contexts, and those contextual factors do matter when explaining 
change as a process (Parker, 2008, p.855). Specifically, and as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, utilising a theoretical framework that is based on an interpretive 
epistemological assumption helped to support the analysis of the case study 
findings; and, at the same time, the findings of this research proposed an 
extension of the framework that was used. Third, IAR allows closer contact with 
human beings in order to analyse and understand their daily interactions and 
performance in accounting practice and routines (Granlund in Ahrens et al., 
2008).  
Accordingly, the IAR view of social reality is subjectively-created, i.e., there is 
continual refinement and modification of the social stock of knowledge through 
continuous social interaction between individuals and the social, political, and 
historical contexts (Chua, 1986). However, despite this continual refinement, 
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some temporary stability of structures also exists, which form institutionalised, 
taken for granted structures (ibid). IAR can thus be employed in addressing 
such research questions as: How are organisational routines produced and 
reproduced in everyday life? What are the deeply embedded assumptions that 
structure organisational routines? How are institutions formed? How are 
institutions sustained and modified? What are the typical motives that explain 
action? (Chua, 1986, p.614). Which are in line with this research’s enquiries, as 
outlined in Chapter 1. 
4.2.3. Human nature 
According to Hopper and Powell (1985), “assumptions about human nature 
refer to the relationship between human beings and their environment” (p.431). 
There are two views on this assumption: first, the external environment can 
determine and restrict the behaviour of people, and their experiences. 
Alternatively, it is possible to consider people as being independent and having 
free-will, which leads to their ability to create their own environment (ibid, 1985). 
Based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions adopted in this 
research, outlined above, the human nature view adopted in this thesis is of a 
voluntary nature, rather than being deterministic27 (Neumau, 2006). Accordingly, 
in this view, “social settings and subjective points of view help to shape the 
choices a person makes, but people create and change those settings and have 
the ability to develop or form a point of view” (ibid, p.90). The cultural, historical, 
and personal background of individuals can thus influence the decisions made 
by them to introduce a change within an organisation, for example, 
implementing BSC or an ERP system, which may challenge the existing ways 
of doing things. Alternatively, individuals produce those social settings, and new 
cultural and personal backgrounds may develop, which, in turn, will shape new 
ways of thinking and doing things, i.e., individuals interact within the social 
context, as well as reinforcing shared meaning (Neumau, 2006, p.94). Such a 
view will facilitate the explanation of how management accounting change as a 
process evolved within PackCo; as it will help to understand how existing ways 
of doing things made employees react in a specific way to the implementation of 
                                            
27
 Determinism is “an approach to human agency and causality that assumes human actions are largely 
caused by forces external to individuals that can be identified” (Neuman, 2006, p.83) 
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BSC and the ERP system within PackCo, and also of how new rules were 
embedded within PackCo according to the existing ways of doing things.  
4.2.4. Methodological implications  
Hopper and Powell (1985) stated that the three assumptions referred to above 
have methodological implication which need to be adopted by the researcher 
directly; that also has two ends, either the researcher adopts a hermeneutic 
method, or a scientific method. Accordingly, a scientific method will be adopted 
by the researcher “when reality is concrete and objective, and human nature 
behaviour is deterministic” (Ryan et al., 2002, pp.39-40). So, the researcher will 
use statistical techniques to test hypotheses and to analyse the data collected 
using questionnaires and surveys, to gain knowledge and explain and predict 
social regularities and patterns (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Ryan et al., 2002). 
Alternatively, “where reality is grounded in subjective experiences and 
individuals possess free will”, then a qualitative research methodology (QRM, 
hereafter), will be utilised by the researcher to gain knowledge. Adopting a QRM 
allows the researcher to interact and to be engaged with the field, the context, 
history, and micro-details of organisational and institutional life (Parker, 2014). 
This provides penetration and discharge from the inside, which explains the 
interaction of management accounting with organisational processes (ibid, 
2012). This leads to a deeper understanding of how to apply management 
accounting during situations of organisational change (Vaivio, 2008; Parker, 
2012, 2014; Humphrey, 2014). Accordingly, it is rational to adopt QRM in this 
research for the following reasons. First, and according to Parker (2014), when 
the research’s purpose is to understand the processes that occur inside the 
black box of an organisation and how they intermingle with the institutional, 
contextual, and historical factors, then it is appropriate to apply QRM in such 
research. Neuman (2006) emphasised the same point, and stated that 
researchers should adopt QRM when examining social processes within their 
social context, such as management accounting.  
Secondly, Vaivio (2008) has argued that the organisational reality that an 
organisation encounters does not match the implicit ontological simplifications 
of the textbook view (p.66). Textbooks view management accounting as a 
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collection of techniques that aid managers to make decisions within a 
predictable operating environment, since the reality is dissimilar to such 
textbook views, because organisations, in reality, operate in an intensively 
competitive and institutionalised environment. Vaivio (2008) stated that QRM 
studies of management accounting techniques have therefore documented how 
these techniques interfere with the complexities of the political processes that 
affect how power is distributed within an organisation, as explored in Chapter 2. 
Additionally, the study emphasised that QRM can enhance the ability of the 
researcher to understand how management accounting practices can shape, 
and be shaped, by the context in which they are applied. Similarly, Neuman 
(2006) has stressed the importance of context in shaping qualitative research. 
Specifically, he stated that when social context changes then “it implies that the 
same events or behaviors can have different meanings in different cultures and 
historical eras” (p.158).  
Additionally, QRM allows the researcher to explore management accounting 
from a processual perspective; i.e., it explores how management accounting 
change as a process unfolds through time within a specific organisational 
setting (Burns, 2000). The area of management accounting and organisational 
change is also one of the major areas addressed by QRM (Parker, 2012). By 
referring to the work of Baxter and Chua (2003), Parker (2012) suggested that 
management accounting research based on QRM offers distinctive 
contributions to knowledge about change, including how the changes in the 
social, cultural, political, and economic conditions affect the management 
accounting change as a process; how management accounting change evolves 
in an unpredictable manner, due to institutional conflict and instability, and the 
importance of institutional change for the effective implementation of 
management accounting change (p.62).  
Accordingly, different management accounting scholars have supported the 
adoption of case studies and in-depth interviews as research methods when 
adopting a QRM (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Scapens, 2006; Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006; Vaivio, 2008; Parker, 2012). A case study is therefore the 
main research method adopted in this research, and the following section will 
focus on exploring it.  
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4.3. Research method 
Neuman (2006) defined research methods as “sets of specific techniques for 
selecting cases, measuring and observing aspects of social life, gathering and 
refining data, analyzing the data, and reporting on results” (p.2). This section 
introduces the research method that were adopted in this research. There were 
two stages for data collection. At the first stage, a survey with follow up 
interviews were adopted for a pilot study in order to explore the diffusion of 
various MAPs within NOROMCs (see Chapter 6). While, in the second stage, a 
case study approach was adopted so as to get a deeper understanding of how 
MA change, as a process, unfolds over time within PackCo. This was done 
mostly by referring to the works of Scapens (1990) and Yin (2009). 
4.3.1. The survey method 
This section gives a brief resumé of how the survey was utilised as a research 
method in order to explore management accounting practice within NOROMCs, 
i.e., the different management accounting practices adopted and used by the 
surveyed organisations.  
As the survey was essentially a pilot study for a more detailed and in-depth 
case study of MAPs adoption in NOROMCs in Oman, the survey not only 
provides breadth to the present study, but also provides a useful platform for 
deeper analysis in the subsequent case study. However, as such, the following 
does not provide a lot of detail in relation to survey-type research methods (e.g., 
the advantages or limitations of such research methods). This is believed to be 
beyond the scope of the present thesis, and the survey per se was only a pilot 
aspect of the present research; however, any reader interested in learning more 
about the survey-based research method can refer to (Hyvönen, 2005; Nasser 
et al., 2011; Lebedev, 2015; Orelli et al., 2016) This being said, and because it 
has much greater prominence in this thesis, there will be fuller discussion of the 
case study approach in Chapter 7 (as there already is in this Chapter).  
The basis of the survey questions (see Appendix 1 for a copy) were adapted 
from Hutaibat (2005); however, Sections 4 and 5 of the survey were introduced 
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entirely for this study, based on reviewing the current literature relating to the 
changing nature of MAPs (Innes and Mitchell, 1990; Scapens, 1994; Granlund 
and Lukka, 1998; Vaivio, 1999; Burns and Vaivio, 2001; Granlund, 2001; 
Kasurinen, 2002; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). The survey was distributed and 
collected, in person, to/from the principle accountants in 110 companies which 
were operating at the Alrusyal Industrial Estate, from June to September, 2010, 
(Please see Chapters 4 and 5 for more details about why this industrial estate 
was chosen for the research). However, only 52 of the surveys returned were 
usable (i.e., 47%). In addition, follow up interviews were held with 21 
accountants, to both extend the understanding of the survey results and to 
provide a useful platform from which to undertake a more in-depth case study of 
MAPs adoption (see Chapter 6). 
Data collected by the survey helped to develop some research patterns (see 
below); including: power mobilisation to enforce and introduce a change within 
an organisation, as will be detailed in Chapter 6. Additionally, this first stage of 
data collection helped to short list case studies to three cases, and then to 
choose one case, that is PackCo, as will be detailed later in this chapter.  
4.3.2. Case study approach (Scapens 1990, and Yin 2009) 
Yin (2009) identified different ways of conducting social science research, and 
these depend on three condition: (1) the type of research questions, (2) the 
control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (3) the focus on 
contemporary, as opposed to historical, phenomena (p.2). He stated that the 
case-study is a preferred research method when the research focus is on 
answering questions about how and why, when the researcher has little control 
of events, and when the research focus is on a social phenomenon within a 
real-life context (ibid, p.2). In brief, the:  
“case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as individual life 
cycles, small group behavior, organizational and managerial 
processes, ..........., and the maturation of industries”(p.4).  
Consequently, this section introduces the reasons for which the case study 
method was adopted in this research. 
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First, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, management accounting studies that 
seek to identify the impact of change as a process based on survey outcomes 
will not address the nature and complexities of MA change as a process. 
Longitudinal case studies of how the implementation of change as a process, 
such as the introduction of a new ERP system, therefore evolve as needed 
(Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003, p.230). Moreover, the adoption of the case-study 
as a research method emerged in the management accounting field as a result 
of the gap between the theory and practice of MA (Scapens, 1990). More 
precisely, the practice of MA in reality did not harmonize with the conventional 
wisdom of the MA textbooks. Additionally, the superficial view of MA practice 
that is produced by survey-based research motivates the use of more intensive 
field work and/or case studies, where required (Llewellyn, 2007; Bogt and 
Helden, 2012; Lillis, 2008; Yasukata et al., 2013; Belal and Owen, 2015).  
Second, according to Parker (2012, p.56), field based case study research 
involves the researcher in direct contact with organisational settings, conducting 
in-depth research into the actors and their contexts in their naturally occurring 
settings. Field research also involves the application of multiple methods, such 
as interviews, observations, and documentary analysis that addresses real, live 
settings and processes. They “offer rich, contextualised accounts and 
understanding of organisational and management accounting practices” 
(Parker, 2012, p. 56). In other words, using case study as a research method 
offers a deeper understanding of organisational actors and their world, which, in 
turn, helps the researcher to find answers to questions such as: Why does a 
change emerge within an organisation? How does the change as a process 
evolve within that organisation? (Parker, 2012) 
Finally, according to Drury and Tayles (1995), management accounting studies 
that are based on surveys provide attention-directing information on areas that 
need in-depth case study research. They add, that when the research purpose 
is to explore management accounting as a socially constructed phenomenon 
that is shaped and is shaping the social milieu, then case study is suitable for 
the exploration of such phenomena. The following section therefore discusses 
the nature of case study as a research method, including different types of case 
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study, and the processes of carrying out a case study, proposed by Scapens 
(1990). 
4.3.2.1. The nature of case study  
Case study is considered a fieldwork research method that examines 
management accounting as a social practice within its organisational context 
(Scapens, 1990). Utilising case study as a research method with a focus on 
examining the actual use of MA systems, helps to understand how MA 
techniques or systems are embedded in the daily practices of different 
employees within an organisation (Scapens, 1990; Tuomela, 2005; Kholeif et 
al., 2007; Englund et al., 2013). This section thus explores the case study as a 
research method in relation to the purpose of the current research.  
Yin (2009, p.18) defined case study as: 
“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” 
According to Scapens (1990), a case study can be used in different ways, i.e., 
classified to different typology, according to the purpose of the case study. This 
includes: descriptive, illustrative, experimental, exploratory, and explanatory 
case studies. For the purpose of this research, the last type has been adopted 
because explanatory case studies: 
“Attempt to explain the reasons for accounting practices. The focus of 
the research is on the specific case. Theory is used in order to 
understand and explain the specific, rather than to produce 
generalisation. If available theories do not provide convincing 
explanations, it may be necessary to modify them” (Scapens, 1990, 
p.265)  
Earlier in this chapter, it was mentioned that the epistemological assumption 
which underpins this research is social constructivism, which means that MA is 
studied as a social practice that shapes, and is shaped, by its social context 
(Hopper and Powell, 1985). In other words, adopting this assumption helps to 
explore how MA is conditioned by the socio-political system, and how “it 
provides a set of rules which structure certain types of organisational behaviour, 
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and how these rules emerge out of the social practices of the organisational 
participants” (Scapens, 1990, p.268). As the purpose of this research is to 
explore how MA change as a process evolves, and how different socio-political 
dynamics, such as power, institution, rules and routines, shape, and are 
shaped, by the change as a process. Then an interpretive/explanatory case 
study is suitable for this research, and helps the researcher to understand MA 
as a social practice by locating it in its historical, social, economic, and 
organisational context. This research method is also in line with the theoretical 
framework that has been adopted in this research (Please see Chapter 3), as 
the framework argues that MA practice is a socially constructed practice, and in 
order to understand this it requires an understanding of the complex inter-
relationship between different organisational elements, including institutions, 
rules, and routines (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Finally, as argued by Berry and Otley (2004), the case study is suitable for 
understanding the content, processes, and context of the accounting practice, 
which helps to explore the complexity, content richness, processes and the 
context of change. The following section therefore introduces the steps that 
were followed in conducting this research case study, as proposed by 
(Scapens, 1990). 
4.3.3. Main steps of conducting a case study (Scapens, 1990)28 
According to Scapens (1990), there are steps that a researcher should follow 
when conducting a case study, and these include: preparation, collecting 
evidence, assessing evidence, identifying and explaining patterns, theory 
engrossment, and report writing. This section provides more detail about those 
steps and links them to the current research. However, it is important to state 
here that, despite introducing these steps, “it must be emphasised that case 
study research is a complex interactive process which cannot be characterised 
by a simple linear model” (Scapens, 1990, p.273). Specifically, throughout the 
                                            
28
 This section refers mostly to Scapens ‘(1990) article, if another reference is used that will be stated 
clearly 
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process of conducting the case study, the researcher may have to iterate 
between those steps in a different order.  
4.3.3.1. Preparation  
Preparation is the first step when conducting a case study. In this step, the 
researcher needs to review the available theories which may be related to 
explaining the case study, and that can help the researcher in approaching the 
case study. Such early adoption of a specific theory does not mean that the 
researcher cannot introduce additional theory as the research process 
proceeds. Instead, “the researcher should be flexible to allow such development 
to take place” (Scapens, 1990, p.274). In this stage of the current research, 
different theories were reviewed, including: structuration theory (Macintosh and 
Scapens, 1990), new institutional theory (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983), and 
management accounting change as a process framework (Burns and Scapens, 
2000). Based on this review, the last framework was adopted for this 
research,29 as explored earlier in the theory chapter. 
4.3.3.2. Selection of the case study  
According to Scapens (2004), when there is a well formulated theory and the 
research purpose is defined well, then that helps in selecting a critical case 
study. As mentioned above, Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework was 
adopted as a theoretical framework with which to inform the findings of this 
research. However, the selection of the case study was difficult as, based on 
the results of the first research stage, i.e., the survey results (see Chapter 6); 
there were few interesting case studies to follow up in order to use this 
theoretical framework. The researcher finally selected three organisations from 
the surveyed NOROMCs: the first produces food oil, the second produces 
chemical mixtures, and the third produces different types of packaging products. 
The selection of those specific case studies was based on the different 
management accounting changes that had been introduced within the last 1030 
                                            
29
 More details of this framework are provided in Chapter 3, and why this framework was adopted in this 
research. 
30
 The 10 year period is between (2000 and 2010) 
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years in these organisations. Table 4-1, below, summarises why those three 
case studies were interesting. 
 
Organisation  Change  Why interesting 
case  
Difficulties in 
following up 
with the case  
Food oil producer  Introduction of 
SAP 
• There are no 
tariffs on food 
imported to 
Omani 
markets 
• Operating in a 
very intense 
competitive 
market  
No co-operation 
from all 
employees within 
the organisation. 
Thus, difficult to 
get enough 
evidence to 
support the case 
study’s story 
Chemical 
mixtures 
producer  
Introduction of 
ABC costing 
system  
• There was a 
change in the 
costing 
system after a 
new cost 
accounting 
manager was 
appointed to 
the 
organisation  
• Difficult to 
follow up with 
the case as 
employees 
were reluctant 
to answer 
during 
interviews 
• The 
appointed 
cost 
accounting 
manager left 
the 
organisation 
and the ABC 
system was 
eventually 
suspended  
Packaging 
products 
(Selected case 
study) 
Introduction of 
BSC that was 
forced by the 
head office, as 
well as a new 
integrated 
management 
control system 
similar to the one 
used in the head 
office 
• There was too 
much power 
mobilisation 
with the case 
study  
• Both changes 
challenge 
existing 
institutions, 
but they 
evolved in 
totally 
different ways  
• Employees 
were very 
cooperative 
from different 
levels  
• Support from 
the general 
manager of 
the case 
study 
• Access to the 
case study 
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Partnership with 
a multi-national 
organisation  
whenever it 
was needed  
Table 4-1: Shortlisted case studies 
The questionnaire results (see Chapter 6) explored the Omani context in terms 
of different management accounting practices that had been adopted by non-oil 
related Omani manufacturing companies (NOROMCs), and they gave a general 
view of the Omani case. The results, in short, showed that although the Omani 
context has witnessed many different changes, as shown in Chapter 5, the 
majority of the surveyed NOROMCs are still applying traditional MAPs. The 
selection of PackCo as a case study for this research therefore emerged for the 
following reasons, and these made it an interesting case study to explore.  
First, the case study company was chosen because it is different from the 
majority of the surveyed companies, in the sense that it appeared to be 
implementing more contemporary management accounting practices (MAPs) 
than had the other surveyed NORMOCs. According to the questionnaire results, 
the number of surveyed NOROMCs that had implemented contemporary MAPs 
was limited. Based on this, PackCo Company was thus chosen. Added to that, 
the case study company is operating in the packaging industry; and apart from 
Dugdale et al. (2006) and Quinn (2010), the number of studies that have 
explored management accounting specifically in packaging companies is 
limited31. Exploring the management accounting change as a process and how 
it evolved within the case study company would thus be interesting and should 
add to the current literature on management accounting change, in general, and 
change within packaging companies specifically. As concluded from the 
questionnaire results, a company’s size can affect the type of management 
accounting practices implemented by them (in the sense that the bigger 
companies implement more contemporary MAPs if one compares them to small 
ones). However, although the case study company in this research is relatively 
small, it implements contemporary management accounting practices. This 
said, the case study company is part of a larger group, with its head office (HO) 
in Dubai. Additionally, and as will be described in the chapter on the empirical 
evidence, the group company (with a head office based in Dubai) also entered 
                                            
31
 Global changes in this industry will be detailed in Chapter 7 
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into a partnership with a multi-national, Canadian based packaging company; 
which makes the analysis of the change process more complex and 
interdependent. PackCo was thus chosen as a case study for this research.   
Gaining access to a case study company is a challenge, as is getting 
cooperation from the people at the site to respond (Creswell, 2007). 
Fortunately, with all three of the initial case studies that I started with, there was 
no rejection of participation in this study, especially when the concerned top 
management saw the letter of cooperation from Sultan Qaboos University. As 
this is the only governmental university within the country, getting this letter 
opened doors for a researcher to get access within the private sector in general, 
since cooperation with an employee working in the governmental sector means 
cooperation with governmental requirements. However, as time passed, some 
reluctance was clear from the first and second organisations, while the PackCo 
company was always welcoming and willing to cooperate. This motivated the 
researcher to follow up with this organisation; plus, as mentioned above, there 
were different changes that had been introduced into the organisation within the 
last 10 years. 
Moreover, according to Burns (2004), it is advisable to get access to a case 
study company that is near to where you live or work. Which decreases many of 
the obstacles that may affect the researcher’s progress in collecting data, 
including: the cancellation of interviews due to emergency situations by the time 
the researcher arrives; the cost of travelling between sites, as well as 
dangerous liaisons with other cars on the roads. Moreover, due to the busy 
schedules of the interviewees, the researcher may travel all the way to a case 
study site just to conduct one interview. Burns (2004) advises the researcher to 
get access to an organisation that is near to where the researcher lives or works 
to avoid all these delays in the data collection process. Consequently, and 
based on the above recommendation by Burns (2004), in this research the 
focus and the selection of the case study was on one industrial area amongst 
the seven industrial areas around Oman (see Chapter 5 for more details). This 
is the Al Rusyal Industrial Area. This industrial area is located within a 10-
minute drive, both from my living and work places, and thus it was easy for me 
to re-arrange any cancelled interviews, or to drive there for just one interview. 
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Cancellation of an interview was due mostly to the arranging of an emergency 
visit to the interviewee by a customer or a visitor. I thus had to re-arrange 
another interview. This did not affect my progress in the research very much, as 
I usually went back to my office and did other work relating to the research, 
including, for example, the transcription of previous interviews.  
All these changes within the external operating environment of PackCo, and 
inside PackCo, including the introduction of BSC, a new ERP system, and the 
partnership with the Canadian multi-national company, and its consequences; 
made the case study interesting to explore and to dig deeper into the change as 
a process and how it unfolds over time. In addition, the convenient access to 
the case study, in terms of distance, as well as the cooperation from different 
employees within PackCo, facilitated the selection of this specific case study.  
4.3.3.3. Collecting evidence  
Although reviewing and choosing a theory in the previous step helped in 
directing the researcher to the types of evidence to collect from the case study; 
this should not limit the researcher from altering his/her ideas because of 
evidence that emerged from the case study. Different sources of data collection 
can be used, including: documentation, interviews, direct observation, and 
participant observation. According to Langley et al. (2013), “longitudinal data 
are necessary to observe how processes unfold over time........mixed methods 
combining interviews, archival data, and observations […..] correspond well to a 
perspective emphasizing process questions and an ontology where processes 
rather than things are the main focus of attention” (p.6). As the main purpose of 
this research focused on exploring how MA change as a process unfolds over 
time, and how different change dynamics shape that unfolding process, then 
interviews were applied mainly in this research to enable that purpose to be 
achieved. This section thus introduces this research technique.  
According to Yin (2009), interviews are considered the most important source of 
data collection for case studies. Case study interviews can be described as 
being fluid, rather than rigid, in that the interviews will be guided by the 
conversations, instead of by structured inquiry. In addition, “interviews are an 
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essential source of case study evidence because most case studies are about 
human affairs or behavioural events” (Yin, 2009, p.108). Based on the purpose 
of this research, that seeks to investigate how management accounting change 
as a process evolves, in-depth-semi-structured interviews were adopted as a 
data-collection technique for this research.  
In-depth-semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to ask key 
respondents about their perspectives and opinions that are related to the 
research matter, which could help in making further inquiries that are related to 
the research matter. As such, interviews may take a long, and may not take just 
a single sitting (Yin, 2009). Interviews were considered the main data collection 
method, but also other methods were used. For example, getting copies of 
documents to collect data wherever this was possible. Moreover, observation of 
interviewees was important, especially while interviewing them or their 
colleagues. According to Scapens (1990), informal ways to collect evidences 
are as important as formal ways. Informal ways include: casual comments, the 
tone of answers, physical gestures. Scapens (1990) added that such clues can 
be used to validate data obtained through the formal methods. Indeed, data 
collected at PackCo that was based on informal methods were important in 
confirming data collected formally as well, as that provided the signals of power 
distribution within PackCo, as will be explored in Chapter 7. 
Prior to the fieldwork, semi-structured interview questions were prepared that 
were based on different themes that had emerged from the questionnaire 
results, as will be explored below (N-vivo section), as well as questions that 
emerged from the main research’s purposes. Additionally, some questions 
emerged during the interviews, and these were based on the interviewee’s 
answers. Questions that emerged after reviewing previous interviews were 
saved for future interviews. Finally, at the end of each interview, I asked a 
general question: Would the interviewee like to add any extra comments that 
were related to the issues discussed. Such a question gives the interviewee an 
opportunity to sum-up his/her answers, as well as providing some extra 
information. Additionally, all of the interviewees were allowed to express their 
thoughts about the changes introduced into the organisation, i.e., BSC and ERP 
system. This helps the researcher in obtaining different views from different 
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interviewees, and that facilitated getting more data and evidence that was 
related to both changes. It is important to state that before conducting the 
interviews I had assumed that it was power mobilisation rather than existing 
institutions that shaped the MA change as a process within PackCo, and this 
viewpoint was based on the results of the first stage of the research process, 
which included a questionnaire and follow-up interviews32. As soon as I started 
the interviews, the power mobilisation became obvious, as will be detailed 
below. However, it was not possible to ignore the role of institutions in shaping 
how in both, i.e., BSC and the ERP system, changes as a process unfold over 
time, see Chapter 7 for more details. 
Based on the research protocol, an appointment with the interviewees should 
be scheduled prior to the interview (Yin, 2009). In case of cancellation due to 
the busy schedule of some interviewees, a new appointment will be set. As 
different interviewees have different work experience, as will be explored in the 
empirical evidence chapter. That, in turn, affected the number of interviews 
conducted with the interviewee, as well as the length of the interviews. For 
example, the Sales Manager’s major responsibilities required that he work out 
of the office and travel a lot within the region. That decreased the time in which I 
would have the opportunity to meet him. The following table (Table 4-2) shows 
the number and length of the interviews with different interviewees within 
PackCo. 
Interviewed person  Date of interview Length of 
interview 
General manager 23/January/2011 1 hour 19 minutes  
General manager 22/September/2011 1 hour 
General manager 29/September/2011 1 hour 18 minutes 
General manager 30/September/2011 25 minutes 
General manager 14/November/2011 1 hour 25 minutes 
Production Manager 5/December/2011 25 minutes 
General manager 5/December/2011 15 minutes 
Sales Manager 7/December/2011 45 minutes 
General manager 18/December/2011 40 minutes 
General manager 24/September/2012 50 minutes 
                                            
32
 The second phase of the research process, i.e., the case study, is the main data collection source for 
this research, and thus this chapter focused on the methods and methodology related to the case study 
and not on the first research stage. The first research stage’s main purpose was to explore the Omani 
context in relation to the nature of the management accounting techniques adopted by non-oil-related-
Omani-manufacturing companies (see Chapter 6). 
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Sales coordinator  4/ October/ 2012 30 minutes 
General manager 4/ October/ 2012 30 minutes 
General manager 1/ December/ 2014 1 hour 10 minutes  
Table 4-2: Summary of interviewed PackCo employees 
All of the interviews were tape-recorded after receiving permission from the 
interviewees, as well as getting a signed consent form from them. That helped 
in concentrating with the interviewee and following up ideas or statements 
easily with him/her during the interview. In addition, tape-recording facilitated 
the observation of the informal clues of the interviewees and, as mentioned 
above, such clues are as important as the formally collected data. Although 
using a tape-recorder may hinder the interviewees from providing some detailed 
data, this was not a major issue which the researcher faced during the data 
collection process. In general, interviewees were mostly cooperative, and they 
didn’t refuse to answer any question, but the General Manager refused to 
provide some of the reports as they were confidential.   
Within PackCo, the General Manager (GM) was very cooperative and friendly to 
me. I had to explain the purpose of my research, with all the supporting 
documents, only to him, and he introduced me to other organisational members 
before my first interview with them. That helped to break the ice prior to the 
interview, as well as gaining trust from those interviewees. Additionally, data in 
this research consisted mostly of hours of interviews, audio-records, as 
mentioned above. All audiotaped interviews were transcribed, and that 
consisted of around 83 pages of transcription.  
Accordingly, the first stage of the interviewing process aimed to interview top 
managers in different departments of PackCo so as to understand their views 
and reactions towards the changes that had been introduced within the 
organisation during the last 10 years. Additionally, during this stage, the 
researcher tried to explore how and why the two initiatives were introduced to 
PackCo. How had the change as a process evolved, and what are the different 
change dynamics that shaped the change as a process? 
Different themes emerged from the first interview stage about how both 
changes as a process evolved within PackCo, and those themes agreed, in 
general, with the Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change framework. However, 
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the most obvious theme was the mobilisation of different sources of power by 
top managers, especially the power of resources, while they were imposing the 
change at PackCo, as will be detailed in the empirical chapter. Accordingly, 
follow up interviews were conducted, especially with PackCo’s General 
Manager, to understand how he imposed the change within the organisation. 
Based on the interviews conducted at this stage, I was able to understand why 
changes were introduced into PackCo, how top managers imposed the changes 
and how different change dynamics, including: power, institution, rule, and 
routines, shaped how the change unfolds as a process over time. 
Consequently, the second stage of the interviewing process aimed to interview 
employees from a lower level in order to understand their perspectives 
regarding the changes implemented at PackCo. Unfortunately, due to the small 
size of the organisation (25 employees in total), language obstacles between 
different lower level employees and the researcher (lower level employees 
speak very little English and Indian languages only), and many employees in 
the administration, i.e., accounting and sales, were new and joined only after 
the implementation of both changes. The number of interviews with employees 
at a lower level was very few, and the majority stated that they did not face any 
problems with the changes introduced for different reasons. More precisely, 
power mobilisation by top management, and little experience and knowledge of 
how change affects lower level employees’ performance evaluation (i.e., the 
mobilisation of power of knowledge). Fortunately, there was one Omani 
employee who joined PackCo before the implementation of both changes, and 
she speaks Arabic, which removed the language and communication barrier 
between us, and I was able to interview her so as to understand how some 
employees at a lower level reacted to the changes introduced. Interestingly, 
although the Omani employee did not have the knowledge to be able to 
understand BSC as a technique, she was able to realise how the new-BSC-
related rules affect her performance evaluation, and she resisted the change. 
This will be explored in Chapter 7. Based on the limited number of interviews 
with lower level employees, it was clear that there was some resistance to the 
changes introduced.  
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Different themes thus emerged from this second phase. First, the mobilisation 
of power by top managers was confirmed by the answers provided by lower 
level employees, as some said: “he (GM) insisted that I work according to the 
new system” or “what managers require, we do”. Second, with such power 
mobilisation, there were some employees who resisted the change and, 
accordingly, the GM had to adjust the new rules to conform with existing ways 
of doing things. This stage informed our understanding of how different 
employees reacted to both changes, and how top managers adapted the new 
rules to concur with the existing ways of doing things and, at the same time, for 
employees to produce and reproduce new rules based on existing institutions, 
and are according to top management directions and requirements, as will be 
explored in the empirical evidence chapter.  
4.3.3.4. Assessing evidence  
Unlike quantitative research based research, when conducting qualitative 
research and employing interviews as a research method, where the researcher 
as well as the subject takes part in the research process, it is not possible to 
validate the data in the same manner as one would in quantitative based 
research . In addition, qualitative based research studies look at management 
accounting as a socially constructed reality in which the relationship between 
different variables are explained through theories that “must include reference 
to mechanisms or processes by which the relationship among the variables 
identified is generated” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p.20).  McKinnon 
(1988) has also stated that although field research differs from experimental or 
survey based research, in the sense that the former is concerned with 
“describing or modelling the complex pattern of roles and interactions that 
comprise a particular process or phenomenon”; while the latter is concerned 
with studying causal relationships, or the correlation between different variables 
(p.36). It is important in both types of research “that the researcher is studying 
the variables, phenomenon or process he or she purports to be studying and 
that the data obtained are reliable” (McKinnon, 1988, p.36). 
Different tactics and strategies are therefore recommended to establish the 
quality of empirical social research. For example, Yilmaz (2013, pp.318-319) 
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demonstrated that: “since qualitative research is focused on meaning and 
interpretation in cases which are unique and context-bound” and as the 
“ontological, epistemological, and theoretical assumptions of qualitative 
research are fundamentally different from those of quantitative research, it 
should be judged on its own terms”. Qualitative researchers thus argue for 
different standards in judging the quality of research, as Scapens (2004) 
summarised:  
… whereas traditionally, empirical and especially quantitative researcher talk 
about reliability, validity and generalisability, in the case of study research we 
should think in terms of procedural reliability (credibility), contextual validity 
(plausibility) and transferability (p.270).   
The following sections will address these terms and how they are utilised in the 
current research for evidence assessment.   
 Credibility/ Authenticity instead of reliability   
According to Johnson and Rasulova (2017, p.15), “research is seen as credible 
when the researcher has confidence in the truth of the findings with regard to 
the subjects of research and the context where it was conducted”.  Qualitative 
research creditability also concerns the relationship of the researcher with the 
field work; where “the researcher needs to stay close to data but at a reflexive 
distance from it” (ibid, p.15).  Enhancing qualitative research’s credibility can be 
achieved by following different strategies, including: (1) prolonged engagement, 
and (2) triangulation (Baxter and Chua, 2008; Johnson and Rasulova, 2016). 
In terms of the prolonged engagement of the researcher in the research field, 
the present researcher spent a good amount of time at the case study 
company.  This helped to understand the settings of the case study, building 
trust between the researcher and the participants, which allowed interviewees 
to talk comfortably during the interviews and, in turn, enriched the data 
collected.  Additionally, according to McKinnon (1988), spending more time in 
the research field can increase the research’s credibility, as spending a 
substantial amount of time in the research field leads to: 
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1. Decreasing the researcher’s biases, as it allows the researcher to get a better 
understanding of the studied phenomenon’s background. 
2. Decreasing the possibility of the researcher filling in many interpretation gaps 
based on his/her own values, projections, and expectations. 
3. Allowing the researcher to focus and follow with a patient and relaxed attitude 
to form research patterns. 
4. Allowing the researcher to discover any anomalous data which may change 
his/her earlier preconceptions of the research phenomenon 
5. Decreasing observer-caused effect as, according to Kidder (1981, p.109): 
“the more the participant observer is immersed in the research setting, the less 
likely the research subjects are to distort the research” 
6. Allowing the researcher to collect more data and to observe more events; 
which, in turn, facilitates the collection of more evidence related to the research 
phenomenon 
In terms of triangulation, interviews are the main data collection method in this 
research and, according to Yin (2009), “interviewees’ responses are subject to 
the common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation” 
(pp108-9). Accordingly, to avoid such bias, in this research data, which was 
collected from interviews, it was compared with data collected from other 
sources (i.e., multiple sources of data, or triangulation), such as the 
organisation’s web-site, documents provided by different interviewees, 
participant observation, and the cross-checking of what different interviewees’ 
perceptions on the two changes implemented within PackCo were. Using 
multiple sources of evidence, i.e., triangulation, thus increases the credibility of 
the current research. 
 Plausibility instead of validity  
According to Baxter and Chua (2008), plausibility concerns “what is it about the 
way in which the researcher writes that makes his/her field research sensible 
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and believable” (p.106).  Three aspects were identified in the literature that thus 
constitute plausibility: (1) external validity; (2) internal validity, and (3) construct 
validity (Scapens, 1990; 2004; Yin, 2009) 
External validity concerns research findings’ generalisability. In other words, are 
the case study findings generalisable beyond the immediate case study (Yin, 
2009)? In relation to this research, are the findings of PackCo’s MA change as a 
process case study, as explored in Chapter 7, applicable to other NOROMCs?  
Yin (2009) points out that external validity represents a barrier to doing case 
studies, and research based on a single case study is criticised, in the sense 
that it offers a poor basis for generalising findings. He added, that such critiques 
are more related to survey-based research which is concerned mainly with 
generalising findings that are based on sample results (i.e., the sample is 
intended to be generalisable to a larger universe). However, “this analogy to 
samples and universes is incorrect when dealing with case studies”, as survey-
based research looks for statistical, and not analytical, generalisability as case-
study-based research (ibid, p.43). Yin (2009) emphasised this point, and stated: 
“in analytical generalisation, the investigator is striving to generalise a particular 
set of results to some broader theory” (p.43).  
Accordingly, this research is not intended, or expected, to present results that 
will represent MA change as a process and the way it unfolds through time 
within all NOROMCs. Instead, the main focus of this research is to produce 
results that could be generalised to a broader theory, which is Burns and 
Scapens (2000) MA change as a process framework (OIE). This research 
therefore contributes to the extension of that framework, as has been explored 
in the theory chapter.  
Second, internal validity concerns the relationship between variables, and is 
more closely related to explanatory case studies (Yin, 2009).  However, “in case 
study research this criterion is replaced by the notion of contextual validity, 
which indicates the credibility of the case study evidence and the resulting 
conclusions drawn” (Scapens, 2004, p.269).  Contextual validity can be 
achieved through evidence triangulation (ibid).  In other words, the researcher 
may compare evidence collected in relation to the same issue, but through the 
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use of different sources of evidence, i.e., interviews, documents, and/or 
websites.  For example, in PackCo mobilising the power of resources to impose 
the new BSC rules within the organisation was highlighted by the PackCo GM.  
The validity of this claim was confirmed also by different interviewees within 
PackCo, as detailed in Chapter 7. 
Third, construct validity concerns: “how theoretical constructs are 
operationalised in messy-real world data” (Lillis, 2006, p.461).  To achieve 
construct validity, the results and findings of this research were discussed and 
presented at different academic events throughout the study period. 
Presentations were made at different stages of the research process, including 
the post-data collection phase, as well as the post-analysis stage. At each 
event, above, an abstract, PowerPoint presentation, and sometimes a work-in-
progress article, would be available to the audience.  
Additionally, peer-reviewing with other PhD students at other conferences 
attended by the researcher, as well as with colleagues in accounting 
departments, either at Exeter or in Oman, also helped to enhance and construct 
the validity of the study.  This helped to enhance the quality of the current 
research, in the sense of exploring the implicit meanings of different research 
perspectives that may remain implicit in the researcher’s mind only and thus to 
overcome ‘biased interpretation’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Scapens, 2004). 
 Transferability instead of generalisability  
Transferability in qualitative research is argued to be an alternative to the term 
generalisability is quantitative research.  With qualitative research, 
… the objective of individual case studies is to explain the particular 
circumstances of the case, whereas the objective of a research programme 
based on these case studies is to generate theories capable of explaining all 
the observations made.  As case studies seek to apply theories in new contexts, 
the theory is likely to be refined and/or modified, and, through this process the 
theory is generalised.  
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i.e., transferability (Scapens, 2004, p.269).  This aspect was highlighted earlier 
in this chapter and will also be detailed later in it. 
4.3.4. Identifying patterns and N-Vivo software  
Coding or pattern identification is integral when conducting qualitative research; 
as it guides the researcher throughout the analysis process (Neuman, 2006). 
Coding helps the researcher in mechanical data reduction and analytical 
categorisation. In this research, N-Vivo software was used to identify patterns, 
as explored below. 
For this research, themes and patterns emerged as the case study progressed. 
An outline, based on Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as a process 
framework propositions developed. That helped to figure out any missing 
connection in empirical data and suggested avenues for further investigation 
(Scapens, 1990).More evidence was collected, which allows the discovery of 
new patterns or themes, and the addition of new connections. That lead 
sometimes to a re-interpretation of the previously collected evidence. Pattern 
development helped to articulate and explain the case study. Specifically, 
patterns emerged from the research used to explain the findings, as well as by 
referring to theories which were adopted in prior case studies in order to explain 
the case study. This allows for the extension of the theory to meet a newly 
emerged pattern, as explored in the theory chapter, and this will be detailed in 
the empirical chapter.  
Although different patterns that related to management accounting change as a 
process within the Omani context emerged through the first stage of data 
collection, i.e., the survey results,33 the major pattern that emerged was the role 
of power in shaping the management accounting change as a process. 
Additionally, more patterns emerged as the case study progressed, including: 
the role of the rewards systems in shaping the MA change as a process, as 
mentioned in theory chapter. The rest of this section therefore outlines the use 
of N-Vivo to identify patterns (the coding process) of the PackCo case study. 
                                            
33
 see part 2 of Chapter 5 
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4.3.5. Data analysis and theory engrossment  
According to Yin (2009, p.127), “the analysis of case study evidence is one of 
the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies. Too many 
times, investigators start case studies without having the foggiest notion about 
how the evidence is to be analyzed”. Yin identified five qualitative analytical 
techniques: pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic 
models, and cross-case synthesis. This section refers to the data analysis 
techniques adopted in this research. 
The main analysis technique used in this research is explanation building, which 
is “a special type of pattern-matching” (Yin, 2009). Analysing data based on 
pattern-matching is about comparing the empirical research with what had been 
predicted, i.e., comparing the findings of the PackCo case study with the main 
arguments of Burns and Scapens (2000). The process of explanation building 
based on pattern-matching is ‘iterative’ in nature. Based on this analysis 
technique, and according to Yin (2009, p.143), “the eventual explanation is 
likely to be a result of a series of iterations” as will be detailed below. 
Alternatively, Yin (1994, p.111) has stated: “in that, propositions (initial and 
subsequent) are continuously revisited throughout the data collection and 
analysis phase until a final explanation can be derived”. Yin (2009, p.143) 
summarised these series of iterations as follow: 
 Making an initial theoretical statement or an initial proposition about policy or 
social behaviour 
 Comparing the findings of an initial case against such a statement or 
proposition  
 Revising the statement or proposition  
 Comparing other details of the case against the revision 
 Comparing the revision to the facts of a second, third, or more cases 
 Repeating this process as many times as is needed 
Precisely, and according to the empirical results of this study, the explanation 
building process can be summarised in these series of iterations. The study 
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started with an initial proposition that was based on Burns and Scapens (2000) 
MA change as a process framework: 
Employees within PackCo will resist the BSC and ERP system as new 
rules associated with both changes conflict with existing routines and 
taken-for-granted ways of doing things 
As more evidence, mainly from interviews, was collected throughout the 
research process, new patterns emerged. The initial phase of evidence 
collection revealed that Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as process 
framework explains the proposition made above. However, there were some 
elements, such as power mobilisation and the rewards system, which were not 
strongly present in this framework, as already referred to in the theory chapter. 
Two new patterns therefore emerged from the collection of more evidence, 
reviewing the initial proposition, and comparing new evidence against the initial 
proposition. These two propositions were power mobilisation by top managers, 
and the effect of the rewards system in shaping the change process.  
Power mobilisation by top managers was a dominant pattern based on the 
empirical evidence of this study. Top managers enforced and imposed the 
change within PackCo by utilising different sources of power, as explored in the 
empirical evidence chapter. Additionally, linking new rules with the rewards 
system was also a dominant pattern, especially with the introduction and 
implementation of BSC, see Chapter 7.Other theoretical propositions were 
therefore required and considered to support and expand Burns and Scapens 
(2000) theoretical propositions (see Chapter 3 for more details). 
Two extra propositions were thus developed based on Hardy’s (1996) power 
mobilisation framework and a literature review of rewards system effects on 
shaping how MA as process of change unfolds over time . 
Although new rules introduced with the changes challenged existing 
ways of doing things, employees were enforced to implement the 
change by top management through mobilising different sources of 
power 
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Employees resisted the change, and the associated change in 
existing ways of doing things, due to the effect of the change in the 
financial rewards 
This iterative nature of explanation building, based on pattern-matching, 
therefore helped to utilise Burns and Scapens (2000) management accounting 
change framework, Hardy’s (1996) power framework, and the effect of the 
rewards system in shaping how MA change as a process evolved. Based on the 
empirical findings of this study, an expansion and extension of Burns and 
Scapens (2000) MA change as a process framework was proposed, as 
explored in the theory chapter. As a result, a more robust and powerful 
framework and theoretical propositions resulted from expanding on Burns’ and 
Scapens’ (2000) framework (see Chapter 3). Such a framework can be 
facilitated to explain MA change as a process within organisations. Specifically, 
the theoretical proposition results based on this study is that it is quite 
reasonable to take Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework and to conceptualise 
the process of change over time; mainly in terms of persistence between the 
new rules and the existing institution. However, it is not the ‘institutionalised’ 
taken-for-granted assumptions that necessarily primarily influence the change 
process. Instead, there are other dynamics that are not so explicitly dealt with in 
the Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework; namely: power mobilisation and 
incentive schemes. 
4.3.5.1.1. N-vivo  
According to Yin (2009), with case-study based research it is difficult to analyse 
data especially for novices. It is thus useful to use some sort of analytical tool to 
produce the required analytical results. Additionally, the researcher needs to 
know how to use the tool and what to look for; i.e., to have an overall analytical 
strategy.  
Accordingly, in this research, a computer-assisted tool, namely, -N-Vivo - was 
adopted to facilitate the analysis of the research data and findings. N-Vivo is 
one of the computer-assisted tools (CAT, hereafter) that is used for qualitative 
data analysis. This tool is powerful and contains different functions, including: 
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helping the researcher to code and categorise large amounts of data collected 
from interviews, documents, videos, and various sources of data collection 
methods (Yin, 2009). To use such a CAT, it is important to realise that there are 
two important key words: ‘assisted’ and ‘tools’. In other words, “the software will 
not do any analysis for you, but it may serve as an able assistant and reliable 
tool” with which to code and build patterns from your data (Yin, 2009, p.128).  
Similarly to different CATs, N-Vivo was utilised in this research to develop 
codes and organise the collected data to facilitate a better understanding of the 
MA change as a process (Bringer et al., 2006; Woods et al., 2016; Davidson et 
al., 2016). Precisely, how different change process dynamics, based on Burns 
and Scapens; (2000) MA change framework, including: power, rule, routines, 
and institution, shaped the change as a process that unfold over time. 
Additionally, other change dynamics also emerged from the data. These are:  
employees’ rewards and Omanisation, as will be explored later in the empirical 
chapter, and as mentioned earlier in the theory chapter. The following parts of 
this section detail the usage of N-Vivo in developing and identifying patterns 
(codes) for the PackCo case study. 
After downloading N-Vivo from the University of Exeter website, I started to 
upload all of the interview transcriptions into it. Initially, there were around six 
codes that emerged from the field work, including: company background, 
balanced scorecard, ERP system, power mobilisation, old IT system, and new 
partner effect. After developing those codes, I started reading again through the 
interviews, line by line, and to assign different quotations to various existing, as 
well as emerging, codes, as this became needed. Moreover, sub-codes were 
also created. This process took around 6 weeks, as I had to go through each 
and every line in each interview. When the first part of the coding was done, this 
resulted in quite a large number of codes, around 70. As this process is 
‘iterative’; i.e., the researcher is able to gradually adjust existing codes to build 
more complex categories of codes, the 70 codes were reviewed, some of them 
were combined and others were categorised as sub-codes, instead of being a 
main code. Finally, the researcher ended up with 13 main codes34 .  
                                            
34
 Codes are referred to as nodes within N-Vivo 
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Unlike statistical results, where the researcher can use the same CAT-output for 
analysis, with the N-Vivo results the researcher needs to figure out if any 
meaningful patterns are emerging (Siccama and Penna, 2008; Robertson, 
2008; Kikooma, 2010; Bouten and Hoozée, 2013; Hopper and Bui, 2016).As Yin 
(2009) has stated, N-Vivo results do not help in “developing a rich and full 
explanation or even a good description of your case, in response to your initial 
how and why questions, instead you will require much post-computer thinking 
and analysis in your part” (p.128).   
The final codes that the researcher ended up with emerged based on the main 
research questions, which related to how and why management accounting 
change as a process unfolds within PackCo. Additionally, following the 
theoretical concepts in Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change process 
framework facilitated the development of other nodes within Nvivo. Additionally, 
some codes emerged and had an effect in shaping how the change as a 
process evolved, but they were not emphasised either in the initial coding stage 
or in the theoretical framework. For example, the effect of the rewards system in 
shaping the MA change as a process, is already mentioned in the theory 
chapter and will be explored further in the empirical chapter. The following 
section demonstrates data analysis and theory engrossment based on patterns 
identified through the use of the N-Vivo software. 
4.3.6. Report writing  
Finally, the researcher needs to write up a report to “make the case and its 
explanations intelligible and plausible to outsiders” (Scapens, 1990, p.276). The 
case report write up should convince the reader that the researcher 
understands all of the case’s circumstances, and that all given explanations 
should be based on sound reasoning.  
In general, Yin (2009) enforced the importance of having an ‘analytic strategy’35 
in order to develop or craft the case study story, as “the strategy will help the 
researcher to treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling analytic conclusions, 
                                            
35
 The four general analytic strategies mentioned by Yin (2009) are: (1) relying on theoretical propositions, 
(2) developing a case study description, (3) using both qualitative and quantitative data, and (4) examining 
rival explanations. 
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and rule out alternative interpretations” (p.130). Among those analytic strategies 
is: relying on theoretical propositions to craft the case study story. In this 
research, Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change process framework was 
mainly36 applied to develop the theoretical propositions of the case study and to 
craft the case study story as well; as, Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) framework 
helped in shaping the research questions. Specifically, how and why did the MA 
change as a process within PackCo evolve, and what are the different change 
dynamics that shape, and are shaped, by the change process? Utilising this 
framework therefore helped to focus attention on certain data, and to ignore 
other data throughout the case study writing up process. In addition, developing 
a case description was also applied initially as the researcher faced some 
difficulty in shaping the case study story at the early analysis stage and 
according to the theoretical propositions’ strategy. Applying such analytic 
strategies therefore facilitated the writing up of a theoretically infused case 
study chapter, which is Chapter 7. 
4.3.7. Weaknesses and limitations of case studies  
Similarly to other research methods, the case study method also has some 
limitations. This section demonstrates those limitations, according to Scapens 
(1990). Scapens (1990) has stated that, traditionally, research based on one 
case study is criticised due to lack of the possibility to find generalisability. 
However, and as already mentioned above, qualitative research based on case 
studies focuses on developing and generalising theory, instead of findings. As 
argued earlier, research based on case studies aims at theory generalisation, 
not statistical generalisation, and this results in the theoretical implications of 
the research report, i.e., other case studies can implement a similar theoretical 
framework to explain their findings. The implications of this research will be 
referred to in the last chapter. As such, “case study research has its own 
internal rigour and is capable of generalisation”; but there are some limitations 
to case study as a research method, as will be detailed below (Scapens, 1990, 
p.276). 
                                            
36
 As mentioned in the theory chapter, Hardy’s (1996) power mobilisation framework and the effect of the 
reward system in the change process also supported and extended the theoretical propositions of Burns 
and Scapens MA change as a process framework  
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First, it is not easy to draw boundaries around the case study subject matter 
(Llewellyn, 1992; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996, 
Hansen, 2011). This is due to the holistic and historical perspectives of socially 
constructed qualitative accounting researches (see Chapters 3 and 4). 
Specifically, and in relation to this research, it should be clear how changes 
within PackCo relate to the changes in the packaging industry, both in Oman 
and globally, to NOROMCs, and to the Omani context, in general. More 
precisely, the current researcher should be clear about how far to extend and 
expand the case study in order to explain the interrelations between case study 
and social system. Similarly, with the historical dimension, the researcher 
should be particular about how far back in time the researcher should probe, as 
the research looks at how management accounting change as a process 
unfolds over time. As such, the researcher should be satisfied with the 
approximations; boundaries and time scopes of the case study, as detailed in 
Chapter 7. 
The social reality of case-study-based accounting research raises the second 
difficulty for researchers. Specifically, as this type of research is regarded as a 
social, and not as a natural phenomenon (Scapens, 1994; Vaivio, 1999; 
Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; Flick, 2002; Potter, 2005; Irvine and Gaffikin, 
2006; Lounsbury, 2008; Parker, 2014), it is thus difficult to consider the 
researcher as a neutral independent observer and human beings must be 
involved in the research to understand the research as a social system. As 
such, “the social reality must be interpreted by the researcher and, thus, case 
studies represent an interpretation of the social reality” (Scapens, 1990, p.277). 
This raises the problem of researcher bias, and to avoid or reduce the effect of 
such a difficulty, different evidence and data assessments techniques are used 
throughout the research process, as already outlined above. Despite all this, “it 
has to be accepted that case study research provides an interpretation of the 
social system being studied, not an objective representation” (ibid, p.277). 
Finally, the third difficulty in conducting case study research is related to ethical 
issues, i.e., the researcher’s relationship with the research subjects (Scapens, 
1990; Vaivio, 2008; Taylor and Scapens, 2016). Specifically, as various social 
constructive accounting research projects require access to organisations and 
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their related confidential information; then, to get such access, confidentiality 
must be assured to the research subjects. This can be achieved through also 
implementing different research techniques, including gaining informed consent 
from all of the research subjects to clarify for them the nature and scope of the 
research, making clear that their participation in the research is voluntary, and 
protecting their privacy (Scapens, 1990). The researcher has to be clear that all 
of the information provided will be dealt with in a confidential manner. This 
allows the subject to feel secure and to be more open in providing information. 
The researcher also has to provide some disguised information about the 
organisation studied, and this may affect the exploration of the organisational 
context, but it raises the confidentiality of the research (ibid). Similarly, it is 
important that the researcher consider confidentiality when dealing with different 
members of an organisation in order to get more views and opinions from them. 
Maintaining such confidentiality may result in difficulty in checking the validity of 
evidence through the subjects, and that can be avoided by using validity and 
reliability techniques, as mentioned above. 
4.4. Conclusion  
This chapter has detailed the research paradigm that has been used to explore 
the different management accounting change dynamics which shape how 
change as a process evolves within an organisation. Specifically, the chapter 
has outlined the philosophical assumptions that underpin this research 
(research design) as well as the research strategy. 
The research design is based on the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979). From 
their work the research’s philosophical assumptions were identified. According 
to their framework, accounting research’s philosophical assumptions are 
classified into two dimensions; namely: the nature of social science and the 
nature of society. These, in turn, shape the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of the research, and also have implications for the research 
methodology. 
In short, in this research, a social constructivist ontological assumption has 
been adopted. To study MA change as a process, it is thus important to 
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consider the context in which change evolves, and to look at change as a 
process. Where different change dynamics’ interactions drive the change, and 
the change is not explained as a linear relationship between different change 
dynamics. Accordingly, an interpretive epistemological assumption is used in 
this research. By adopting such an epistemological assumption, the researcher 
needs to depend on participants’ views to acquire the requisite knowledge in 
relation to how MA change as a process unfolds over time within an 
organisation, and how different change dynamics shape, and are shaped, by 
the change as a process.  
Accordingly, a case study (interpretive) was adopted in the research to 
investigate/ explore the research questions. Specifically, qualitative research 
methodology is adopted as a result of adopting socially constructive and 
interpretive assumptions, which allow the researcher to better understand the 
research context, history and to obtain micro-details of an organisation and its 
institutional life. This will facilitate a better understanding of how change as a 
process evolves within an organisation. Evidence was collected from different 
sources, but mainly through semi-structured interviews. N-Vivo was used to 
organise and identify case study patterns, which were used to craft the case 
study report and to analyse it. The next chapter gives a general background to 
the Omani operating context, followed by a chapter which highlights the 
diffusion of various MAPs within NOROMCs (i.e., survey results). Chapter 7 
then introduces the description as well as the theory infused analysis of the 
PackCo case study. 
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CHAPTER 5 : RESEARCH CONTEXT (OMAN) 
5. Introduction  
Context cannot be ignored when exploring MA change as a process within an 
organisation. Actually, the importance of context in shaping how MA change as 
a process unfolds over time, is referred to by various studies, as already 
explored in Chapter 2 (Kloot and Martin, 2000; Kasurinen, 2002; Chanegrith, 
2008; Hopper et al., 2008), Chapter 3 (Burns and Scapens, 2000), and Chapter 
4 (Pettigrew, 1997; Neumau, 2006Parker, 2008). This chapter therefore 
presents the research context, which is the Sultanate of Oman (hereafter, 
Oman). It mainly demonstrates the major changes that the Omani business 
environment has witnessed during the last four decades. Specifically, the 
chapter provides some details of issues which could influence the practice of 
organisations and, eventually, management accounting practices. The chapter’s 
chief purpose is to demonstrate the main investing opportunities and constraints 
within Oman. That, in turn, affects the competitiveness level within the country, 
as well as the operation of various organisations operating in Oman and in due 
course, the MAPs adopted by those companies. Additionally, as this research’s 
ontological assumption is social constructivist, i.e., it focuses on the context 
within which management accounting change as a process evolves, and the 
complexity and interdependence between the context and MAPs, as explored 
earlier in the previous chapter. Similarly, and as referred to in Chapter 2, 
ignoring the change context may result in a delay, or even in an unsuccessful 
implementation of MA change and how change as a process unfolds over time 
(Kasurinen, 2002). Then, exploring the Omani context is important in 
understanding how MA as process of change unfolds within PackCo, as will be 
detailed in Chapter 7.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into 3 more sections. In the next 
section, a general background of the Omani context is provided. This is followed 
by a general background to the Omani economy, with an emphasis on the 
changes within the economy. Section 3, below, focuses on the industrial sector 
in Oman- and the emphasis is on non-oil-related Omani manufacturing 
companies (NOROMCs) - with a focus on the Alrusayal Industrial Estate.  
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5.1. Oman demographic and economic background 
This section introduces a background to the Omani context in general; with a 
focus on the Omani demographic and economic backgrounds. 
5.1.1. Demographic background 
The Sultanate of Oman owns a strategic location, as it is located at the junction 
of the world’s two largest continents: Asia and Africa. This location is a middle 
point in the trade routes between Europe, Asia and the Far East (Oman the 
development experience and investment climate, 2003; 2008). Oman has 
borders with the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the 
West, with the Islamic Republic of Iran to the North, and the Republic of Yemen 
to the South, and the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea lie to the East of 
Oman. Oman’s total population was about 4,741,305 in 2017. Its area is 
approximately 309,500 sq. kms., with a coastline of almost 1,700 kms. The 
monetary unit of Oman is the Omani Rial (R.O.; R.O. 1.000= 1000 Baizas). The 
Omani Rial is tied to the US Dollar at the rate of US$1= Baizas 385.5, and it has 
had a stable rate for the last 40 years.  
The Sultan of Oman is His Majesty Qaboos bin Said, since he acceded to the 
throne of the Sultanate on 23rd July. 1970, Oman has witnessed changes in all 
sectors, including, education, health, industry, services, etc. As my research will 
be about the changing nature of MAPs in non-oil-related manufacturing 
companies operating in Oman; it is thus important to have an overview of the 
Omani business environment and the changes to that environment. The 
following section thus describes the Omani economic background, and this is 
followed by a section that focuses on the industrial sector and its importance for 
the country’s economy and development.  
5.1.2. Omani economic background 
The Oman economy is based on oil and gas production; which is about 757,000 
barrels per day (Masan, 2016). That represents about 75% of government 
revenues and 50% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As oil is a scarce 
resource and its price is not stable; then, the Omani government set up an 
138 
 
economic vision for Oman that is called Economic Vision 2020 (Hammoudeh 
and Choi, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2011; Hamdi and Sbia, 2013). This is a 
strategic long term development plan for the period 1996-2020; which is 
basically a series of five year development plans and it outlines Oman’s 
development priorities and objectives on a long-term basis. The vision aims to 
(Doing Business in Oman, 2011, p. 5): 
> Develop local human resources and upgrade the skills of Omani citizens 
> Promote the optimal use of human and natural resources by the private 
sector in an efficient and environmentally sustainable manner. 
> Enhance private sector involvement in economic activity 
> Create suitable conditions for optimal exploitation of natural resources and 
the distinct geographical location of the Sultanate. 
> Develop a free diversified economy with a vibrant private sector, along with 
ecologically sound and balanced economic development of all the sectors 
Consequently, the Sultanate has witnessed a decrease in the contribution of oil-
related-returns to the GDP, and an increase in the contribution of non-oil-
related-activities to the GDP (Annual Industrial Report, 2014; Statistical Year 
Book, 2015). Specifically, the contribution of non-oil-related activities to the 
GDP has increased during the last 10 years; Figure 5-1 below shows the most 
recent statistics relating to the contribution of different activities to the GDP. The 
change in the contribution of different activities to the GDP components is 
attributed to the government policy of decreasing its dependence on oil and gas 
returns, as mentioned above. Furthermore, that increase was due mainly to the 
good Omani investment climate (see below), in addition to the incentives 
provided by the government to investors in non-oil-related industries, as will be 
detailed below in the following section. 
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Items  2012 2013 2014 
Millions Omani Rials 
A. Petroleum Activities 15,350.2 15,205.8 14,840.0 
Extraction of crude petroleum & incidental services 
to oil and gas 
14,239.1 14,047.0 13,780.1 
Extraction of natural gas 1,111.1  1,158.8 1,059.9 
B. Non-Petroleum activities  16,029.6 17,198.3 18,927.4 
Mining and quarrying 100.9 114.7 124.5 
Manufacturing  3,143.5 3,138.8 3,151.9 
Construction  1,747.0 1,897.0 2,054.3 
Electricity & water supply 318.9 346.2 376.2 
Public administration & defence 2,472.2 2,764.6 3,163.9 
Table 5-1: Gross Domestic Product by kind of economic activity at current prices 
(Source: Statistical Year Book, 2015) 
5.2. Oman investing opportunities and constraints  
As mentioned above, Oman has witnessed various changes in all aspects since 
his Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said started governing the country on 23rd July, 
1970. This section demonstrates the global competitiveness of Oman as a 
result of changes in the following aspects: government efficiency, country 
infrastructure, and the business and economic fields. Understanding the level of 
global competitiveness of Oman will help to explain how this competitiveness 
level affects (either by getting better investment opportunities or by constraints) 
the operation of different organisations that are operating in the Sultanate, and 
also affects the operation of the case study company, as will be detailed in 
Chapter 7.  
5.2.1. Government efficiency 
Buckley and Rynhart (2011), from the International Labour Office, reported on 
the promotion of sustainable enterprises in Oman. They believe that this 
depends on 17 conditions, including good governance, as the international 
labour conference (2007) concluded. They argued that “poor governance, 
corruption and inefficient institutions37 can discourage entrepreneurship and 
hold back private-sector growth and development” (p.3). Different key indicators 
are used to measure good governance, including government effectiveness. 
                                            
37
 Institutions here refers to organisation, and not institutions as referred to in the theory chapter. 
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Buckley and Rynhart (2011) refer to the World Bank for their government 
effectiveness definition. Accordingly, it is defined thus:   
“Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies”38. 
The government effectiveness of Oman was ranked above the other Gulf 
Cooperative Council countries (GCC hereafter) average during the years 2007-
2009. This indicates a good investment environment in Oman; and a similar 
conclusion was also reported by the World Economic Forum written by Schwab 
in 2014. Based on that report, Oman39 was ranked 33 out of 148 counties 
around the world in 2013-2014, in terms of general global competitiveness. 
Additionally, the report generated by the International Labour Office presented 
the most problematic factors for doing business in Oman and the following 
figure shows the respondents’ views on those factors40: 
 
Figure 5-1: The most problematic factors for doing business in Oman, Source: 
World Economic Forum (Schwab, p.298, 2014) 
                                            
38Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf 
39
 The global competitiveness ranking of Oman in 2014-2015 is 46/144 
40
 From the list of factors on the chart, respondents were asked to select the five they thought the most 
problematic for doing business in their country, and were asked to rank them between 1 (most 
problematic) and 5. The bars in the figure show the responses weighted according to their ranking (World 
Economic Forum, 2014) 
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The results presented in Figure 5-1, above, are in line with this research’s 
results, in terms of the challenges that face organisations operating in Oman, as 
will be presented more specifically in Chapters 6 and 7, and as will be detailed 
in Chapter 7; restrictive labour regulations, or Omanisation, and an inadequately 
educated workforce allows employees at different organisational levels to utilise 
different sources of power, and this has consequently affected how the MA 
change as process evolved within PackCo. Basically, those two highly ranked 
factors represent the minimum requirements that need to be met by all investors 
who invest in Oman. Such minimum requirements may be considered to be a 
constraint by some investors (The Report: Oman, 2013). Specifically, foreign 
investors can obtain a license from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to 
engage in a business in Oman, but only with a minimum investment capital of 
R.O. 150,000, and foreign investors are not allowed to own more than 70% of 
the company’s capital, except in certain cases41 (PKF, 2011). Second, 
according to the Omani Labour Law, there is a minimum wage requirement for 
Omanis, and all organisations operating within the country have to implement 
the law. Third, there is an Omanisation programme that has been in operation in 
the country since 1988 (Group, 2013). The main objective of this programme is 
to replace expatriates with Omanis (Al-lamki, 2000; Al-lamki, 2005). Actually, 
the programme’s objective is not only to ensure a job for each citizen, but also 
to reduce Oman’s dependence on expatriates and thus ensure self-reliance. 
There is therefore a ratio of Omanisation which must be met by an organisation 
and that is stipulated by the Ministry of Manpower. For the industrial sector, the 
ratio of Omanisation is 35% (Oman Information Center). The last two minimum 
requirements represent a problematic factor for those who might wish to invest 
in Oman, as emphasised by various interviewees,42  as is made clear in Figure 
5-1, above. Such governmental requirements present a source of power for 
Omanis working within industrial organisations, and sometimes forces 
organisations to adopt the new MA change rules, as will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 7. 
                                            
41
 The Council of Ministries, on a recommendation from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, may allow 
100% foreign ownership in an Omani Company, subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions: 
1.The capital of the company should not be less than RO 500,000 
2.Projects contribute towards economic development OR in the case of a direct government contract, a 
foreign company can register a branch or 100% subsidiary (PKF, 2011, p.13) 
42
 See Part 2 of this chapter 
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On the other hand, as the government realises the importance of foreign 
investments in developing the country’s economy, it provides different 
incentives for foreign investment, especially direct long-term foreign 
investments (Investment Climate Statement, 2015). This is reflected in the 
foreign investment law, as will be detailed below, and is also emphasised by 
several national and international reports. Those reports have indicated that 
there are many advantages for investors who invest in Oman (PKF43 Report, 
2011; Buckley and Rynhart, 2011). For example, the PKF International Report 
(p.1) provided a list of advantages that are granted by the law in regard to doing 
business in Oman, and these may encourage foreign investors to invest in 
Oman. They are: 
> Liberal foreign ownership in companies is permitted. 
>  Capital and profits of a business entity can be fully repatriated. 
> No personal income-tax. All individuals can fully repatriate their savings. 
> Low income tax rate structure for companies, and double taxation relief 
treaties available with many countries44. 
> Income tax holiday period of five years, renewable for further period of five 
years, available for business entities engaged in priority areas of economic 
development, i.e., the private sector and non-oil-related investments. 
Additionally, investors who invest within the Sultanate can enjoy these two extra 
advantages: 
> The Sultanate is geographically ideally located, proximity to Gulf, Asian and 
African markets, so easy access (see Figure 5-2 below), and  
> It has political stability. 
                                            
43
 PKF stands for Pannell Kerr Forster 
44
 Presently Oman has double tax avoidance treaties with 29 countries, including the UK, Canada, 
Singapore, and other. 
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Figure 5-2: Sultanate of Oman location in world map45 
From what has been written above, it is possible to state that the Omani 
government is effectively encouraging investment in non-oil-related activities by 
providing good investment climates for both local and foreign investments. The 
following two sections present the changes which Oman has witnessed in terms 
of infrastructure, business and the economy, which make Oman a competitive 
investment destination.  
5.2.2. Business and the Economy 
Oman’s economy has changed dramatically since 1970. From being almost a 
closed economy, it has moved to being an open and globally integrated 
economy (Al Marhubi, 2000; Khalifa, 2010). This section demonstrates the 
different factors that increase the level of competitiveness within the Omani 
market, in addition to the effect of the free trade zones.  
According to different studies, and as demonstrated in Chapter 2, market 
competition is an important factor that forces organisations to introduce 
changes in order to cope with the other changes within their operating 
environment; otherwise, the organisation may be forced out of the market (Libby 
and Waterhouse, 1996; Kloot and Martin, 2000; Lamminmaki and Drury, 2001; 
                                            
45
 Source of map: http://tourofoman.om/2012/location.html 
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Haldma and Laats, 2002; Connor et al., 2004). Consequently, three factors 
make the Omani market a very competitive one: 
First, the Omani market’s size is very small, in terms of consumer numbers 
(Ernst and Young, 2011; PKF, 2011; PwC, 2015). This makes the market more 
competitive, i.e., the number of suppliers is higher than the number of 
consumers might warrant. That, in turn, puts more pressure on organisations in 
terms of their being ready to meet customers’ needs, as well as unstable market 
conditions. The importance of meeting customers’ needs and the effect of 
market competition were major forces encouraging the introduction of MA 
change within PackCo, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. Additionally, the 
interviewees in the first data collection stage46 emphasised this point, i.e., the 
small size of the Omani market, as a constraint to their expansion. For example, 
the finance and accounts manager of company 10 stated “the market over here 
(Oman) is very small, and we are trying our best to export to other countries but, 
again, we are facing a lot of competition on those markets”. 
Second, the Omani customs duty laws state that almost all products may enter 
Oman with minimum or no-customs duty, i.e., duty free (Ernst and Young, 2011; 
PKF, 2011; Affairs, 2015; PwC, 2015). That, in turn, increases the competition 
within the Omani market, as local and international players can offer the same 
product at nearly the same price, and sometimes international products will 
have lower prices, due to customs duty regulations. Additionally, and as will be 
detailed below, Oman is a member of different trading unions or organisations 
(Facts and Figures, 2015). For example, the Sultanate is a member of the GCC 
Customs Union. The Union’s members agree to remove customs and trade 
barriers among their countries. More precisely, 5% of the goods’ cost, insurance 
and freight value, apply as the customs duty for all goods traded between union 
members (PEIE). However, goods like tobacco and alcohol are subject to a 
100% customs duty rate (Ernst and Young, 2011; PKF, 2011; PwC, 2015). 
Additionally, goods imported into Oman from any country can be exempt from 
customd duty, especially food (PwC, 2015). This was also mentioned by the 
interviewed chief accountants as a factor that increases the competition level 
                                            
46
 See Chapter 6 
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within the Omani market. For instance, the Finance and IT Manager of 
Company 2 stated  
“First of all, it is a free market, i.e., it is duty free. You can get staff from 
anywhere in the world without duty. If the company has to survive in 
the Omani market or the GCC market, it has to compete with the best 
companies in the world- when such a company has established an 
international reputation and can also get the raw materials that are 
available in the local market. Here, I am importing my basic raw 
materials from 5,000 to 12,000 miles away. I have thus to overcome 
all these obstacles. With all that, we are able to reach the consumer- 
given that my value is even better than that of the imported product”. 
Third, Oman has a long history of trading and political contacts with many 
countries in the Arab world, the Indian sub-continent, the Far East, the USA, 
and East Africa (Al Yousef, 1997, p.46). Precisely, Oman is a member of the 
following organisations: The Indian RIM Association, Islamic Centre for the 
Development of Trade, League of Arab States, United Nations, World Bank, 
and World Trade Organisation (ibid). Additionally, the Sultanate has many 
bilateral agreements; including free trade agreements with the USA and 
Singapore (US Commercial Service, 2016; Facts and Figures, 2015). Being a 
member of these organisations and unions provides opportunities for free trade 
to investors within Oman and, at the same time, it increases the competition 
level in the Omani market. On the other hand, being a member of these trade 
agreements may help to bolster the Omani economy, as mentioned above, the 
competitiveness level of the Omani investors as they can export their goods to 
member countries at lower prices.  
The market can be considered to be an important change dynamic, and it can 
force organisations operating within the Omani context to introduce a change in 
their organisations, as will be demonstrated in the empirical analysis chapter. 
Various of the different interviewees assured me of this47. As the study’s 
purpose is to explore the changing nature of MA practices within non-oil-related 
                                            
47
 See Chapter 6.  
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Omani manufacturing companies; the next section demonstrates some facts 
about development in this industrial sector. 
5.3. The industrial sector in Oman- Focus on Non-Oil-Related Omani 
Manufacturing Companies (NOROMCs) 
The development of non-oil-related activities has received huge consideration 
from the government since the 1970s (Hvidt, 2013; Puglisi, Annual Industrial 
Report, 2014; Times of Oman, 2016). The government focuses on enhancing 
and improving the role of non-oil-related companies and on increasing their 
contribution to the country’s GDP in order to boost the rate of non-oil-related 
Omani products’ export (Khalifa, 2010; Hvidt, 2013; Wasty and Martin, 2014; Al-
Saqlawi et. al., 2016; Haque et. al., 2016). Consequently, the government has 
established different governmental agencies that support non-oil-related 
organisations, as well as emphasising their role within the country (PEIE; Al-
Badi et. al., 2009; Annual Industrial Report, 2014; WTO Report, 2013; Facts 
and Figures, 2015). This section highlights the importance of the NOR-sector to 
the Omani economy.  
First, due to the instability of oil prices and its limited availability, the 
government has emphasised the role of NOROMCs and their contribution to the 
country’s GDP (The Report: Oman, 2016). This was ensured in the 7th Strategic 
Plan (1996-2000).48 This plan’s objectives included (Strolla and Peri, 2013; 
2016): 
> Paying attention to the development of non-oil-related activities. 
> Providing more facilities for non-oil-related industrial organisations, in terms 
of easing their exporting activities by developing needed infrastructures, 
such as seaports, airports, and free-zones. 
>  Paying attention to small and medium size organisations by providing 
financial and administrative support for them, without ignoring the 
importance of large organisations in developing the country’s economy. 
                                            
48
 The Third Cycle of the Oman Vision 2020 (1985-2020) 
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> Taking advantage of various regional and international agreements to enter 
new markets. 
Second, based on Sultani Decree number 52/2011, the Public Authority for 
Investment and Export Development (Ithraa) was established in March, 201149. 
The vision of this organisation is to create new income resources for the country 
through promoting investments in the non-oil-related sector, as well as 
developing their exports (Ithraa, 2016). This can be achieved through motivating 
local and foreign investors to invest in the non-oil-related sector through 
improving the services provided to those investors. To be specific, the 
establishment’s missions are: 
> To provide information to foreign investors relating to the Omani investment 
climate, rules, and procedures. 
> To help investors to finish formal procedures, get approvals from 
governmental agencies, and to get financial loans from the government and 
commercial banks, especially small and medium size organisations50.  
> To review investment project proposals and provide consultancy to improve 
the project’s launch strategy. 
> To help local investors to know potential foreign investors and vice versa  
> To organise and attend workshops, seminars, and conferences to introduce 
Oman as an attractive investing destination. 
> To review investment rules, regulations, and procedures to provide 
recommendations to concerned governmental agencies in order to improve 
them and to decrease investment constraints. 
Third, in1993, the government established the Public Establishment of Industrial 
Estates (PEIE), based on Sultani Decree 4/93. The main office of the 
establishment is located in the Al Ruysal Industrial Area51. The establishment’s 
vision and mission are to attract industrial investments and provide continuous 
support to investors through providing incentives to them and strengthening 
                                            
49
 https://www.ithraa.om/ 
50
 More details will provided below in relation to the importance of small and medium size organisations  
51
 More details about the industrial areas within the country will be provided  
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Oman’s position as a leading regional centre for investment. The 
establishment’s main objectives are52: 
> To help existing and new establishment members53 in improving their 
operations and entering the global market. 
> To promote Oman as a vital, vibrant trading destination, based on the 
availability of natural, cultural, and human resources. 
> To continue to improve industrial areas and related workplaces to meet the 
current needs of existing and potential members. 
The efforts of all these establishments and governmental agencies in improving 
the investment in non-oil-related sector is reflected in the improvement in, and 
increased number of, investment in this sector, as Figure 5-5 demonstrates. 
Additionally, Figure 5-6 below shows that the level of direct foreign investment 
in the non-oil-related industrial sector has also increased in recent years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
52
 https://www.peie.om/ 
53
 The members include all non-oil-related manufacturing companies operating in the different industrial 
areas that are located within the country.  
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Industrial 
Activity 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
Total Investment Omani Rials (000) Number of non-oil-
related companies 
Food, 
Beverages, & 
Tobacco 
382,136 431,114 441,478 430 442 454 
Spinning, 
Weaving, 
Textiles, & 
Leather 
182,413 182,555 182,716 62 74 82 
Wood Products 96,996 101,756 105,712 141 156 164 
Paper products, 
Printing, & 
Publishing 
114,331 117,211 119,419 101 115 121 
Chemicals 
Products 
5,886,528 5,943,522 5,977,436 294 308 330 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 
Products  
2,082,427 2,093,546 2,110,351 51 58 65 
Basic Metal 
Industries 
2,082,427 2,093,546 2,110,351 53 64 71 
Fabricated 
Metal Products 
2,861,572 2,873,623 2,905,357 268 279 321 
Other 
Manufacturing 
Industries  
9,592,245 9,657,950 10,471,423 806 854 910 
Total  23,281,077 23,494,823 24,424,243 2,206 2,350 2,518 
Table 5-2: Number and total investment of registered manufacturing companies 
in Oman according to industrial activity, Source: Statistical year book, 2015 
Additionally, the government has provided extra incentives for investors who 
invest in non-oil-related activities in order to enhance the role of these 
companies within the country (PKF, 2011; PwC, 2015). Firstly, those companies 
are exempt from duties on imported machinery and equipment, spare parts, 
basic raw materials, semi-processed materials, and filling and packaging 
materials that are used in production for the organisation’s full production life. 
Second, non-oil-related manufacturing companies get a special low rate for 
electricity consumption, since electricity is the main power used for machinery 
operation. Third, those companies receive financial support from the Oman 
Development Bank for exporting their goods and importing inventories (either 
finished goods or raw material), as well as insuring those goods. This helps in 
developing their operations, as they feel more secure. Fourth, the government 
provides support for locally produced products in terms of buying them through 
governmental bodies and agencies, instead of buying imported ones.  Fifth, the 
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government provide well developed industrial plots for setting up projects at 
concessional lease rents (PKF, 2011). 
Industry 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Millions Omani Rials 
Oil & Gas Exploration  2,744.9 2,801.5 3,018.0 3,577.1 4,081.3 
Financial 
Intermediation  
806.1 829.9 961.1 1,130.1 1,183.9 
Manufacturing  958.4 1,257.5 1,185.9 1,006.4 924.1 
Real estate-Renting & 
Business Activities  
312.9 403.6 413.7 458.5 507.0 
Trade 171.8 202.1 230.1 242.1 258.0 
Constructions  167.5 181.1 172.1 182.8 203.1 
Transport-Storage & 
Communication  
167.9 221.1 204.7 194.7 188.5 
Hotels & Restaurants 72.9 89.2 91.4 85.2 165.6 
Electricity & Water 68.3 69.9 74.0 73.5 76.4 
Other 35.0 34.7 45.9 48.3 48.3 
Total  5,505.7 6,090.6 6,396.9 6,998.7 7,636.2 
Table 5-3: Direct Foreign Investment by Industry Type, Sources (Foreign 
Investment Reports, 2014; p. 24 
5.3.1. Industrial estates in Oman- Focus on the Al-Rusayl Industrial Estate  
This section gives a summary of the Omani industrial estates, with a focus on 
the Al-Rusayl Industrial Estate, since the research was conducted in the 
manufacturing companies that operate in this specific industrial estate, for 
various reasons that were detailed in the methodology chapter.  
Due to the importance of diversifying the sources of the national income, 
creating a convenient investment environment in the Sultanate, creating job 
opportunities for citizens, and the need tp exploitation local raw materials; the 
government took the initiative in 1983 of establishing the first industrial estate: – 
the Al Rusayl Industrial Estate. It was formally opened in 1985, and it is located 
in the capital, Muscat. Consequently, five more industrial estates were 
developed around the country, in different locations, as indicated in Figure 5-7, 
below. Table 5-4, below, gives some important highlights about all the industrial 
estates. Increasing the number of industrial estates improves the national return 
from industrial activities, especially non-oil-related activities, since establishing 
industrial estates in different areas of the country allows investors to have 
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branches in different cities in the Sultanate. This facilitates the provision of 
better services to customers, as well as the development of those cities.  
 
Figure 5-3: Location of industrial estates within the Sultanate, Source: 
Communication and Investors Services Center 
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Industrial 
Estate∗∗ 
Year of 
establishment 
Location∗ # of 
existing 
businesses 
Nearest 
airport 
Nearest 
free 
zone 
Nearest 
seaport 
Al 
Rusayl 
1983 Muscat  211 Muscat 
international 
10km 
Sohar 
223km 
Sohar 
223km 
Sohar 1992 Batinah 
North 
239 Muscat 
international  
223km 
Sohar 
5km 
Sohar  
6km 
Raysut 1992 Dhofar 116 Salalah 
international 
15km 
Al 
Mazynah 
260km 
Salalah 
4km 
Sur 1999 Alsharqiya 64 Muscat 
international  
200km 
Sohar 
448km 
Sohar  
448km 
Nizwa 1994 Aldakhliya 68 Muscat 
international  
140km 
Sohar 
300km 
Sohar 
300km 
Buraimi 1998 Aldhahira  477 Muscat 
international  
300km 
Sohar 
120km 
Sohar 
120km 
Smail 2010 Aldakhliya 22 Muscat 
international  
50km 
Sohar 
260km 
Sohar 
260km 
Table 5-4: Important highlights about industrial estates in Oman, Source: 
Industrial Annual Report, 2014 
∗The location name refers to the governorate where the industrial estate is located.  
∗∗There are also various services provided for businesses within the industrial estates, including: accommodation, 
banking, document clearance, etc.  
The remainder of this section offers some facts about the Al-Rusayl Industrial 
Estate.  It was opened on the 4h December, 1985, and is located in the Muscat 
Governorate, as indicated above. There is a modern road network that link Al-
Rusayl Industrial Estate with different areas of Muscat and with different 
governorates in the Sultanate. The nearest major highway to this industrial 
estate is the Rusayl-Nizwa highway; which connects the Muscat Governorate to 
the Albatina and Aldakhliya Governorates. 
The area of land that was prepared for the purposes of construction for 
manufacturing companies and facilities is 7.9million square meters. The 
industrial estate started with 12 manufacturing companies and there are now 
211 companies, producing different products including food, chemicals, 
electrical products, building materials, textiles, ready-made cloths, stationery 
products, and medical tools. Unfortunately, there are no statistics about the 
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amount of investment in each and every industrial estate within the Sultanate; 
but there are some general statistics that show the size, in terms of total 
investment and the number of manufacturing companies54 in each governorate, 
and that is summarised in Table 5,5, below. 
Governorate  Total investment 
R.O. (000) 
No. of manufacturing 
companies  
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
Muscat  6,673,860 6,710,926 6,793,862 719 740 771 
Dhofar  2,342,099 2,375,211 2,387,255 210 216 231 
Musandam  16,240 17,149 17,226 13 15 17 
Al Buraymi 63,257 65,194 79,843 133 147 166 
Ad 
Dakhilyah 
179,003 200,121 209,326 144 165 184 
Al Batinah 
north 
12,005,120 12,124,866 12,923,874 581 636 676 
Al Batinah 
South 
88,406 85,471 87,045 147 150 166 
Ash 
Sharqiyah 
South 
1,453,669 1,454,137 1,456,523 131 135 145 
Ash 
Sharqiyah 
North  
10,264 11,123 13,814 70 82 93 
Adh 
Dhahirah 
110,901 112,368 117,217 43 49 54 
Al Wusta 338,258 338,257 338,258 15 15 15 
Total  23,281,077 23,494,823 24,424,243 2,206 2,350 2,518 
Table 5-5: Number of registered manufacturing companies and size in total 
investment in each governorate, Source: Statistical Year Book, 2015, p.227 
As Table 5-5, above, illustrates, the number of manufacturing companies within 
Muscat, together with total investment, is the highest; confirming that the Al 
Rusyal Industrial Estate is the oldest industrial estate. This has increased the 
probability that companies will operate in the Al Rusayl Industrail Estate, 
witnessing most of the changes within the Omani economic setting, as referred 
to, above, in this chapter. Consequently, that affects how different organisations 
operate within the Omani context, as highlighted above, and this will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
                                            
54
 This may include oil-related manufacturing companies  
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5.4. Conclusion  
Oman has a strategic location, as it is located between the largest two 
continents in the world, Asia and Africa. The Sultanate has a very modern 
infrastructure that includes a good road network, health care and 
telecommunications networks. As an oil producing country, the Sultanate has 
tried to decrease the country’s dependence on oil and gas revenues, since 
those resources are scarce. This is being achieved through the different 
development plans; including: Oman Vision 2020 Different governmental bodies 
are responsible for organising the development process in Oman; in addition to 
the importance of private investment, either local or foreign. More incentives 
were thus provided to investors, which helps to increase the return from non-oil 
revenues, and to decrease the country’s dependence on oil revenue. As the 
purpose of this research is to explain MA as process of change within a 
NOROMC, the next chapter provides a general perception of the different 
management accounting practices that are used and adopted by the surveyed 
NOROMCs. This is based on survey results. This means that the survey was a 
pilot study that allowed the researcher to pull together a lot of general issues in 
relation to MA practices within NOROMCs; which then will inform issues that the 
researcher would focus on in detail and in more depth, in the case study. 
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CHAPTER 6 : MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICES IN NON-OIL-
RELATED OMANI MANUFACTURING COMPANIES  
6. Introduction 
The previous chapter offered a general background to Oman and, in particular, 
its status as an attractive, competitive setting for investment. This chapter 
explores the different management accounting practices (MAPs) adopted by 
non-oil-related Omani manufacturing companies (NOROMCs). As previously 
mentioned, the main purpose of the survey was to get a sense of the breadth of 
MAPs in NOROMCs which, in turn, will serve as a useful platform from which to 
then conduct a more in-depth explanatory case study (Please see Chapter 7). 
In addition, however, some of the surveyed respondents were further 
questioned in follow-up interviews, and the basic survey data will therefore also 
be supported by quotations from those accountants who were interviewed. As 
will be revealed, below, we observed from the survey that the most common 
drivers for changes in NOROMCs’ MAPs were: (1) the mobilisation of top 
management’s power, and (2) developments in the external operating 
environment (e.g., increasing competition and changing customer needs).  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section 
presents some general descriptive results relating to the surveyed companies. 
This is then followed by Section 6.3, a presentation of the social, political and 
economic contextual factors which affect the MAPs’ nature within the Omani 
context. In Section 6.4, there is an overall summary of the different MAPs 
adopted by those NOROMCs, comprising the survey, and also the level of 
adoption. The closing sections of the chapter then try to make some sense of 
the results, in particular, trying to understand why those NOROMCs surveyed 
(and interviewed) had, or had not, made the MAPs adoptions and changes. 
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6.1. Demographic information55 
This section provides general descriptive information relating to the 
organisations surveyed. This will help to develop a general background for the 
responding accountants and their corresponding companies. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, different studies have found that there is a direct 
relationship between various organisational characteristics and the type of 
MAPs adopted by an organisation. Luther and Longden (2001) and Haldma and 
Lääts (2002) studied the effect of ownership structure and the type of MAPs 
adopted; Al-Omiri and Drury (2007) examined the effect of industry sector on 
the costing systems used by companies; El-Ebaishi et. al. (2003) and Wu and 
Boateng (2010) reported that the bigger the company’s size the more 
opportunity there is for those companies to introduce contemporary MAPs.  As 
the main focus of this research is to explore the changing nature of MAPs, and 
how contextual factors shape the ways in which MA as a process unfolds over 
time in the case study company, this section highlights the general 
demographics of the organisations surveyed; which will help to develop a better 
understanding of the specifications of the surveyed NOROMCs, as 
demonstrated in Table 6-1 to Table 6-6. However, and as already mentioned in 
Chapter 4, finding the statistical relationship between different organisational 
characteristics and the type of MAPs adopted by the organisation, is beyond the 
focus of this study. The results presented, in this section will thus mostly be 
descriptive. 
Company ownership structure 
Percentage  Number of companies  Ownership structure  
56% n=29 100% Omani private  
21% n=11 Omani public  
21% n=11 Mixed investment 
2% n=1 Foreign investment 100% 
100% N= 52 Total  
Table 6-1: Surveyed NOROMCs ownership structure 
 
 
 
 
                                            
55
 Additional demographic information is provided in Appendix 2. 
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Company legal structure 
Percentage Number of companies  Company type 
56% n=29 Corporation 
31% n=16 Partnership 
13% n=7 Sole proprietorship  
100% N=52 Total  
Table 6-2: Surveyed NOROMCs legal structure 
Companies’ industrial sector 
Industrial sector Number of companies Percentage 
Natural resource products 11 21 
Electricity, equipment & tools 9 17 
Food & beverages 7 13 
Others56  7 13 
Plastic & paper products 6 12 
Furniture & wood products 5 10 
Chemical & pharmaceuticals 4 8 
Mixed industrial sectors 3 6 
Total  N=52 100% 
Table 6-3: Surveyed NOROMCs industrial sector 
Size of companies based on number of employees  
Number of employees Number of Companies Percentage 
Less than 10 1 2 
10-40 6 11 
41-80 15 29 
81-120  6 11 
121-160 2 4 
161-200 4 8 
More than 200 18 35 
Total  N=52 100% 
Table 6-4: Size of surveyed NOROMCs based on employee number 
Size of companies based on average annual sales 
Average annual sales Number of companies Percentage 
Information not provided 14 27 
Less than R.O. 1,000,000 6 11 
1,000,000- 5,000,000 17 33 
5,000,001-10,000,000 4 8 
10,000,001-15,000,000 4 8 
15,000,001-20,000,000 2 4 
More than 20,000,000 5 9 
Total  N=52 100% 
Table 6-5: Size of surveyed NOROMCs based on average annual sales 
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 Others industrial sectors include: clothing, paints, leather products 
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Table 6-1 (above) demonstrates that the majority of the NOROMCs surveyed 
are 100% Omani-owned companies. Although foreign investment represented 
only 2% of the capital of the surveyed NOROMCs, this amount is actually 
increasing, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, due to the different investment 
facilities that are being offered to foreign investors.  
In terms of sector, respondents were asked to identify the industrial sector in 
which their company operates, among the 7 sectors classified by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry- Oman. Table 6-2 presents a summary of that 
question. The majority of the surveyed NOROMCs were operating in natural 
resource products and the electricity, equipment and tools industrial sectors, 
respectively.  
According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Oman) classification of 
companies into different sizes depends on the number of employees in the 
company, as well as the invested capital. Any company with less than 10 
employees and less than R.O. 5,000 as invested capital will be classified as a 
small company; any company with more than 99 employees and R.O. 5,000 as 
invested capital, will be considered a big company. From Tables 6-4 and 6-5, 
above, the majority of the NOROMCs surveyed are officially classified as either 
medium or large companies57, although they might still be considered small if 
compared to global and international companies, as two interviewees 
highlighted: 
In the international market we are a very small organisation, compared 
to the big organisations that are operating in the international market 
(Accounts Manager, Company #14) 
It depends what you are considering as ‘big’. In terms of sales 
turnover, which is between 70-100 millions Oman Rials. O.k., 
internationally we are small; but in Oman we are big (Financial 
Deputy Manager, Company #4) 
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 It was not possible to get information related to invested capital for each and every surveyed company, 
thus, the classification of the surveyed Omani manufacturing companies will be based on employee 
numbers. 
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As will be highlighted later, this might possibly explain why the bulk of 
companies surveyed have commonly adopted traditional MAPs. 
The next section will highlight some important socio-political-economic-
contextual factors that have supported the findings of the case, as will be 
detailed in Chapter 7. 
6.2. Socio-Political-Economic-Contextual factors  
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the various socio-
economic-contextual factors which shape the management accounting change 
process, as detailed in Chapter 2. Additionally, multiple factors have shaped the 
Omani business environment, as already mentioned in Chapter 5, including: (1) 
the small Omani market size, (2) low customs duties for goods, and (3) trade 
agreements. Indeed, the survey results reveal that the broader Omani context 
has a significant impact on the general operation of NOROMCs, as will be 
further developed in this section. 
Exports to total sales percentile 
Percentage of sales return from 
exports 
Number of 
Companies Companies percentage  
No exports at all 16 31 
1%-5% 6 11 
6%-14% 4 8 
15%-30% 5 9 
31%-50% 2 4 
51%-70% 12 23 
71%-90% 4 8 
More than 90% 3 6 
Total  N=52 100% 
Table 6-6: Exports to total sales percentile for surveyed NOROMCs 
Domestic and International competition level 
   Level of competition 
Type competition No 
competition 
Low Moderate High Total 
Domestic  
Count  
Percentage  
 
1 
2 
 
15 
29 
 
12 
23 
 
24 
46 
 
52 
100% 
International  
Count 
Percentage  
 
1 
2 
 
6 
12 
 
9 
17 
 
36 
69 
 
52 
100% 
Table 6-7: Type and level of competition faced by surveyed NOROMCs 
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It is apparent from Table 6-6 (above) that 31% (n=16) of the companies 
surveyed were not receiving sales returns from their exports. On the other hand, 
nearly a quarter (23%, n=12) of the companies were in receipt of sales returns 
from 51%-70% of total sales. The Table also provides a sense of the level of 
competition, both domestic and/or international, which the NOROMCs surveyed 
claimed to face. More specifically, nearly 70% of the companies surveyed 
(n=36) claimed that they face high competition in the international markets 
and/or from international competitors. 46% (n=24) of companies reported high 
competition in the domestic market. So, based on this, it would seem that 
NOROMCs are facing more competition from international competitors than 
from local competition. 
In the follow-up interviews, the accountants were asked why international 
competition levels and exports were so high, and a high proportion remarked 
that this was due to the small Omani market size; which is in line with the 
specification of the Omani investing setting, as mentioned above and in Chapter 
5 also. For example, the Finance Manager of Company #23 stated: 
Generally, we reach the upper limit of 90%, because the local market 
is too small, compared to the company’s production capacity. There 
is no way to sell the products except through exporting (Finance 
Manager, Company # 23)  
When the Financial Controller of Company #24 were asked why 90% of their 
sales came from exports, he said: 
Because the local market is very small, and with the 10% that we are 
supplying to the local market we have about 60%-80% of the local 
market share 
Seven of the follow-up interviewees also referred to the internationalisation of 
the Omani market as a key driver of high competition from international 
competitors, i.e., the incorporation of Oman with other countries through trade 
agreements:  
We have moderate competition in the Omani market, as far as other 
Omani manufacturers are concerned, as there is only one more Omani 
company that is producing a similar product to ours. But we have very 
big competition from outside, places like China, India, Pakistan, and 
others (Account Manager, Company #16) 
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Table 6-8 (below) confirms that the majority of the accountants interviewed in a 
follow-up to their survey, were non-Omanis; interestingly, more than 75% (n=41) 
of these were of Indian origin. Interviewees raised three key factors behind this, 
namely: (1) the lack of experience of Omani graduates, (2) Omani employees’ 
unwillingness to learn, and (3) high salaries required by law for Omanis 
occupying similar jobs to those of other nationalities. For instance, the Financial 
Executive of Company #44 stated: 
The employee needs a proper background in the field to be able to 
hold such a position, and there is a lack of that with Omani people.  
The Accounts Manager of company #15 said: 
The problem with Omanis is learning, as, if you have to learn 
something, you must have the eagerness and you have to struggle to 
learn, but Omanis mostly don’t have the patience to learn. And it is 
costly to train them and expensive to hire them, compared to 
expatriates who have the same capacity. Add to that that this company 
is not a governmental company but a profit making organisation, and 
its business nature is to maximise your profit, and this is the main 
philosophy, and it is management strategy to hire lower salaried 
people, and that is what I can say about it.   
However, despite this low number of Omani principal accountants, 
organisations still needed to comply with government requirements to employ at 
least 35% Omanis as a proportion of their total employees. As we will see later, 
in Chapter 7, this requirement is a source of power, to which resistance to 
change can occur.  
Participants’ nationality 
Nationality  Count Percentage  
Indian  41 79 
Sir Lanka, Sudan, & 
Pakistan 
6 11 
Oman  5 10 
Total  N=52 100% 
Table 6-8: Participants’ nationality 
The previous two sections gave descriptive data of the surveyed NOROMCs, as 
well as highlighting some of the socio-political-economic-contextual factors that 
affect, to some extent, the changing nature of MAPs and how MA as process of 
change unfolds over time, as will be detailed in Chapter 7. The next section 
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gives a summary of the type of MAPs adopted by the surveyed NOROMCs, 
together with the adoption level. 
6.3. Management accounting practices 
This section summaries the adoption levels of different MAPs amongst the 
NOROMCs in the survey.  
In Sections 2 and 3 of the survey, respondents were asked to identify which 
MAPs were adopted by their companies, and to choose the importance level of 
the adopted MAP among 54 MAPs, as listed in Tables 6-9 and 6-10 below. It is 
clear from Table 6-9 (below) that the majority of those companies surveyed did 
not adopt most of the MAPs considered in the survey. In fact, only four of the 
MAPs considered were to any extent properly (i.e., highly) adopted, namely: 
evaluating organisational performance based on sales; cash flow budget; sales 
budget; and production budget. Ten further MAPs were adopted at a moderate 
level; and the remaining MAPs were adopted at a low level (see Tables 6-9 and 
6-10).  More details concerning the MAPs adopted are provided in Appendix 
2.58 
Name of 
techniques Type of MAP 
No. of 
companies
59
 
Percen
tage60 
ADOPTION 
LEVEL 
Cash flow budget Budgeting and Controlling  44 0.85 
HIGH 
ADOPTION 
Product quality Performance 
evaluation 37 0.71 
HIGH 
ADOPTION 
Production budget Budgeting and Controlling  41 0.79 
HIGH 
ADOPTION 
Sales Performance 
evaluation 43 0.83 
HIGH 
ADOPTION 
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 It is important to mention here that there were criteria that were used to measure the adoption level of 
different MAPs: 
(1) If <50% of the participants indicated that the MAP was important, or very important, to the 
company, then the adoption level of the MAP will be low 
(2) If 50%-70% of the participants indicated that the MAP was important ,or very important, to the 
company, then the adoption level of the MAP will be moderate  
(3) If >70% of the participants indicated that the MAP was important, or very important, to the 
company, then the adoption level of the MAP will be high  
 
59
 This number represents the number of surveyed NOROMCs which use the MAP, and also indicated that 
the chosen MAP is either important, or very important, to the company. 
 
60
 This number represents the number of MAPs adopted, either to a high or moderate level, of the total 
surveyed NOROMCs 
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Sales budget Budgeting and Controlling  42 0.81 
HIGH 
ADOPTION 
Job Order costing  Costing techniques 26 0.50 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Actual costing Costing techniques 28 0.54 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Budget variance 
analysis 
Performance 
evaluation 32 0.62 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Cost controlling 
budget 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  27 0.52 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Customer 
satisfaction survey 
Performance 
evaluation 29 0.56 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Employees' 
attitude/ 
satisfaction 
Performance 
evaluation 27 0.52 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Master budget Budgeting and Controlling  28 0.54 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Meeting the 
budget 
Performance 
evaluation 28 0.54 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Payback period 
Capital 
investment 
appraisal  
29 0.56 MODERATE ADOPTION 
Product 
profitability 
analysis 
Performance 
evaluation 28 0.54 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Return on 
investment 
Performance 
evaluation 30 0.58 
MODERATE 
ADOPTION 
Table 6-9: MAPs adopted either at high or moderate adoption level by surveyed 
NOROMCs 
Name of 
techniques Type of MAP 
No. of 
companies Percentage 
ADOPTION 
LEVEL 
ABC costing  Costing techniques 9 0.18 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Absorption 
costing 
Costing 
techniques 14 0.25 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Accounting 
rate of return 
Capital 
investment 
appraisal  
13 0.25 LOW ADOPTION 
Activity-based 
budget 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  10 0.19 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Back flash Costing techniques 2 0.04 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Batch costing Costing techniques 11 0.21 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Benchmarking 
of 
management 
processes 
Performance 
evaluation 7 0.13 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
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Benchmarking 
of operational 
processes 
Performance 
evaluation 9 0.17 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Benchmarking 
of product 
characteristics 
Performance 
evaluation 11 0.21 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Benchmarking 
of strategic 
priorities 
Performance 
evaluation 7 0.13 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
BSC Performance 
evaluation 9 0.17 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Budget system 
for 
coordinating  
Budgeting and 
Controlling  8 0.15 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Capital 
budgeting 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  18 0.35 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Cash flow 
return on 
investment 
Performance 
evaluation 24 0.46 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Controllable 
profit 
Performance 
evaluation 13 0.25 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Cost-volume 
profit analysis 
Performance 
evaluation 23 0.44 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Customer 
profitability 
analysis 
Performance 
evaluation 16 0.31 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Day-to-day 
operation 
planning 
budget 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  14 0.27 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Division (sub-
unit) profit 
Performance 
evaluation 12 0.23 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
EVA Performance 
evaluation 9 0.17 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Financial 
position 
planning 
budget 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  25 0.48 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Flexible 
budget 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  11 0.21 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Incremental 
budget 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  7 0.13 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Internal rate of 
return 
Capital 
investment 
appraisal  
17 0.32 LOW ADOPTION 
Managers’ 
compensation 
budget 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  8 0.15 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Market share Performance 
evaluation 13 0.25 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
165 
 
Meeting the 
budget 
Capital 
investment 
appraisal  
23 0.44 LOW ADOPTION 
Net present 
value 
Capital 
investment 
appraisal  
18 0.34 LOW ADOPTION 
Operation 
costing  
Costing 
techniques 14 0.26 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Process 
costing 
Costing 
techniques 19 0.37 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Residual 
income 
Performance 
evaluation 10 0.19 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Share price Performance 
evaluation 7 0.13 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Standard 
costing 
Costing 
techniques 25 0.48 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Supplier 
evaluation 
Performance 
evaluation 21 0.40 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Target costing Costing techniques 7 0.14 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Team 
performance 
Performance 
evaluation 18 0.35 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Variable 
costing 
Costing 
techniques 14 0.26 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Zero-based 
budget 
Budgeting and 
Controlling  4 0.08 
LOW 
ADOPTION 
Table 6-10: MAPs adopted either at low adoption level by surveyed NOROMCs 
Other studies have reported similar findings to those suggested in the present 
research (Lamminmaki and Drury, 2001; El-Ebaishi et. al., 2003; Hyvonen, 
2005; Hutaibat, 2005; McLellan & Moustafa, 2011).  
In the follow-up interviews, some of the accountants highlighted the various 
factors which, in their view, were most likely explain the adoption of different 
MAPs in their company. Overall, there were three factors which consistently 
appeared as being key drivers for MAPs’ adoption. First, almost half of the 
follow-up interviewees claimed that pressure from top management, or a parent 
company, was the key driver of choices made about MAPs: 
The reporting which is needed by the parent company and the owners 
is being generated by this system, and they are satisfied with it. Of 
course, when new systems are introduced, the information is passed 
to them (owners) in whichever way they require it. (Accounts Manager, 
Company #16)        
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Based on our position as a multinational company, we are going along 
with the parent company, and we are using the same techniques as 
the parent company. This does not give us a chance to look for other 
techniques or to implement them; we are going along with the parent 
company (Senior Accountant, Company #19)  
A second key factor for the choice of the MAPs used, and one that was 
highlighted by several of the survey respondents, was industry and company 
type:  
Not all techniques are suitable for all industries. These techniques 
which we are using now are suitable for our particular type of industry 
(FAAM, Company #27)    
Any company is free to use any system; there are no restrictions. But 
one should use the best practice which your business follows, to give 
you better direction. Go with techniques that are suitable for your 
business, not necessarily the one which is written in books (GM, #26) 
A third factor which was highlighted as being important for choice over MAPs, 
was company size: 
Our company is not very big, so we control everything with the current 
system, it is sufficient and more than enough (Accounts Manager, 
Company #14) 
Management accounting is an ocean, but we implement practices that 
suit our company’s size and operations (Accounts Manager, Company 
#2)        
Having briefly highlighted that most of the companies visited in the post-survey 
interviews predominantly adopted traditional MAPs, the next section explores 
the actual changes introduced by some of the surveyed companies and, where 
possible, explains why such changes were made. 
6.4. Management accounting change 
The previous section highlighted the different MAPs adopted by the surveyed 
NOROMCs. This section relates to the changing nature of MAPs. Namely, it 
introduces the typology of change in MAPs within the surveyed companies, as 
well as the drivers of change. 
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In Section 4 of the survey, participants were also asked to identify actual 
changes that had been introduced to their companies’ MAPs between 2001 and 
201061. Table 6-11 (below) provides a summary of the types of changes 
introduced, as well as the number of companies who introduced, or not, each 
type of change to the surveyed NOROMCs during the last 10 years. The most 
common change introduced into the companies surveyed was change relating 
to new production techniques, including a move away from manual to automatic 
production processes; the survey revealed that 62% (n=32) of the companies 
surveyed had introduced such a change. Next in the survey was the 
introduction of new management accounting information systems (56%, n=29); 
then the introduction of new product costing systems (50%, n=26). New 
internal/external reporting systems’ adoption was the fourth highest change 
cited in the survey (42%, n=22), followed by new budgeting systems (35%; 
n=18). Finally, non-financial performance measurements (17%; n=9), a world 
class manufacturing system (15%; n=8), and the balanced scorecard (13%; 
n=7), were all changed by less than 20% of the companies surveyed.  
Change introduced  Yes, change 
introduced 
No, change 
not 
introduced 
Total  
New product costing 
system  
26 26 52 
Balanced scorecard 7 45 52 
New budgeting 
system 
18 34 52 
World class 
manufacturing 
system  
8 44 52 
Non-financial 
performance 
measurement  
9 43 52 
New production 
technique (e.g., from 
manual to 
automated) 
32 20 52 
New management 
accounting 
information system 
29 23 52 
New 
external/internal 
reporting system 
22 30 52 
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 This list of the typology of change was developed after reviewing existing literature on the changing 
nature of MAPs (Wijewardena and Zoysa,1999; Abu-Kasim, 2004; Juhmani, 2007) 
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Table 6-11: Change typology and number of companies introduced/not each type 
of change 
As mentioned in the literature review chapter, several studies have reported on 
the drivers of change (Askarany and Yazdifar, 2015; Abdel-Maksoud et al., 
2016; Al-Sayed and Dugdale, 2016; Ax and Greve, 2017). In this study, survey 
participants were also asked to identify what they perceived to be drivers of 
change in the MAPs used by their company – see Table 6-12: 
Driver of change  Yes, it is driver of 
change 
No, it is not driver of 
change 
Total  
Globalisation  17 35 52 
Internationalisation  10 42 52 
Advanced information 
technologies  
18 34 52 
Production technology  30 22 52 
Change in organisational 
structure  
15 37 52 
Environment & 
sustainability issues  
8 44 52 
Change in management 
styles  
21 31 52 
New governmental rule or 
regulation related to 
NOROMCs 
4 48 52 
Table 6-12: Drivers of MAPs change 
As can be seen in Table 6-12 (above), improvements in production technology 
was deemed the most important change driver (58%; n=30) amongst the 
companies surveyed. Next were changes in management styles (40%; n=21), 
followed by advanced information technology (35%; n=18). Globalisation was 
acknowledged by 33% (n=17) of the survey respondents as being a key driver 
for changes in MAPs; while changes in organizational structures was 
recognized by 29% (n=15) of respondents. Finally, amongst the least influential 
of (MAPs) change drivers, according to the survey respondents, were: 
internationalisation (19%; n=10), environment and sustainability issues (15%; 
n=8), and new governmental rules or regulations (8%; n=4).  
Follow-up interviews with 21 of the survey respondents emphasised those 
drivers of change that are covered in Table 6-12 (above). First, several 
interviewees referred to the importance of being ‘efficient’ and ‘fast’ in 
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production, due to new market requirements and changes in production 
technology62: 
The company had very low production capacity, but now we have 
made it 20 times higher than the old capacity. That is related to market 
developments either locally or internationally (Assistant Executive 
Director, Company #41)  
The second key driver of change in MAPs, as highlighted in the follow-up 
interviews, was the importance of producing timely, accurate and detailed 
management reports; which was supported by the availability of information 
technology at affordable prices: 
The new system has improved the calculation of product cost and 
product prices. The new system can make complicated cost 
calculations, compared to the old one (Finance Manager, Company 
#23)  
The introduction of the ERP system was a business requirement; the 
previous software was not able to give the required information and it 
was taking time also. The business was growing, and the previous 
system was not giving the required information, and it also took time 
to rectify the information. So, the company felt it was better to move 
to a well-established ERP system, which will not give us trouble 
(Financial Controller, Company#15) 
Third, another popular reason from the follow-up interviews concerning changes 
made in a company’s MAPs were the changes made in relation to management 
styles – e.g., from the recruitment of new managers, change in company 
ownership, and/or from pressure exerted by top management: 
There are some techniques that we can adopt and that will give value 
addition to the company. But sometimes I will say, based on our 
position as a multinational company, and we are going along with the 
parent company and we are using the same techniques as the parent 
company. And this does not give us a chance to look for other 
techniques and implement them (Senior Accountant, Company #20) 
Whenever a new person comes in, he will have his own ideas, and 
with his experience he will maybe try to improve things. The 
employees may find it difficult, but if it is a good thing for the company, 
then one has to adapt to the change. When the new ‘top’ managers 
joined the company, they realised the limitations of the existing system 
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 E.g., from manual to automated production.  
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and decided to move to a new system (Assistant Finance Manager, 
Company #26)   
You know, a new manager will bring something new to the company. 
Changes in managers will bring changes to the company; and two 
people are not the same. With the new CEO, new changes were 
introduced in terms of reports’ formats; I would not say that they are 
big changes, as such, but it is an ongoing process (Financial 
Controller, Company #15)  
The findings of the survey and the follow-up interviews are therefore broadly 
consistent with much of the extant literature that is explored in Chapter 2.  
6.5. Conclusion  
One of the objectives of this research is to explore the changing nature of MAPs 
within NOROMCs, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Then, the purpose of this chapter 
was twofold, namely: (1) a general and ‘pilot’ survey of MAPs adoption in 
NOROMCs, and (2) a platform for more in-depth exploration of MAPs adoption 
and implementation in a NOROMC case study organization in Oman.  
The findings presented in this chapter implied that the surveyed NOROMCs had 
adopted various MAPs that were included in the survey. However, it can be 
concluded that the majority of the NOROMCs surveyed predominantly used 
traditional MAPs (see Tables 6-9 and 6-10). Furthermore, the most important 
factors to affect the adoption and/or change of different MAPs were: 
1. Top managers’ information requirements; also, the information 
requirements of government authorities, parent companies, and other 
regulatory bodies, such as ISO (i.e., pressures from top level authorities). 
2. Company size and industrial sectors 
3. (Non-)availability of advanced information technology  
4. Contextual factors, including: market competition (either national or 
international) and governmental requirements 
Finally, as this survey represented a ‘pilot’ study, the prominent purpose of this 
chapter was to present descriptive findings about the changing nature of MAPs, 
with only limited effort being made to explore their social-political-economic 
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implications; i.e., the findings in this chapter represented a platform for the next 
chapter’s analysis. Precisely, the next chapter of this thesis will explore deeply 
how MA as process of change unfolded over time in PackCo, based on the 
social constructivist perspective and an interpretive approach, as explored in 
Chapter 4. Accordingly, Burns and Scapens (2000) MA as process of change 
framework was adopted as a theoretical lens through which to understand the 
complexities and interdependency of various change factors in shaping how MA 
as process of change  evolved within PackCO  
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CHAPTER 7 : THEORETICALLY INFORMED CASE STUDY ANALYSIS  
7. Introduction63  
In this chapter, the theory described in Chapter 3, in particular, Burns’ and 
Scapens’ (2000) institutional framework of management accounting change as 
a process, and Hardy’s (1996) framework of power, will be used to make sense 
of observations in the case study company (hereafter referred to as PackCo). 
More specifically, Burns and Scapens (2000) will help to unpack the change 
processes at PackCo; while Hardy (1996) will help to unpack how different 
actors utilised different sources of power and shaped the change process as 
they did.  
At PackCo, two main organisational changes were introduced between 2000 
and 2010, namely: (1) the implementation of a balanced scorecard (BSC), and 
(2) the implementation of a new enterprise resource planning system (ERPs). 
The BSC was effectively imposed by the head office in Dubai, and the ERPs 
was initiated and driven by PackCo’s General Manager (GM). With both 
changes, the employees' reactions and behaviours varied at different stages of 
the change process. That is, employee resistance occurred initially in both 
changes, although resistance towards the BSC was relatively higher than with 
the ERPs. Different factors at least partly explain the magnitude of employee 
resistance for each change programme, including the speed at which new 
practices became (or not) routinised and institutionalised, and the impact of 
change on employees’ performance evaluation. 
This chapter is divided into five further sections. The next section presents 
some background information about the case study company. Section 7.2 will 
explore changes in the operating environment of PackCo, as well as the nature 
of the relationship between PackCo and the Dubai HO. Then, in Section 7.3, 
there will be a discussion of the different institutions that existed within PackCo 
prior to the introduction of the BSC and the SAGELINE500 ERP system. Next, 
Section 7.4 explores the two changes-BSC and the ERP system- introduced 
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 In this chapter I will be referring to the PackCo group company as the group company; and will be 
referring to the PackCo Oman branch as PackCo 
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into PackCo, supported by the theoretical frameworks mentioned in Chapter 3. 
That will be followed by the conclusion. 
7.1. Company profile64 
This section provides some background information about the case study 
organisation (PackCo), in particular, in relation to the organisational structure, 
governance, etc. It also describes, briefly, how the group company expanded 
between 1989 and 2012, through opening new units in different locations across 
the Middle East. Finally, the following also explores changes in the group 
company structure resulting from entering a major partnership with a multi-
national company. 
The group manufactures packaging material, mostly packaging labels. PackCo 
is part of a larger group organisation whose head office is located in the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE)/ Dubai, and which has units in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and 
Egypt. The Dubai office was established in 1989, while the Oman branch 
(PackCo) was established in 1996. As mentioned, there are two other units in 
the group company. The Egypt branch was established in 1997, whereas the 
Saudi Arabian unit was established in 2012. It was believed by group 
management that such expansion would help the group to have closer 
connections to their indigenous customers, as will be highlighted below. The 
management felt that regional companies are better able to deliver products to 
their customers, and at lower prices; which, in turn, presents the company with 
a competitive advantage over most of its main competitors. As described by the 
GM at PackCo: 
My local customers will give me more business, rather than buying 
products from outside of Oman. The new branch in Saudi Arabia is 
opened now. Previously, PackCo exported to Saudi Arabia, but now 
the local branch in Saudi will do business with the local customers65. 
In addition, opening a branch in Saudi will help to reduce the product 
costs (e.g., freight costs will be eliminated, which is about 3%-4% of 
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 Almost all quotations in this chapter are from interviewees from the Oman unit, as it was not costly but 
impossible to get access to the HO in Dubai 
65For example, the Almari Milk Company (a big Saudi dairy producing company) is not giving business to 
PackCo, because it has to deal with local Saudi packaging businesses, since, if it does that, the Saudi 
government will give them incentives for the exporting and/or importing of raw materials. However, when 
the PackCo group opened a branch in Saudi, Almari became their first customer.  
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total cost. If you can offer that much discount to customers, you will be 
competitive 
The group’s products, packaging labels, fall into two main categories, namely: 
(1) self-adhesive (e.g., PVC and paper), and (2) flexible packaging66. The 
group’s strategy focuses on differentiating its products from those of its main 
competitors, as was reinforced by PackCo’s GM:  
What we are doing is adding a variety of techniques onto our labels. 
That makes our product different from our competitors’ labels - things 
like varnish, better quality of printing-ink, etc. And this is helpful for the 
customers in their business, as well  
In 2009, the group entered a three-year license agreement with a multinational 
Canadian-based company (hereafter referred to as CCL), which is a global 
leader in the packaging industry. The principle aim of this agreement, in so far 
as the group was concerned, was to gain technical know-how and, in return, the 
group company paid 0.5% of its total sales as a licensing fee. Prior to this 
agreement, CCL had no presence in the Middle East, although it had branches 
in 148 other cities worldwide. PackCo’s GM described the license agreement as 
follows: 
[….] to have a better technical knowhow with this company (CCL), so 
that we can launch a better product in the market. And technical 
knowhow is related to the technical side of doing business. In other 
words, when we need some help regarding the new materials coming 
in, or new production technology for the packaging industry, how to 
handle those materials, how to produce economical batch quantities 
from those materials. But, in a day to day management, there is no 
intervention. CCL used to get quarterly sales reports, and the group 
used to pay the licence fees  
He added that CCL was:  
.... A pioneer in designing new printing materials and various other 
technologies in packaging. CCL is telling the machine manufacturers 
what machines they need, what kind of processes they need for the 
next generation of label-printing or packaging-printing 
                                            
66
 Any packaging that is not hard and bends slightly while still holding a shape. It can be a bag, envelope 
or pouch that, when, filled changes shape. 
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Subsequently, in 2011, CCL acquired 50% of the group’s shares and, as a 
result, a partnership was formed in a joint venture before the close of the 
original three-year licence agreement. CCL had been impressed by the way that 
the group had run its business, especially in terms of its implementation of the 
balanced scorecard (BSC) and their attainment of the ISO (International 
Organization for Standardization) certificate. The Chief Executive of CCL 
remarked;  
We have enjoyed a great relationship with the Managing Director 
(Dubai) of PackCo-CCL and his team, since we began the license 
arrangement in 2009. The two companies share many common 
customers, technologies and business partners; so this was a logical 
next step for both of us. We are especially proud to enter into a new 
partnership. The new venture continues to build on our strategy to 
invest in the world’s emerging markets that are so important for many 
of our consumer product customers67 
The group company’s main benefit from this partnership was still knowledge-
sharing with CCL. Through such sharing of knowledge, the group company was 
particularly helped in identifying where to focus its sales for current product 
types, as well as which new products it should seek to offer to the local market. 
Through the joint venture partnership with CCL, the group company was also 
able to have a better handle on newly-available production machinery and new 
production technologies. Furthermore, the group company’s management 
believe that their joint venture partnership has made them stronger, especially 
following the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent global economic 
downturn. The Sales Manager at PackCo commented in this regard:  
The market has become more competitive, especially from 2009 when 
the recession started to bite. So what we have done is merge with 
CCL. This is what big companies are doing; they merge together so 
that they become stronger in the market     
   
Such arguments were reinforced by a study of the world packaging industry 
(WPO) in 2008, in which it was confirmed that there had been an increase in the 
global consumption of consumer goods from 2003 to 2009 (WPO, 2008). 
                                            
67
 CCL-Canada website: 
http://www.cclind.com/investors/documents/20110321CCLIndustriestoInvestinaJointVentureLabelCompan
yfortheMiddleEastandIndia_000.pdf 
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Furthermore, this report argued that emerging economies represented new 
market opportunities for investors from the developed countries, especially with 
their increasing use of consumer goods.  
This is the group’s company structure. The group company is part of a bigger 
investment group that is based in Dubai, and PackCo is then a unit within the 
packaging company group. The structure of the big investment group is 
reflected in Figure 7-1 (below). 
 
Figure 7-1: Location of PackCo in the group hierarchy (Kasurinen, 2002, p.330) 
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Figure 7-2, below, gives a detailed structure of the case study group company 
structure; followed by a brief background of PackCo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are 25 employees working at PackCo, and the company generates an 
average per annum turnover of R.O.1,600,000 (£2,704,047). PackCo’s growth, 
in terms of production capacity, more than doubled in ten years, from 10 million 
meters per annum (2000) to 24 million meters per annum (2010). However, the 
total number of employees at PackCo has remained roughly the same, at 25 
employees (which includes both administrative and operations employees), 
since the company began in 1996. Since its inauguration, PackCo’s total sales 
have steadily increased from R.O. 10,000 (£16,976) in 1996 to R.O. 100,000 
(£169,765) in 2010. This growth has been attributed mostly to the group’s 
strategy of aiming to expand its market share amongst top-rated customers. 
The GM of PackCo labelled these customers ‘A-grade customers’. Those 
customers are usually international players (i.e., Unilever) and the majority of 
the group sales returns come from such customers. More details will be 
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provided later in the chapter on the effect of A-grade customers in the operation 
of PackCo and, subsequently, the management control system within PackCo. 
This section thus gave a general background of the group company and some 
highlights of PackCo. The following section moves on to consider changes in 
the operating environment of PackCo, as well as the world packaging industry. 
This will later help to explain how contextual specifications shape the unfolding 
of MA as process of change within PackCo. 
7.2. Changes in PackCo’s operating environment  
Before focusing more specifically on the two change initiatives within PackCo, 
the following will consider the broader context within which such changes took 
place. This section thus discusses developments in PackCo’s operating 
environment in Oman and at world level.  
As explained in Chapter 2, changes in an organisation’s external business 
environment can affect how it operates, and may be an important factor in 
driving internal changes (Ezzamel et al., 1996; Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 
1998; Mat et al., 2010). Theoretically, and as explained in Chapter 3, Burns’ and 
Scapens’ (2000) framework also highlights the importance of external 
phenomena for the reopening and questioning of existing organisational 
routines. The following thus explores the external environment in which PackCo 
operates, the relevance of which will become clearer later in the chapter, when 
explaining how the two main change processes unfolded in PackCo. More 
specifically, this section focuses on: (1) the nature of the world packaging 
industry, including the significant effect of its large-scale customers, and (2) 
head office pressure.  
The packaging industry is no different from any other industry, in that it is 
continuously impacted by changes in the global economy, where downturns and 
shocks can bring pressures from both suppliers and/or customers. In this study, 
the effect of top customers, or A-grade customers, on the operation of the group 
company, in general, and PackCo, in particular, was the main driver of 
introducing a new performance evaluation system, that is, the BSC, as will be 
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detailed later in this chapter. The nature of the packaging industry, with a focus 
on label packaging, will thus be explored below, and also the effect of big 
customers in the industry will be demonstrated according to the study 
conducted by the World Packaging Organisation68 (WPO, 2008).  
According to the WPO study, mentioned above, in general, the global 
packaging market has witnessed an increase in sales of around 51% between 
1999 and 2009 ($372,400 to $563,847 millions), with higher consumption of 
packaging material in the Asian region in 2009, and the largest producer being 
the USA, also in 2009. Although the industry was affected by the changes within 
the global economy, there were other drivers of change related to the industry, 
irrespective of the changes within the global economy. These included (WPO, 
2008, p.5) (1) the ageing of the world’s population, (2) the trend towards smaller 
households, (3) the increasing requirement for convenience among consumers, 
(4) rising health awareness among consumers, (5) the trend towards 'on-the-go' 
lifestyles among increasingly time-poor consumers, (6) growing requirements 
for brand enhancement/differentiation in an increasingly competitive 
environment, (7) new packaging material development, (8) the move towards 
smaller pack sizes as the incidence of families eating together at the dinner 
table became less common, and (9) increasing awareness of environmental 
issues and the adoption of new regulatory requirements on packaging recycling. 
Although all these factors drove the change in the global packaging industry, 
only factors (6) and (7) are closely related to the discussion of the case study in 
this research, as will be detailed later in this chapter. As such, the effect of 
these two factors on the operation of packaging manufacturing companies will 
be explored in some detail below. 
In regard to the factor (7) above, there was a change in the raw materials used 
to produce packaging products. The new raw materials provide end users with 
high-performance packaging with strong barrier characteristics. This helps in 
sustaining the product on the shelves for a longer time. In addition, new 
features were introduced to the packaging of final products, including integrating 
intelligent components within packaging (in specific product labels) to provide 
                                            
68
 WPO will be used hereafter.  
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more information about the product to the consumer. As such, changes in the 
packaging material was summarised by the WPO (2008, p.9) into the following 
five points: (1) high barrier materials69, (2) active packaging, (3) intelligent 
packaging70, and (4) digital printing for packaging. Such changes in the raw 
materials, and the final product improvements, introduced within the packaging 
industry, affected the operation of PackCo, as will be seen below. 
In addition to the changes in packaging materials, the packaging industry was 
affected by the growing requirements of buyers (packaging manufacturing 
company customers) for brand enhancement/differentiation, since packaging 
plays an important role in differentiating consumable goods. In other words, 
packaging “provides a marketing advantage at the point of sale” of the goods 
(WPO, 2008, p.8). As such, packaging cost represents a major proportion of the 
total final product cost for packaging industry customers. Global brands had 
concerns about such packaging differentiation as a competitive strategy, and 
this gave those big players a strong position within the packaging industry, 
especially when it came to consumable goods. Consequently, “the success or 
otherwise of a new packaging product can often be assured by its adoption by 
just one major global brand. Aside from quickly generating a high level of 
demand in its own right, this also tends to bring with it copycat switches by 
minor brands” (WPO, 2008, p.9). The effect of this brand 
improvement/enhancement factor, as well as its consequences on the operation 
of packaging industry, also had its effect on the operation of PackCo. This 
helped to explain why a new accountability system was introduced at PackCo, 
as will be detailed below. 
As mentioned above, different factors affect the global packaging industry, 
including: developments in raw materials, production techniques, and the effect 
of big players (WPO, 2008). For the purpose of this study the following section 
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 High barrier materials in flexible packaging laminations prevent the permeation of water, water vapour, 
oil, oxygen, aroma, flavour, gas, or light. A product’s formulation can be impacted adversely if these 
elements migrate into or out of the package. 
70
 The purpose of the ‘active packaging’ is the extension of the shelf-life of the food and the maintenance, 
or even improvement, of its quality. While the purpose of ‘intelligent packaging’ is to give an indication of, 
and to monitor, the freshness of the food (Dainelli et al, 2008). 
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will thus focus on the effect that big players, or as PackCo’s GM labelled them, 
A-grade customers, had on the operation of PackCo. 
7.2.1. PackCo and big customers  
From the above, it is possible to state that big customers do affect the operation 
of packaging organisations, due to the changes mentioned previously. This 
section will explore how this industry nature is reflected in the operation of 
PackCo. 
The group company’s main objective is to capture the maximum market share, 
via concentrating on servicing big customers, or A-grade customers. As already 
mentioned, focusing on serving big customers would help the group company to 
improve its’ operation in multiple aspects, as presented by the PackCo GM: 
Serving such big customers differentiates our business and our 
products. As you have to improve your quality, you have to improve 
your services, and you have to improve your investment scheme in 
production technologies to meet their requirements. As the business 
nature requires, we have to concentrate on the requirements of big 
customers, and adjust our production according to their needs. Yes, 
initially, the effort is more, but the rewards are also better in the future. 
The effect of big players on the operation of PackCo, in terms of product 
differentiation and production technologies, is thus obvious from the above, and 
is in-line with the industry nature, as explored earlier. Actually, ignoring the 
requirements of such big customers may cause serious financial problems to 
packaging organisations, since, according to the study conducted by the world 
packaging organisation, “the success or otherwise of a new packaging product 
can often be assured by its adoption by just one major global brand” (2008, 
p.9). Providing A-grade services to those big players therefore helps PackCo to 
capture a higher market share of A-grade customers and to get more business 
from similar customers, as stated by PackCo’s GM: 
We started with PNG, and we are doing now for Unilever, Glasgow, 
Colgate, and Palmolive. That also helps the company to get new good 
customers; as if the customers realised that PackCo is serving these 
big customers, then that means that the company is doing a good job. 
And new customers will not mind paying more for a good quality 
product.  
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Second, the strategy of concentrating on large customers is also translated 
through the company (products) quality standards, whereby there is no sacrifice 
in the quality of raw material to meet the requirements of smaller customers. If 
small customers wish to purchase goods from PackCo, they have to accept the 
A-grade-quality standards—and the corresponding price for such quality. The 
company avoids any risks of supplying low-quality products to their A-grade 
customers, as PackCo’s GM said: 
We don’t produce products according to customers’ requirements, in 
terms of quality; that is strictly not allowed as per the group policy. We 
get only ‘A-grade’ raw materials for our ‘A-grade’ customers, and they 
pay a premium for that. The company offers the same material for B-
grade customers, if they are willing to pay, otherwise they can go to a 
competitor and meet their requirements 
According to different interviewees from PackCo, there is a change in the 
specifications and types of products that the group company produces today 
(2010) and those that it produced 10 years back. In fact, the group company 
started with basic labels only, and now it is producing more glorified71 labels. 
Such a change in product specification is a reflection of the different changes in 
the industrial sector, as explored above, and as PackCo’s GM emphasised: 
Yes there is a change, because it is a market driven business. If a 
market needs today no labels, we will be out of business. If the market 
needs a different type of labels, we, as a manufacturer, will be forced 
to get on that kind of labels that are saleable in the market. It is market 
driven, and it is not a company decision. 
In other words, the changing taste of customers, in terms of product type and 
the quality required, drove such changes in production technology at PackCo. 
Alternatively, an increase in customers’ knowledge regarding different 
production procedures within the industry forced PackCo to introduce changes 
in how products were handled. As the Production Manager of PackCo 
commented: 
                                            
71
 The group company has different printing techniques, including the following: (1) flexography (Flexo), (2) 
letter press, (3) silk screen, (4) hot foil/cold foil’ (4) rotogravure. The silk screen technique enhances the 
finish of a self-adhesive label. This technology adds gloss, depth of colour to a printed label to help catch 
the consumer’s eye as the labelled product sits on a shop shelf next to rival brands. (source: 
www.PackCoccl.com/) 
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Ten years back the product type was very simple and easy to produce, 
and you can’t compare it with what the company is producing now. 
Now, there are so many complications, each and every customer 
wants more glorified products,, and they know the latest production 
technology. In previous years, there was only process colour. In other 
words, the same colour only just changes in the template and run the 
job, now a day’s not like this, the customers are asking for special 
colours. They know the different production processes, like: the hard 
foils, or screen printing. The customers are capable of knowing the 
quality of product they need, they are asking if the company can 
provide that quality standard product, or not. Before the last five years, 
whatever we gave them, that will be the quality. 
The relevance of those changes to the operation of PackCo will thus be 
explored in the remainder of this section. It focuses on the introduction of the 
airport concept to the production floor of PackCo, plus the introduction of an 
inspection machine to the production line. Such changes in PackCo got its’ 
operation locked-in with A-grade customers’ requirements. Accordingly, the 
importance of A-grade customers continued to shape how the group company 
carried out its daily operations, as well as its production procedures, as follows. 
Although PackCo introduced changes in terms of the type of products produced 
to meet the changes in the requirements of big customers, it started to face 
some issues in regard to the goods delivered to A-grade customers, i.e., 
weaknesses. Those weaknesses were (1) late delivery to A-grade customers, 
and (2) an increase in the percentile of faulty delivered goods. With these two 
weaknesses, PackCo started to lose part of its’ big customers market share. 
PackCo therefore had again to adjust its procedures in order to recover the loss 
of its A-grade customers’ market share. PackCo thus introduced the following 
changes into the production procedure.  
First, PackCo introduced the airport concept72 to the production floor, which 
helps to manage and plan production schedules better. In detail, the airport 
concept allows the company to prepare a 48-hour production schedule and 
                                            
72
 Airport concept: 1. Prepare the schedule 48 hours production schedule must be prepared, so the 
production people will know exactly what they are going to produce in the next 48 hours to give the 
customers on-time delivery.  
2. Check-in: What you are going to check-in? Do you have materials, do you have plates, do you have all 
consumables required, do you have ink and everything? Yes, checked! 
3. Departure lounge: the company has created a place on the production floor where all required materials 
for producing the order are placed, and that place is called the departure lounge. The company made a 
trolley and it is helpful when all the needed materials for production are placed on it.  
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organise the production process, which, in turn, helps in delivering products on 
time to customers. It allows the company to send products out of the production 
line faster and to deliver to customers within around four to five days, while, 
previously, it was taking around one month to deliver products (Appendix 3 
provides a diagram that illustrates the airport concept). In summary, the airport 
concept is related to organising the production process so that it leads to a 
decrease in the set-up time, and helps in delivering orders to customers on 
time. The Production Manager at PackCo said: 
......there is a set up time; that is the setting that will be done before 
each and every job. Previously, the company was taking 2-3 hours to 
do the job setting. While nowadays, we are taking less than 40 
minutes; because instead of one person doing the setting, three 
people will do it now. That helps the company to reduce the job setting 
time. In addition, we do a 48 hour production planning, which helps in 
responding to customers’ needs faster. 
The PackCo Production Manager concluded “the machines are the same, but 
the way of doing the job has changed.” PackCo was thus able to overcome the 
late-delivery weakness through the introduction of the airport concept to the 
production floor. Another weakness that needed to be resolved was in relation 
to the faulty products delivered to customers. Additionally, when complaints 
from A-grade customers increased regarding faulty delivered products, PackCo 
invested in a deductive device to discover faulty parts and remove them from 
the roll before the finished goods reached the customer.  
From the above we have learned that different changes occurred within the 
operating environment of the group company. Accordingly, the group company 
adjusted its production processes to the standards that met A-grade customers’ 
requirements (this is based on the PackCo experience, but it also applies to the 
group company73).  
 
Despite the fact that PackCo is the only company of its kind in the Omani 
market, competition still exists from international companies, especially with all 
the changes within the Omani operating environment, as explored in Chapter 5. 
                                            
73
 Because, in general, the different units were following whatever system or procedures were applied by 
the HO in Dubai, more or less. 
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PackCo relies upon two main strategies to win over its competitors, namely, 
product quality, and its customer relationships. This was highlighted by different 
interviewees; for example, PackCo’s GM commented in this regard: 
 
Yes, we get affected by competition- everybody gets affected! If there 
is no competition, there is no motivation to work to make a better profit. 
And, there are different competing strategies, such as: price, quality, 
or service. We are not competing on a price basis, but on a service 
and quality-basis, so our competitors cannot compete with us. Our 
product is not unique, but the way it is handled and catered for is 
different   
PackCo thus locked itself and its operation, in the short run, into serving A-
grade customers, with a huge investment in those changes within the 
production processes, including the introduction of the airport concept, the 
inspection machine, and the lock-in with the supplying of A-grade raw materials. 
In other words, serving A-grade customers was locked in by factors such as the 
internal business processes that were dominated by serving A-grade 
customers, market credibility and a reputation that had developed from/by  
serving A-grade customers, and, more importantly, equipment specifically 
dedicated to producing final products to the standards of A-grade customers 
(Yazdifar, 2004, p.218-219; Dietrich and Burns, 2000). 
However, in 2007 the group company’s market share among A-grade 
customers was affected by the intense competition in the market, which resulted 
from different changes in the Omani business operating context, as well as from 
the effect of the two weaknesses that were related to on-time delivery and faulty 
delivered goods, and this still continued to some extent. With the potential crisis 
of losing more of the market share of A-grade customers, the group company 
took proactive action and started to look for solutions in order to regain the trust 
of A-grade customers and to align the efforts of different departments within the 
organisation to meet the requirements of these customers. At the same time, it 
tried to utilise the improvements in the production procedures (airport concept 
and deductive machine) to best meet the A-grade customers’ needs, especially 
since it would be difficult for the group company to work around the lock-in in 
production procedures, as described above (Yazdifar, 2004, p.219). As different 
studies have concluded, when competition tends to increase in the market, the 
tendency of organisations to use accounting controls also increases, for 
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example, Scapens and Roberts, 1993. Accordingly, the rest of this chapter will 
focus on explaining how the group company dealt with this lock-in by 
introducing a change in the management control system (i.e., accountability) of 
the organisation with reference to the Oman unit (PackCo), which is the focus of 
this research.  
How the HO in Dubai thus imposed the new accountability system, that is, the 
BSC, on PackCo, and how the different existing institutions, including the 
existing accountability institution, the power institution, and routines existing at 
PackCo before BSC implementation, shaped the MA change as a process, will 
be explored below. In addition, the study will explore how such change in the 
management control system, as well as the pressure of reporting to the new 
partner, resulted in the implementation of an Enterprise Resource Planning 
system (ERP system) within PackCo. All that will be discussed later in this 
chapter by utilising Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change framework and 
Hardy’s (1996) power framework. Before doing so, the following section 
introduces the different institutions that existed in PackCo prior to the 
introduction and implementation of the BSC and the ERP system.  
7.2.2. Head office pressure  
In addition to the changes within the Omani operating context, and the nature of 
the packaging industry, mentioned previously, PackCo faced other external 
pressures from the Dubai head office. This section will thus outline the nature of 
the relationship between PackCo and the Dubai head office.  
The nature of the relationship between PackCo and the Dubai HO can be 
described, in general, by the first source of power from Hardy’s (1996) 
framework, that is, power over resources- see Chapter 3. In other words, the 
head office mostly gives orders to other units operating within the group, and 
units have to implement those orders as they are directed. Actually, within the 
group company, there is a culture of power, and that comes from the 
hierarchical position of the source of power, i.e., managers. Which allows 
different managers in top positions to utilise the power of their positions to get 
things done in their way by employees at subordinate levels, by using the 
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powers of: resource, decision making, or meaning (Hardy, 1996). The 
cartelisation of power at the high hierarchical levels also leads to the 
centralisation of decision making in the hands of the superiors (Lau & Buckland, 
2000). As such, “decision-making was done by relying on the experience of key 
people, and those that have power, and the potential ability to change 
behaviour through politics and influence” (Yazdifar et al., 2008, p.413). Such a 
power mobilisation institution within the group company affected the operation 
of PackCo in all aspects, including the type of MAPs adopted by PackCo, and 
the nature of the reports that were provided to the head office, as will be 
detailed later in this chapter.  
The nature of this power culture and the decision centralisation are not unique 
to PackCo. Instead, it can be described as an institution that is embedded within 
the Omani context. As Section 6.5, in the previous chapter, showed, top 
management requirements, i.e., from HO, or a parent company, are considered 
one of the main forces in introducing a change within an organisation. This 
confirms that the decision-making process is centralised and is mostly 
controlled by people who have the power of resource (Hardy, 1996). 
Finally, according to Pfeffer (1992), 
 “Hierarchical direction and authority is usually seen as legitimate, 
because the variation in formal authority comes to be ‘taken for 
granted’74 as a part of organizational life. Thus the phrase, ‘the boss 
wants.....” or “the president wants...’ is seldom questioned or 
challenged” (p.40),  
but such a source of power is not absolute, as will be explored below in this 
chapter. 
7.3. The prevailing institutions within PackCo 
The notion of institution was introduced in Chapter 3; and, according to Burns 
and Scapens (2000, p.8), institution is defined as “the shared taken-for-granted 
assumptions which identify categories of human actors and their appropriate 
activities and relationship”. This section explores the other institutions that 
                                            
74
 According to Burns and Scapens (2000), this refers to ‘institution’. 
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existed at PackCo, in addition to the power institution, explored above, before 
the introduction of the BSC and ERP system. Identifying those existing 
institutions facilitates the explanation of how the MA change as a process 
evolved, and how different change dynamics interacted during the MA change 
as a process.  
7.3.1. Pre-BSC accountability institution: 
This section explores the financial-accountability-institution that existed at 
PackCo before the introduction and implementation of the BSC. Understanding 
the existing ways of doing things prior to the introduction of the BSC helps to 
explain how the MA change as a process evolved within PackCo, as will be 
explored below.  
The group company produces high quality labels for A-grade customers’ needs, 
as was already explored, above. The pre-BSC financial accountability institution 
at PackCo can be described as being production-oriented (Please see below). 
The group company therefore continued to improve the production processes 
without paying attention to the accounting and accountability system that 
existed within the organisation. When the group company secured its position 
with A-grade customers, it didn't pay particular attention to the existing financial 
accountability system, and such internal inefficiency was thereby exported to its 
customers through high selling prices or, as was explored above, ‘premium’ 
prices that A-grade customers were willing to pay (Scapens and Roberts, 1993). 
As the group company’s revenue was derived mostly from A-grade customers, 
fault-free orders and on-time delivery were more important than a more ‘strict’ 
financial accountability system.  
In line with the study by Scapens and Roberts (1993), when managers in an 
organisation focus on production and link profitability and organisational 
objectives to production, there is a possibility that the organisation will end up 
with a poor accounting system, especially if the organisational objectives are 
achieved continuously. As the two weaknesses, mentioned above, continued to 
affect the operation of the group company, plus the lock-in with A-grade 
customers in terms of production operation and fear of potential future losses, 
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the group company was thus forced to search for solutions and to question 
‘existing ways of doing things’(Burns, 2000; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005).  
Before the BSC implementation, the existing accountability institution encoded 
the existing routine within PackCo. Due to the change in the external 
environment in which the group company was operating, described above, 
there was a ‘reopening’ of the existing accountability system within the group, 
with the help of a consulting company. As such, a new accountability system 
was introduced, and new rules associated with such a change were also 
introduced, as will be explored later in this chapter. The rest of this section 
explores the existing routines related to financial accountability within PackCo 
prior to the introduction of the BSC. Later in this chapter, how the conflict 
between new BSC rules and existing routines and accountability institutions 
shaped how the MA change as a process evolved within PackCo, will be 
explored. 
Burns and Scapens (2000) had argued that “in studying management 
accounting change process, we are studying changes in organisational 
routines”, and, therefore, to understand how MA change as a process unfolds 
over time within PackCo, it is important to understand the existing routines 
within the organisation. In addition, existing routines encode the prevailing 
institution within an organisation, and enacting the existing routines is a 
reflexive process. The existing daily routines are based on the pre-BSC 
accountability institution that was enacted and reacted, by different employees 
at PackCo, are discussed below. Within PackCo, there were shared 
assumptions about the accountability system. Specifically, the taken-for-granted 
ways of doing things within the group company, and PackCo in particular, in 
terms of accountability and the performance evaluation that existed before the 
introduction of the balanced scorecard (BSC), was not connected to on-time 
performance. In other words, employees received financial rewards for doing 
their work, regardless of how long it took them to do that work; and this routine 
that was embedded in the existing accountability institution, affected the 
operation of the organisation as well as their market share of A-grade 
customers.  
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Different employees of PackCo talked about their daily routines, with a reflection 
on the existing accountability institution; that is, employees referred to the 
importance of producing and reproducing their daily routine by reflecting on the 
embedded accountability ways of thinking (Burns and Scapens, 2000). For 
example, the PackCo Sales Manager (SM, hereafter) explained his work 
duties—routines—within the unit, and stated:  
So, what I am doing is; I will make an agreement with the customer 
and when the contract agreement between the company and the 
customers is developed with all the fundamental details; then I transfer 
it to my assistants to follow up with the customer. My responsibilities 
here finish (saying it as if he is getting rid of something heavy from his 
burden). For any new development with the same customer, I will be 
involved again 
When that is done, all the documentation work and the following up of the order 
with the customer would therefore be done by the Sales Manager’s assistants. 
He will interrupt the follow-up and documentation process only if there is an 
issue with the customer that could not be handled by his assistants. 
Basically, the Sales Manager manager’s day-to-day routine was to keep in 
touch with customers, either current or potential. In other words, keeping in 
touch in terms of looking out for new potential customers and maintaining a 
relationship with the existing customers, including meetings with customers, 
providing quotations, and providing progress reports and discussing those 
reports with the Sales Director Manager at the HO. The primary focus of the 
Sales Manager was on keeping in touch with customers, and for him, the “sales 
job is not easy.”  
Moreover, the nature of the work of the Sales Manager forced him to leave his 
office, sometimes for a few days, to follow up with customers in other GCC75 
countries, and, describing his work, he stated, “And it is the sales job to be at 
least 80% out of the office.” Additionally, even if he were in Oman, he would be 
out of the office most of the time76 to follow up with local customers. Dominant 
routines among Sales Managers in different units were thus based on the 
                                            
75
 Gulf Cooperative Council (Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain) 
76
 I made a few visits to the case study company and did not see the Sales Manager in his office. The only 
time I saw him was when I had an appointment, and another time when he was busy and preparing to 
leave the office. 
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existing accountability institution, and that was taken for granted, while 
providing better services through on-time delivery to customers was considered 
by him to be “important, but there is no problem if the customer gets the delivery 
late, as long as the late delivery does not harm the customer’s production.” 
Additionally, based on the pre-BSC accountability institution, there was no link 
between late delivered orders and the Sales Manager’s performance 
evaluation; that is, as long as the order was delivered to the customer, there 
was no problem, even if the orders were delivered late. Before the introduction 
of the BSC, the Sales Manager did not have much documentation work, as 
mentioned above. 
The existing accountability institution was reflected in the daily routines of all 
PackCo staff. Similarly to the Sales Manager, the Credit Collection Leader was 
responsible for collecting the credit notes from customers. Basically, with the 
pre-BSC accountability system, there was no connection between the CC 
Leader’s performance evaluation and the time she took to collect the credit from 
the customers. In other words, it was not important how long it took for her to 
collect the credit from customers, as long as she collected it; either she 
collected the credit within the normal credit note period of 90 days, or she took 
longer than the 90 days, or even longer than 180 days, to collect the credit note. 
The same accountability basis was followed by the Production Manager, when 
the Production Manager received financial rewards for all orders produced, 
regardless of how long the order remained on the production line.  
The above examples demonstrate the previous accountability system that 
existed within PackCo. The existence of such an institution explains why 
different employees resisted the new rules associated with the introduction of 
the BSC, as will be explored later in the chapter. In addition to the existing 
institution in regard to the financial accountability, there were also other factors 
that affected how the change process evolved at PackCo, including the power 
institution, explored above. As such, the purpose of introducing the BSC within 
the group company was to “reform the existing systems of accountability within” 
the group company; in other words, a “more rigorous system of accountability” 
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was proposed with the introduction of the BSC (Scapens and Roberts, 1993, 
p.28). As will be explored later in this chapter, the existing financial 
accountability system contrasted with the imposed BSC and its associated new 
rules, which resulted in resistance to those new rules by PackCo employees. 
7.3.2. Pre-enterprise resource planning (ERP) system institution 
 
In addition to the power and the pre-BSC financial accountability institutions 
within the case study company, another institution was embedded within 
PackCo that was related to the management control system that was in use. 
This institution is related to the way employees entered data, retrieved data, 
and produced reports, using FOCUS, the pre-ERP system. This section 
describes this information technology–related institution, which will facilitate the 
interpretation of how the introduction of a new ERP-system, SAGELINE 500 
(SL500) evolved as a process at PackCo.  
Before the introduction of the SL500 ERP system, the existing ways of doing 
things related to the FOCUS system, and involved mainly working with the 
system manually, either in relation to data entry, data retrieving, or report 
production. In addition to the manual aspect of the FOCUS system, there was 
no integration between the different mini-manual systems used within different 
departments at PackCo. This meant that there was no communication between 
different departments. There was also no database associated with the FOCUS 
system, which sometimes led to duplication of information, and information was 
not always available on a timely basis for managers to use, since they had to 
ask other employees for the information, instead of getting it live from the 
system.  
The pre-ERP system institution, which is related to how employees enter data, 
retrieve data, and produce reports, was thus embedded in the ways of thinking 
of different employees and their daily routines, as will be detailed later in this 
chapter. This institution affected the change as a process when the ERP system 
was introduced into PackCo, as different employees resisted the 
implementation of the new ERP system: the new rules associated with such 
change challenged the existing manual institution, as will be explored further 
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below. The resistance level to the ERP system, however, was not at the same 
level as that to the BSC. More details in relation to the pre-ERP system’s 
embedded ways of doing things will be explored below. 
7.3.3. Management style at PackCo, and comfort working zone:  
The management style at PackCo, specifically, (and at the group level, in 
general) helped PackCo GM to some extent to put any new change introduced 
into action. That style was about providing a ‘comfort working zone’ for the 
employees.  
According to the online free dictionary ‘comfort zone’, in psychology, is defined 
as ‘a situation or position in which a person feels secure, comfortable, or in 
control’77. The philosophy behind that management style at PackCo was to help 
employees to work at the company comfortably, without feeling the anxiety of 
pressure from top managers. In such a zone, employees were allowed to make 
mistakes, and managers were always available to help, support, and show them 
the right way to do things. Management dealt with lower level employees as 
they dealt with their friends, which built confidence between managers and 
employees, and created a small social community within the company, which, 
as a result, helped to develop that comfort working zone and gave more 
confidence to employees at all levels to be able to communicate freely with top 
managers (White, 2009).  
Different employees at all levels of PackCo appreciated this management style. 
For example, the promoted Production Manager stated that without the support 
of the PackCo GM he would not be able to carry out the responsibilities of his 
new position:  
Yes, I faced some difficulties in some places, but somebody helped 
me from our Dubai team, and the GM, as well, helped locally. It is a 
supportive team  
                                            
77
 www.thefreedictionary.com 
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The Credit Collection Leader stated the following about the supportive team 
within PackCo:  
I haven’t faced any difficulties since I joined the company as all the 
managers above me are understandable whenever we face any 
problem, and they are helpful and supportive as well. 
The PackCo GM stated the following in this regard: 
That is something which we do here in the company, employees have 
willingness and we give the environment and teach them the right 
thing. Like we have told our employees, any time you have any trouble; 
don’t feel, oh! I don’t know”, and you make mistakes, instead you call 
and ask. This is how we do it, and this is a perfect strategy and it is 
working out. 
To sustain such a style, managers would go out with employees for lunch each 
Saturday. The total number of employees at PackCo is also only 25, including 
shop floor workers, which helps to support the management style at PackCo. In 
comparing PackCo with other big companies in Oman (where sometimes the 
section manager does not communicate with his employees at the lower levels), 
this made PackCo employees feel more comfortable in the working 
environment.  
Having said that, the comfort working zone only worked to a certain extent. 
When the operation of the company was affected by that comfort zone, then the 
priority was the company, not the employees. This will be explained in detail, 
below, when discussing the introduction of the BSC, as well as the ERP system 
implementation (Collier, 2005). 
Such a work environment gave the employees the confidence to express the 
difficulties they were facing in relation to any system, and it created a 
comfortable working environment in which the company achieved its goals and 
the employees were simultaneously satisfied with what they were doing. A 
similar point was made by Nørreklit and Mitchell (2007) when they stated, 
"achieving coherence in measurement systems is unlikely if the system is 
designed and imposed by top management; interaction between the managerial 
and employee constituencies is more likely to produce a successful system" 
(p.187). 
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7.4. Changes that have been introduced into PackCo during the last 10 
years78  
As was explored above, the group company was production-oriented, and with 
various changes within the operating environment, the organisation started to 
question the existing ways of doing things and changes were introduced. This 
section will explore the two changes introduced into PackCo in the last 10 
years, which were the balanced scorecard (BSC) and the Sageline500 
enterprise resource planning (SL500 ERP) system.  
Having explored the different institutions that existed within PackCo, this section 
will explore the interplay between the MA rules and the routines within PackCo. 
This section draws on Burns and Scapens (2000), complemented by Hardy 
(1996), as was discussed in Chapter 3. Both frameworks enable the analysis of 
the MA change as a process within PackCo, and they help to interpret: (1) the 
existing routines, and how they were challenged by new rules, (2) how new 
rules were routinised, but not institutionalised, except after adjustment, 
especially with the BSC implementation, and (3) how power mobilisation at 
different organisational levels, and not just institutions, rules, and routines that 
have shaped both MA changes as processes, that is, the BSC and ERP system 
implementation. Precisely, this section is dedicated to explaining the change 
and/or continuity of MAP at PackCo. Different themes emerged from the case 
study, and more emphasis will be given to those themes. They are (1) the 
importance of existing institutions in shaping the MA change as a process, (2) 
the importance of different sources of power in shaping the MA change as a 
process, and (3) the effect of new rules on employees’ performance evaluation, 
i.e. rewards, and how such an effect has shaped the MA change as a process. 
  
                                            
78
 The section will focus on analysing the change process and how existing employees’ routines within 
PackCo shaped the change process. Due to limited accessto PackCo Muscat only, and the geographical 
span of other units (including the HO), it was not possible to get the views of managers, either at the HO or 
at other units, on the introduction of the BSC and SL500 ERP system.  
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7.4.1. New accountability and performance evaluation system: 
This section describes the process of implementing a new accountability and 
performance evaluation system, the BSC, within PackCo. The BSC was 
introduced into the group company with the intention that it would be used as a 
controlling tool, and would give its operation a more strategic orientation aimed 
at providing better services to A-grade customers, thus sustaining the group 
company’s market share with A-grade customers, and differentiating the group 
company from other players in the market. It is not possible, however, to ignore 
the importance of introducing the BSC to PackCo to create a “technically 
defined and concrete indicators of effectiveness” system within the group 
company. However, that is beyond the focus of this study. The imposition of the 
BSC on different units can be explained as presenting a rational business 
practice to differentiate the group company and to provide better services to A-
grade customers (Oliver, 1993, p.573; Burns, 2000). However, “such description 
would considerably under-play the complex dynamics of such change, as 
process over time” (Burns, 2000, p.579). This section therefore explores how 
the BSC was introduced and implemented in PackCo having been imposed by 
the Dubai HO. It also explains how PackCo’s GM imposed the BSC upon his 
units. In doing so, mobilisation of different sources of power and, basically, the 
power of resources was utilised by PackCo’s GM. Moreover, the section 
explains how mobilisation/lack of power of different employees shaped the BSC 
change as a process. In addition, it is important also not to ignore the effect of 
the existing accountability institution, mentioned above, on shaping the change 
process (Hardy, 1996; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns, 2000). The remainder 
of this section explores both changes in detail. 
7.4.1.1. Power mobilisation at the top level 
 
As was discussed above, in Section 7.2.2, there is a power institution 
embedded within the group company. That power institution was reflected 
during the implementation of the BSC and the ERP within PackCo. Power 
mobilisation was obvious at different times during the process of change, and 
mostly at the early stages of putting change plans into action. This section will 
thus focus on how different actors at the top level, that is, head office managers 
197 
 
and the GM of PackCo, exercised different sources of power to impose the 
implementation of BSC. Another section, below, will explore how employees at 
lower operating levels also exercised their power to resist the BSC. 
 
A. The need for a change, consulting company recommendation, and 
power mobilisation by the Dubai Head Office to impose change 
Hardy’s (1996) power framework was introduced in the theory chapter, and, 
according to that framework, “power can provide the energy for strategic 
change. Without it, we face strategic paralysis because we lack a mechanism 
with which to make change happen” (p.S3). This section therefore explores the 
need to introduce a change within the group company and the ways in which 
different actors, including the consulting company and head office, mobilised 
different sources of power to introduce and implement such a change into 
different units of the group company, including PackCo.  
Though the focus of the analysis of this research is at the micro-level, it is 
important to take into account the effect of the external environment in which 
the company was operating, as the effect of such an external environment is 
important to understand the changes within the organisation. Without changes 
in the external environment, such as the loss of big customers’ market share, it 
is unlikely that change will be introduced into an organisation. In her paper, 
Oliver (1992, p.566) proposed that different factors, including “political, 
functional, and social mechanisms both within and beyond the organization”, 
played a role in the process of deinstitutionalisation; i.e., questioning the 
existing ways of doing things. Among the political pressures identified by Oliver 
(1992) was declining performance; for example, when a company, PackCo for 
the purpose of this research, witnesses a decrease in its market share of major 
customers, then the “legitimacy of what were once tried and true organizational 
activities may be seriously questioned or rejected” (p.568).  
Accordingly, and as explored above, PackCo is operating in a changing 
environment, including changes in the Omani operating context and changes in 
the nature of the packaging industry, which, in turn, decreased the 
organisation’s market share of A-grade customers, which was an indication of a 
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decline in the group company’s performance. Such external pressures thus led 
to the questioning of the existing ways of doing things within the group 
company. It is important to respond to such market indicator, especially with the 
nature of the packaging industry and the power of such A-grade customers in 
the operation of PackCo. Moreover, in line with Abdel-Kader and Luther’s 
(2008) study, there is a relationship between the type of management 
accounting practice (MAP) used by a company and customer power. In other 
words, the more powerful the customers, the more sophisticated the MAPs 
used by the company. Since by implementing more sophisticated MAPs the 
organisation will improve the decision-making process and control, this will help 
it to respond faster to the customers’ enquiries and also help to keep their 
demanding A-grade customers satisfied (Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008).  
The effect of A-grade customers on the business operation was therefore the 
main force that was driving PackCo to introduce a change. The PackCo GM 
called the A-grade customers’ effect on the business operation ‘external forces’, 
when he said: 
The day we visualised this requirement, the company was doing well 
and did not have major financial problems, but company and 
management perceived some kind of threats from competitors, 
external forces you called them, such as markets and customers. 
These are driving forces for the business.……... These are the 
external driven forces, which will push you to the world, and either you 
change yourself and come up with something better or fade out 
PackCo’s GM also added, “So what are the other systems which will fit with our 
way of working and will increase our potential market capacity and production?” 
In addition to the problem that the group company was facing in terms of 
providing better services to A-grade customers and capturing a higher market 
share, the group company’s strategy was to differentiate their company from 
their competitors. As PackCo’s GM described the situation:  
I would say that there was always a challenge to differentiate PackCo 
from other competitors, and it was not that the business was not doing 
well. At that point in time, these are some of the questions which forced 
us to get into something different that our competitors could not touch. 
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Then we said: “fine, what is that we should do?” And we called in a 
consultant. 
The problem of losing some of the A-grade–customer market share and the 
need to differentiate the group company from other competitors, was discussed 
with a Western-based consulting company during 2008. The consulting 
company recommended the BSC as a solution for the group company’s 
external-environment pressures. According to the consulting company, 
implementing such a performance measurement practice would help the group 
company to differentiate itself from competitors.79 PackCo’s GM stated: 
…. Consultant said that your desire to come up will be correlated with 
BSC. So, it was the desire that was much more important than the 
name of the BSC. There are various ways to improve, but the 
company’s desire was more correlated to the BSC, according to the 
consulting company. Because with the BSC the company will start to 
learn which parameters should be tagged, what are the key areas of 
constraints that we are facing, and how do we monitor them?  
Moreover, according to PackCo’s GM, the consulting company stated the 
following: 
“BSC is a new concept in the market and not many companies are 
doing it. You do it. First, it is expensive; second it requires a huge 
organisational structure to support all the activities of BSC.” 
From the above description, it is clear that power was exercised by the 
consulting company to introduce the BSC into the group company. First, power 
over meaning was exercised by the consulting company in convincing the 
management at the head office that the BSC was what they were looking for to 
overcome any issues relating to providing better services to A-grade customers. 
In doing so, the consulting company depended on using phrases such as those 
quoted by the PackCo GM, “BSC is a new concept in the market and not many 
companies are doing it. You do it,” in order to convince top managers at the 
Dubai head office that the BSC was a desirable and rational solution to any 
weakness relating to the relationship between the group company and A-grade 
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 The access for this study was limited only to PackCo Oman, which could not give me the whole picture 
about the discussion between the consulting company and the management at the HO. Getting access to 
the HO would possibly enrich the data related to the research, but due to time and financial constraints, 
that was not possible (this is a limitation of the study). 
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customers. The consulting company was successful in convincing top 
managers at the Dubai head office of this (Hardy, 1996).  
It is not possible to ignore the effect of the consulting company in introducing 
the BSC into the group company, and this effect of the supply side (consulting 
company) in spreading new management accounting practices has been 
proven by different studies (Sulaiman et al., 2008). For example, Ax and 
Bjørnenak (2005) stated that:  
“[o]ne way in which the supply side can popularize an innovation in a 
specific location is by matching the design characteristics and 
rhetorical elements of the innovation to the preferences and 
knowledge of the potential adopters” (p.4).  
It is thus possible to conclude that the group company was not sure what the 
best solution was in relation to its issues with A-grade customers and with 
differentiation. The Western-based consulting company therefore proposed the 
BSC as the proper tool to allow the group company to meet its needs. So, 
based on the consulting company’s recommendation, the BSC was 
implemented and imposed by the Dubai head office onto the different units, 
which will take us to another dimension of power in Hardy’s (1996) power 
framework: ‘power over resources,’ which was exercised by the Dubai head 
office to impose the BSC onto PackCo.  
Based on the power culture explained above, top managers at the head office 
exercised the ‘power of resources’, in terms of authority, to compel the different 
units, including PackCo, to use the new performance measurement system. 
Imposition of a new system or MAP, such as the BSC, is not new within the 
group company, because almost all units follow the procedures and policies set 
by the head office in Dubai. Consequently, “a directive from the parent is seen 
as something that has to be implemented”, without questioning (Siti-Nabiha and 
Scapens, 2005, p.51). PackCo’s GM referred clearly to the power of authority 
that the Dubai HO exercised over the different units so as to put change, the 
BSC, into action: 
To some extent, yes, I would say that there was a push from top 
managers at HO to implement BSC. The thoughts which are there 
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(HO), and the objectives which are set there: we have to do. These 
requirements by head office, then, we have to do them 
Hardy (1996) stated that the power of resources gained from authority and the 
ability to hire and fire, are exercised by actors, such as top managers, to get 
things done their way; it “works along the lines of behaviour modification.” Since 
this source of power is task-oriented, as explored in Chapter 3, its effect is 
limited, and excessive use of this power can cause a strong reaction from 
employees (p. S7). Continuing to use this power caused a 'counter-productive' 
effect at later stages of the BSC change process within PackCo, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. Furthermore, PackCo’s GM reinforced the ways 
that top managers exercised the power of resources to put plans into action, 
and stated:  
So, they (managers at the group level) will not give a chance for 
somebody who says ‘yes’, but is not doing it. And there are two 
options only, which are, either you do it, or you may leave (and he 
laughed). Company, whatever management, said it has to be done. 
For whatever reason, for one person, we cannot affect the others 
Mobilising the power of resources in terms of authority, or the ability to hire or 
fire, is also in line with the notion of ‘top-down’ management accounting change, 
as argued by Burns and Scapens (2000). A more detailed analysis of the effect 
of top-down change on the existing routines will be presented below. 
 
B. Power mobilisation by PackCo’s GM 
 
The previous section explored how top managers at the Dubai head office 
exercised power over resources to impose the implementation of BSC within 
PackCo. This section also draws on Hardy (1996) to explain how PackCo’s GM 
exercised different sources of power to impose the introduction and 
implementation of BSC onto his unit, including the power of resources and the 
power of meaning. In addition, Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as a 
process framework is also utilised to explain how the BSC change as a process 
evolved within PackCo. 
After the HO approved the introduction of the BSC, based on the 
recommendation of the consulting company, and training had been provided to 
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top managers at HO, the HO made each unit’s GM responsible and 
accountable for introducing and implementing the BSC within his/her unit 
according to the training provided by the consulting company and the HO’s 
requirements.  
Power over resources was exercised by PackCo’s GM in the manner by which 
he drew on his relative authority, backed by the support from top managers at 
the Dubai head office, to enforce behavioural modification in his unit, which was 
also supported by PackCo’s small size (Burns, 2000, p.579, Hardy, 1996). This 
was exerted by the PackCo GM in different forms—linking performance with 
financial rewards, and the ability to hire or fire—to impose the implementation of 
the BSC on his unit. PackCo’s GM stated explicitly that jobs were at risk at 
PackCo if employees’ behaviour was not in line with management 
requirements:  
....and [the] company cannot struggle for a long time with a potential 
for a negative performance on those areas, which are important for the 
entire group, not only our unit. So, we have to do some corrective 
actions and remove some anti-elements of our system. 
Moreover, the power of resources, in terms of authority, was also exercised by 
PackCo’s GM to compel the use of the BSC’s new rules within his unit, he 
stated:  
...today also I would say that my team, maybe 50% of them, they don’t 
like the BSC, because with the implementation of BSC their 
performance was affected but they are forced to do it. I can’t help here, 
this is a company, I can have everything in my house that I want, but 
when I am in the company; it is the company’s rules, regulations, 
policies, and procedures, and we are here to make money, not to lose 
it. 
In addition, the power of resources, in terms of rewards, was also exercised by 
PackCo’s GM, as a financial incentive in the form of an annual bonus was 
announced at the early stages of BSC implementation in PackCo. As PackCo’s 
GM described it:  
The company started to incentivise these managers (bonus at the end 
of the year), employees and everybody, including the line managers 
and all. If somebody is doing well in the implementation of these 
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policies and procedures; they will get good incentives at the end of the 
year.  
According to Burns (2000), “On occasions, though not always, momentum in 
change is enhanced by the deployment of incentives for those most affected” 
(p.590). In this case study, the incentives were in financial terms, and that had a 
counter effect and resulted in resistance to the new BSC rules, as will be 
detailed below. 
Besides the mobilisation of power of resources by PackCo’s GM, other sources 
of power were also mobilised to put the imposed BSC into action. For example, 
the Credit Collection Leader started to complain about the new accountability 
system, based on BSC, and how it was affecting her performance and the 
financial rewards. She thus resisted the change. PackCo’s GM tried to convince 
her that the new BSC-rule was not affecting her performance, as she thought, 
and explained to her how things worked with the new accountability system. 
PackCo’s GM said the following on how he convinced the CC Leader about the 
new BSC rule and its consequences in the performance evaluation: 
Let say that there is dispute with a customer and she has not collected, 
it is going to affect her performance. If I, as a manager, don’t take care 
of those parameters, corrective parameters we call them; it will affect 
her performance. The performance, though, it is good, but because of 
one customer it will go low; so, we remove those kinds of cases, 
disputes with customers, and give her a comfort zone. To teach her 
and to make her understand and realise that, look, it is not a negative 
indicator, there is a challenge. However, once it is done, she is 
happier. 
From the analysis presented in this section, it is possible to conclude that 
PackCo’s GM attempted to apply the new BSC-rules in his unit, and to influence 
the change according to the Dubai head office requirements. In line with the 
study by Burns (2000), “despite all the political manoeuvres, and extensive 
mobilisation of power” by top managers at different levels, PackCo’s employees 
resisted the new BSC-rules, as will be explored below, since, without the ability 
to question the existing ways of doing things, “all the politics and power in the 
world cannot guarantee intended institutional change” (Burns, 2000, p.591). The 
stability of existing routines and institutions cannot thus be challenged only by 
mobilising different sources of power; instead, questioning the existing 
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institutions is required in order for a change to be introduced. Accordingly, 
because the new BSC-rules were imposed by top managers, and challenged 
the existing accountability institution through the process of routinisation, 
deliberate resistance was there, as will be detailed below (Burns and Scapens, 
2000; Burns, 2000). 
7.4.1.2. Balanced scorecard new rules 
According to Burns and Scapens (2000), new rules could emerge with the 
introduction of a new management accounting practice, or from existing 
routines if the organisation is worried about losing tacit knowledge through 
employee transfer. At PackCo, new rules were introduced with the 
implementation of the BSC. Those new rules, though, were imposed by top 
managers and they challenged the existing ways of doing things. Employees 
within PackCo enacted and reacted them, as will be explained below. Mobilising 
different sources of power was effective in putting plans into action for some 
time; but as the change process is path dependent on existing institutions; that 
was not enough to change the existing ways of thinking, and an adaption of the 
new BSC-rules was introduced. This section thus introduces the new BSC-rules 
that were introduced with the BSC’s implementation, then, how the imposed 
new BSC-rules were adopted according to the existing accountability institutions 
will be explored later in this chapter. 
After the loss of the A-grade customers’ market share, top managers at the 
group level observed the need for a change in order to achieve the group 
company’s vision of differentiation and of serving A-grade customers in a better 
way; therefore, the BSC was introduced with the aim of directly linking the 
performance of different employees with the achievement of the business vision 
by making employees accountable for their performance in a more concrete 
way. The BSC was therefore imposed by top managers from different levels in 
the organisation. With the newly imposed MAP, new rules were introduced. 
Before presenting the new rules, the section will give a brief description of the 
consulting company’s role in the change process, and this will be based on 
PackCo’s experience. Actually, based on the empirical findings, the consulting 
company’s role in the change process was limited to technical support only. The 
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PackCo GM described the role of the consulting company in the change 
process: 
The consultant was coming to the HO every month, and the group 
company was submitting progress reports. The consultants were 
analysing those reports and then recommending which corrective 
actions were required, and what the key elements are that the 
company should focus on, and, which elements to keep aside (don’t 
monitor them on a regular basis, not weekly but monthly). The 
company has done these all by itself and the consultant was a guiding 
factor only. It was not the consultant who entered the data and said: 
“you have to do it in this way”. 
Based on PackCo’s experience, the consulting company’s role and contribution 
were crucial in the design process, as well as from the technical perspective in 
implementation (Oliveira, 2010). The influential technical role of the consulting 
company was supported more by the lack of technical knowledge of different 
organisational members in regard to the BSC. Unlike different studies, for 
example Oliveira (2010), where the consulting company had an influential role 
in the implementation of SAP within the case study company, the role of the 
consulting company at PackCo was limited to guiding only, and following up on 
how the BSC implementation process was progressing. The geographical span 
of different units, plus the financial consequences of engaging consultants 
directly in different operational units, could explain the limited role of the 
consulting company in the change process at PackCo. Additionally, due to the 
author’s limited access to the group company, it was not possible to fully 
understand the role of the consulting company in the change process. 
Following the BSC training that top managers (GM only from PackCo) from 
different group units received from the consulting company at the Dubai head 
office, each unit general manager was responsible for training and the 
introduction of the change in his unit. The PackCo GM, describing the training 
stage thus: 
...the training period included: basic understanding of the concepts 
and then data gathering; as you need lots and lots and lots of data to 
be pumped into the BSC to make proper decisions, which parameters 
are important for the whole organisation to improve, not for a particular 
line of managers. It was important to know how the data would flow, 
this is one part. The second part is, basically, how will you record those 
206 
 
data, where, and in what format? The format should be unified for all 
across the group, so those formats were defined  
In their study, Burns and Scapens (2000, p.6), defined the rules as “the formally 
recognized way in which things should be done”. In the case study, a set of new 
rules was defined by the consulting company with the introduction of the BSC, 
and that is, how to collect data, how to feed data in the system, and how to 
produce the required reports. Those new rules were supposed to help the group 
company in co-ordinating and giving coherence between the HO and different 
units in how to produce the required reports that were associated with the 
introduction of the BSC. However, throughout the routinisation process, 
deliberate modifications caused by resistance were introduced, as will be 
discussed below (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.6). 
The implementation process of the BSC started in mid-2008, and from the 
beginning of 2010, the company started monitoring all the parameters itself. The 
PackCo GM was responsible for providing monthly reports to the Dubai head 
office. PackCo’s GM stated the following to describe the general employee 
perception of the introduction and implementation of the BSC, and it is clear 
from his quotation how he mobilised the power over meaning to convince his 
employees that the change was good:  
Employees did not reject it, but they were not convinced with the idea 
of BSC. Because, see, there are two things here: one is the knowledge 
of that subject matter and, second, the fear of the unknown. The fear 
of the unknown is always there. What will happen, how will the 
manager deal with me, will they blame me for not performing? Things 
like that. But the approach is different here. It has to be taken in the 
right sense. It is more convincing employees that, look, this is going to 
be beneficial for us 
Giddens (1984, p.57) argued that ontological security is the basic anxiety-
control mechanism, which is developed during the infant’s pre-linguistic stage to 
cope with anxiety and, later, is sustained through the enactment of predictable 
routines in social interaction (Busco, 2009, p.255). And the ontological security 
needs of individuals are satisfied through routinised practices, while reproducing 
the wider organisational and societal order. Within PackCo, before the 
implementation of BSC, the ways of doing things that were embedded in 
employees’ daily routines provided ontological security for the employees and, 
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simultaneously, met the managers’ needs. Though routines are enacted and 
reacted through social interaction, during critical situations, for example, the 
introduction of the BSC at PackCo, routines would be disrupted and "anxiety 
swamps the behavioural rituals habitually performed within the organization" 
(Busco, 2009, p.256). This threatens the ontological security of individuals and 
unlocks the possibilities for change. The introduction of the BSC at PackCo 
threatened the ontological security of different employees by the introduction of 
new rules that challenged the existing ways of doing things, or routines. Even 
though some employees experienced anxiety about how the new BSC-rules 
that had been introduced would affect their performance evaluation, there was 
no “overt or formal resistance” to those new rules at the early implementation 
stages, as the change was a directive from the head office in Dubai (Siti-Nabiha 
and Scapens, 2005). 
For instance, the Sales Manager’s performance was linked directly t on-time 
order delivery, based on the new BSC rule. A score, for the Sales Manager, 
would be calculated according to the on-time order delivery. In other words, a 
score of 5 would be assigned for a 100% of on time delivery, and the score was 
lower with a lower percentage of on-time delivery. The new accountability rule 
challenged the existing accountability institution, as explained above in Section 
7.4.1. The new BSC-rule for Sales Managers was in the form of providing 
monthly reports to HO about the percentage of on-time delivered orders by 
using a manual system called the raving fan module. The Sales Manager 
explained how that module was used:  
The Sales Managers should take 5 or 6 of the major customers and 
track their orders one by one. And there is a score assigned to the 
Sales Manager performance in relation to on-time delivery. For 
example, if I deliver on time, this means a hit (i.e., I delivered on the 
same day agreed with the customer); otherwise that will be a miss; i.e., 
I miss delivering on-time to the customer. Did I hit the agreed delivery 
date or did I miss it? And there is a percentage allocated if I do not 
deliver the orders on time, which depends on how long I was late in 
delivering the order to the customer 
Then, a monthly report on the percentage of on-time delivered orders would be 
sent to the PackCo GM and the Sales Director at HO. In addition, all of the 
necessary data needed to produce that monthly report was entered, mainly 
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manually, into the system. The PackCo Sales Manager described this module, 
and the associated new data-feeding rule:  
The raving fan module was not a well-established programme, it was 
simply Excel. I was the one who calculated the hits and misses and to 
get the percentage I have to put in a formula. And I tried to give it to 
my colleague to do, but I found that he was not doing it properly. So, I 
have to review it and I have to re-do it again. And it was something like 
homework.  
To the Sales Manager, this new rule was only more of a load on him, and if 
there is an even greater load of documentation and reports on sales people; 
you will not get a good bottom line result. However, you will get magnificent 
results as a report, but this is not required 
Accordingly, the Sales Manager enacted the new rule by entering the required 
data into the raving fan module, as well as producing the monthly reports 
required by top managers. For him, this was only an extra load; also, to him, the 
new rule conflicted with the existing sales-oriented ways of thinking and the 
existing accountability institution. The PackCo Sales Manager said, “See, it is 
not that I was not willing to provide the reports; it was extra load and more 
documentation. Any salesman does not like to sit in the office and do lots of 
documentation”.  
The PackCo Sales Manager also added: 
Most important thing to the customer is delivering the order on time 
and for some customers if I delay the order for 2-3 days, it is not a big 
deal. But immediately I put this ‘miss’ in the raving fan module, it will 
give a lower percentage; and, actually, it is not less because the delay 
didn’t harm the customer. We are talking about delivery if I am harming 
his production only. If I am stopping his production, yes, it is a big 
crime; but if the customer agrees that I am going to delay the order for 
2 or 3 days, or whatever, it is o.k. (saying it as if there is no big issue, 
and no need for this new BSC-rule). 
In addition to the Sales Manager, other staff at PackCo referred to the new 
BSC-rule as challenging the existing accountability institution. The financial 
accountability also was directly linked with the CC Leader’s performance 
evaluation, which is based on the new BSC-rule. It was as follows: the CC 
Leader would get a score of 5 when she collected all due credit notes from 
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customers within 90 days, and the score would get lower as she too a longer 
time. Additionally, she received a zero score when she took more than 180 days 
to collect any credit notes. The CC Leader had to submit a report on the credit 
notes, and which notes were collected within the 90 days, and which were not. 
The new BSC-rule is in the form of providing the reports related to credit notes’ 
collection, as well as the link between the CC Leader’s performance evaluation, 
and this created a situation of anxiety for her, as she explained: 
Actually, when this new performance measurement was introduced it 
affected my performance too much, to the extent that, even when I go 
home, I still think about the work and the amounts that I didn’t collect 
from the customers  
Although the new BSC-rule challenged the prevailing accountability institution at 
PackCo, the CC Leader started to enact and react to the new rule in the form of 
providing reports regarding all the credit notes and how long she took to collect 
them. The enactment of the new rule was also a result of the imposition by top 
managers, both at the unit or HO level, and due to power-of-resources 
mobilisation. 
On the other hand, and unlike the situation with the Sales Manager and the CC 
Leader, there was no resistance to the new BSC-rules in the production 
department, despite the fact that there was deliberate resistance by the ex-
Production Manager to the new BSC rules when the idea of the BSC was 
introduced in the first place. The process of change thus evolved in a different 
way within the production department, although all employees at PackCo 
shared the same existing accountability institution. Different events—including 
the dismissal of the existing Production Manager, the promotion of an existing 
supervisor to Production Manager, and all the consequences that followed—
unfolded following the implementation of the BSC at PackCo. 
With the BSC implementation, the performance of the employees was linked to 
the score they received on the scorecard, based on different parameters that 
were related to the employee’s working field; for the Production Manager, there 
were nine parameters, and eventually his performance evaluation and yearly 
bonus were affected too. When the initiative of the BSC implementation was 
introduced to PackCo, the ex-Production Manager, who held a master’s degree 
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in printing and was aware of how those parameters would affect his 
performance, resisted the change from the beginning. Since the head office 
managers had imposed the change within all its units, employees were left with 
two options: either they “do it, or they may leave” according to the PackCo GM. 
Due to the resistance of the ex-Production Manager, he was dismissed from 
PackCo.  
Action was needed to replace the dismissed Production Manager, especially 
since the group company was at the early stages of implementing the BSC. 
Thus, PackCo GM decided to upgrade an existing supervisor to the Production 
Manager’s position after providing some training that was related to language 
and how to handle different documents. The production supervisor only held a 
high diploma in printing and had started to work at the company eight years 
earlier as a printing machine operator. The GM believed that the knowledge 
required for the company was very specific, and upgrading the supervisor to this 
position was better than bringing in another master’s degree holder. PackCo’s 
GM believed that internal promotion was the best for the organisation: 
.... we realised that there is no need to bring in new people from 
outside. The one reason is, because our kind of industry is a very 
specific industry. The knowledge is very, very, specific knowledge on 
that subject matter. All the old lot of people we had, we had some 
troubles with them; so we removed them. What we did was we 
launched the concept of internal promotions. Today, our Production 
Manager is actually -- 8 years back he was a printing operator. 2 years 
back he was a supervisor. The idea here is that he is the one who 
knows how to save the materials, which products to print, how to print 
them and he has complete knowledge of the process. That has really 
helped the company, instead of bringing new staff from outside 
Despite some challenges that the Production Manager faced after this 
promotion, he was handling these new responsibilities well. He was providing 
the different reports required by the top managers, either at the Dubai HO or the 
Oman unit. In relation to the new BSC-rules, he realised that there was a 
change within PackCo. He described this change by referring to the change in 
the amount of data that needed to be entered into the system: 
.... same reports, but there is a change in terms of details provided by 
those reports. Before, it was only 10 columns, but now we are 
making 20 columns; more details were added.  
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However, he did not know what that change was, and how such change was 
affecting his performance. This lack of knowledge was clear from his answer 
when I asked him about his involvement in the process of implementing the 
BSC. He said: “No I am not involved, but I am supporting this.” 
In addition, PackCo’s GM stated many times that the Production Manager was 
implementing the BSC without realising it. He stated that explicitly: 
See, the Production Manager is implementing BSC, but he doesn’t 
know. He went for a leave and when he came back he gave me all 
the required reports. These formats -- we have developed them and 
he is filling them, but he does not know that that is the BSC 
He added: The Production Manager is doing company production 
reports in terms of capacity and ideal hours, and other series of reports 
as well, but the funny thing is that he does not know what those reports 
are made for. The aim is that feeding the data is for BSC, but he does 
not know that he is feeding them with that aim 
As mentioned above, with the BSC implementation, the Production Manager’s 
performance evaluation was linked to 9 parameters, and although such new 
BSC-rules challenged the existing accountability institution, the Production 
Manager started to enact and reproduce the new rule. Finally, the Production 
Manager understood that he was accountable for those report results in terms 
of explaining the results, even though he did not understand how those reports 
were linked to his performance evaluation. He said, “If performance is bad I 
need to give answers, and if it is good also I have to give answers.” 
From the above, it is possible to conclude that all of the employees at PackCo 
enacted and reacted to the new BSC-rules and produced the reports required 
by the top managers, although such new BSC rules challenged the existing 
accountability institution, and there was no resistance to the new rules during 
the first two years of the BSC implementation process. Those new BSC-rules 
were imposed and directed by the top managers from the head office and the 
PackCo, GM supported by the hierarchal power institution. The new MAP was 
implemented, and reports were produced as required by the HO, but it was not 
institutionalised, as will be detailed in the following section.  
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7.4.1.1. Un-institutionalisation of routinised BSC rules, power/ lack of 
power mobilisation, resistance/ no resistance to BSC-rules, and 
adaptation of un-institutionalised BSC routines 
Based on Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as a process framework “as 
new rules are implemented modifications may be introduced, either deliberately 
or unconsciously” (p.6). They also argued that:  
“through implementation of new rules, routines will emerge and 
enactment of rules and routines may be subject to resistance, 
especially if the rules and routines challenge existing meanings and 
values, and actors have sufficient resources of power to intervene in 
this process” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 10).  
This section thus explores the resistance to the new BSC-rules within PackCo. 
An explanation of that resistance cannot be limited to the challenging of the new 
BSC-rules by the existing institution, but other factors, such as power and the 
effect of the new BSC-rule on financial rewards, also explain why resistance 
occurred (Hardy, 1996; Otley, 1999). Moreover, this section also explores the 
modifications introduced for the BSC rules due to the resistance by different 
PackCo employees. 
A contradiction between the BSC-rules and the existing accountability 
institution, plus the effect of the BSC rules on employees’ performances 
resulted in resistance to the BSC by some PackCo staff. As argued by Burns 
and Scapens (2000), when new rules challenge prevailing institutions and 
“actors have sufficient resources of power to intervene in the change process,” 
then new rules would be subject to resistance (p.10). Within PackCo, different 
change dynamics explained how the BSC’s change as a process unfolded. 
First, the Sales Manager and CC Leader mobilised different sources of power to 
resist the new BSC-rules. Second, over time, the BSC routine was not self-
reinforcing and deliberate change was introduced due to resistance by the 
PackCo Sales Manager, as well as the CC Leader, to continue reproducing the 
BSC-rules, especially with the time-consuming raving fan module for the Sales 
Manager and the credit collection limits for the CC Leader. In addition to the 
effect of the new BSC-rules on the employees’ performance evaluations and 
financial rewards, as mentioned above. So, these rationales and the power of 
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resources explain how deliberate change occurred during the routinisation 
process of the BSC-rules, as will be detailed below.  
Employees at PackCo started to enact the new BSC rules as directed by top 
managers, but two years later some employees resisted the implementation of 
the BSC. For example, the PackCo Sales Manager resisted enacting and 
reacting to the new BSC-rule, and the PackCo GM stated, in this regard: 
The Sales Manager was feeding the required data into raving fan, and 
we realised that now it was almost one and a half to two years that the 
sales people were doing this, and then they started complaining about 
it: Oh! This is time consuming! If we don’t provide Sales Managers with 
another more user-friendly system then the company will lose. So, 
management realised that there was a need for some kind of a system 
before they got fed up and stopped entering data, we need to provide 
a new system for them. 
As discussed earlier, the purpose of introducing the BSC within the group 
company was to capture a bigger proportion of the A-grade–customer market 
share. If the group company did not respond to the Sales Manager’s resistance, 
this would have meant that there was a chance of losing the Sales Manager’s 
expertise, which, in turn, meant losing a relationship with customers. Actually, if 
the Sales Manager left PackCo, the majority of the company’s customers would 
leave the company, because a personal relationship is the basis of developing a 
business relationship, at least at PackCo, as the Sales Manager believed.  
Regarding the customers, I built a personal relationship between me 
and the customer....... Thanks God, 90% of Omani customers for 
packaging materials are my customers. The 10% of remaining 
customers are either with Cut Sheet, which is a normal printing press, 
or they shifted from PackCo because of the price 
Not meeting the requirements of Sales Managers in different units meant that 
the group company was going to lose the tacit knowledge when Sales 
Managers left (Burns and Scapens, 2000). That, in turn, would affect the 
operation of the group company instead of solving the problem, as was 
reinforced by the PackCo GM in his comment regarding this issue:  
If people get bored by typing and writing everything, you give them 
something which will make their work easier, peace of mind. And if the 
company did not respond to their claims; then first the data accuracy 
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would be lost, and, second if the Sales Manager gets bored, he will 
stop doing it, and then to restart again it is going to be a problem. So 
that challenge … we have it in our minds, and we have to face it one 
day; today or tomorrow 
The power of resources, that is, expertise, which Sales Managers possessed, 
forced top managers to respond to this resistance and introduce a modification 
to the new BSC rule. This modification helped the Sales Manager to carry on 
his daily responsibilities according to the existing ways of doing things, at the 
same time, helped top managers to control the Sales Manager’s performance in 
providing better services to the customers, in general, and to A-grade 
customers, in particular (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Hardy, 1996).  
Top managers at different locations thus took quick action to make the lives of 
Sales Managers easier in order to save the situation and not to lose the Sales 
Managers at such a critical time. A modification of the BSC-rule was introduced. 
The modification was in the way the Sales Manager entered data and produced 
reports, and the performance evaluation or accountability basis was also 
modified. A module called Mac-Sales replaced the old raving-fan. The Sales 
Manager described Mac-sales and how it operated:  
Mac-Sales is a sales programme with 8 modules for sales people. If I 
am sitting with the customer in my office I have to make a note in the 
system about the customer. So instead of writing it down in a manual 
dairy I will write it in the system; then they (top managers) will see. Is 
this a new opportunity, or maintenance? Maintenance means that I 
met the customer previously, and we spoke regarding an order, but 
the customer did not place the order and it has been 3-4 days since 
we discussed the order details. So, I just go and have a coffee with 
him; ha! Hi, how are you; what is the situation, so and so? This is also 
considered and entered into the system as well. Calls: because I am 
doing most of the calls to customers especially those that are in 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. So, I have to enter that I have spoken to 
so and so in the system. Then I will put a reminder for myself; o.k. I 
called today, and after 5-6 days, if there is any issue, I will call again. 
So, I have to enter into the system that my schedule is so and so, then 
the system will remind me automatically.  
In addition, despite the fact that PackCo’s GM was successful in convincing the 
CC Leader about the new BSC-rule, she started to resist the new rule, since it 
affected her performance, even with the usage of corrective parameters, as 
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stated by the GM and mentioned above. The CC Leader commented in this 
regard:  
I didn’t only reject the responsibilities assigned to me with BSC 
implementation, without limits in credit collection, no, I told the GM that 
I don’t want to handle the credit collection work 
According to Busco (2009), critical situations, for example, the introduction of 
the BSC at PackCo, radically disrupt routines and ontological security as well. 
The CC Leader, after some time and when she realised the effect of the new 
rule on her performance with the usage of corrective parameters, started to feel 
insecure and worry about her performance, because the new rule not only 
added work pressure for her, but it also affected her performance evaluation. 
She was always nervous about the collection period, which sometimes forced 
her to focus on credit collection and neglect other work responsibilities. She 
therefore resisted continuing to implement the new BSC rules. 
Similarly to the Sales Manager, when the CC Leader resisted continuing to 
implement the BSC, PackCo’s GM responded by modifying the new BSC-rule to 
fit the existing ways of doing things. He modified the new BSC-rule as follows: 
the CC Leader became responsible only for collecting the credit notes to the 
limit of 90 days, and any notes exceeding the 90 days and not collected would 
be transferred to higher level managers, the Sales Manager, or the PackCo 
GM. In particular, the CC Leader would no longer worry about the collection of 
credit notes that exceeded 90 days, and the effect that late collection would 
have on her performance evaluation. 
Different change dynamics, in addition to the challenging of the BSC-rules for 
the existing accountability institution, explain why PackCo’s GM modified the 
new BSC-rule and made the CC Leader accountable only for collecting credit 
notes up to 90 days. First, and as explored in Chapter 5, the Omani government 
forced each company investing in Oman to employ at least 35% Omanis as 
employees (Omanisation strategy). PackCo employs exactly the minimum 
required percentage of Omanis, and by losing an Omani employee from the 
unit, the investing company would be breaking Omani investment law. The 
indirect power that the CC Leader gained from the Omani government’s foreign 
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investment legislation—Omanisation—thus forced PackCo to modify the new 
BSC accountability rule. If the CC Leader had not been Omani, and she had 
thus lacked any source of power, the reaction of the PackCo GM might have 
differed. As was mentioned above, a Production Manager was dismissed from 
PackCo as a result of his resistance to implementing BSC. In other words, the 
change process might have unfolded in a different way if the CC Leader had 
been non-Omani, and thus the Production Manager did not have sufficient 
power to intervene in the change process (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Second, as mentioned in Chapter 6, and based on the follow-up interviews, 
Omani citizens are mainly not employed at the higher levels (i.e., managerial 
levels), especially in NOROMCs. There are different reasons for this, including 
the high cost of training them, the lack of qualifications to occupy such 
positions, and higher salaries for Omanis employed in high positions (within 
NOROMCs). The Omani productivity level is also lower. Due to the time that 
PackCo spent in training the current CC Leader, and the time needed to train a 
new person for such a position, the PackCo GM preferred to modify the new 
accountability-rule introduced by the BSC so that it would be compatible with 
the CC Leader’s old ways of thinking, instead of employing another Omani and 
starting training him/her from zero. In addition to the fact that the newly 
introduced rule associated with the implementation of the BSC challenged the 
existing accountability institution, other internal, as well as external, dynamics 
explained why PackCo’s GM modified the new BSC-rule for the CC Leader, 
specifically, the power of governmental authority (i.e. Omanisation) and the cost 
of training Omanis. 
On the contrary, and as explored above, the introduction of the BSC unfolded in 
a different way within the production department. As there was no resistance to 
the BSC’s new rules, despite the fact that the new BSC-rules added work 
pressures to the promoted Production Manager and nine parameters were 
linked to his performance evaluation, he continued to enact and reproduce the 
new BSC-rule until it became a routine, as he indicated: 
The change added work pressure for me, but if I am doing it every day 
I will not feel that there is more work. But if I skip it for one week then 
I feel there is more work to do. At the beginning, I felt that there was 
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more work to do, but now I am doing it every day. I spend only 20 
minutes on the reporting. At the beginning I faced some problems, Oh! 
There are 20 lines to be filled, but now I am o.k. with it 
The lack of power over resources, that is, knowledge and expertise, explains 
why the Production Manager did not resist the new BSC rule, compared with 
the Sales Manager and the ex-Production Manager, as explained above. It is 
important to state here that the lack of knowledge was related to understanding 
how the BSC implementation affected the performance evaluation of the 
Production Manager. This is not related to the technical knowledge per se, as it 
is not possible to ignore the six years’ work experience of the Production 
Manager within PackCo. Although his experience in the field added technical 
knowledge in terms of production procedures, he lacked the tacit knowledge 
and expertise needed for a managerial position, as was reflected in his 
interview responses (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
The change process might have unfolded in a different way if the dismissed ex-
Production Manager had still been working within PackCo. Ezzamel and Burns 
(2005) study’s results demonstrated how conflict of interest and 
power/knowledge between finance and buyer and merchandise managers 
resulted in resistance to implementing the Economic Value Added technique at 
RetailCo. Thus, “formal and overt resistance due to competing interests” might 
explain why the ex-Production Manager resisted the BSC. His knowledge and 
experience level was higher than the current Production Manager’s, because he 
has a master’s degree (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.17). The new BSC-rule 
thus became routinised and maybe institutionalised. 
Last, but not least, a company will respond to the requirements of its employees 
so long as the main objectives of implementing the BSC are not violated, and 
any modifications do not affect the organisation’s operation. That means that 
the comfort working zone has limitations, and there are red lines that cannot be 
crossed by any employee. That was clear from the response of the Sales 
Manager, when he stated clearly that if he resisted implementing the Mac-sales 
module, then the company definitely would remove him from the business. 
See, with my management, I am very frank and very open. I told them 
clearly, if I can do something; then I will do it. If I can’t do it, still I will try to 
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do it, but at the end I will tell them “sorry”. And this is what happened; I 
was doing that (BSC) for two years. But I found that it was an irritating 
activity. And the management understood that, and as a result Mac-sales 
was introduced. But if I am not doing Mac-sales they will tell me “Bye bye!”. 
And they said it from the beginning 
From the information presented in this section, it is possible to state the 
following. The BSC was imposed by the HO on different units, which questioned 
the existing ways of doing things within the group company as a result of 
“changes to the perceived utility or technical instrumentality of the pre-BSC 
accountability system, rather than the result of interest mobilization or 
redistribution in organizational power” (Oliver, 1992, p.571). Yet, employees at 
lower levels exercised different sources of power to resist the change. However, 
just mobilising power is not enough to impose a change; it is important to 
understand existing institutions before introducing any change, because “all the 
politics and power in the world cannot guarantee intended institutional change” 
(Burns, 2000, p. 591). The challenging of the new BSC-rules by existing ways of 
thinking and doing things thus cannot explain fully why actors resist change. 
Other factors, such as power mobilisation and the effect of change on 
employees’ performance evaluations, i.e., rewards systems, also support the 
analysis of how the change as a process evolved in this case study.  
7.4.2. Previously formed institutionalisation and Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) 
Burns and Scapens (2000) explored the process of institutionalisation of rules 
and routines, and, based on their MA change framework, this process involves 
the reproduction of rules and routines through individual actors’ behaviour. It 
also “involves a disassociation of the patterns of behaviour from their particular 
historical circumstances, so that the rules and routines take on a normative and 
factual quality” (ibid, p.11). This section introduces the previously formed 
automation institutionalisation that preceded the introduction and 
implementation of the ERP system, SAGELINE500 (SL500, hereafter) in 
PackCo and its’ importance in shaping how the process of implementing ERP 
system unfold within PackCo. 
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As was detailed above in the previous section, top managers within the group 
company automated the process of entering data for Sales Managers by 
introducing the Mac sales system module, instead of the raving fan module, due 
to the resistance to the new BSC rule. This automation solution can be referred 
to here as a previously formed institutionalisation, which paved the way for the 
implementation of the ERP system within PackCo. In other words, the PackCo 
GM experienced the benefits of automating the new BSC rule for the Sales 
Manager, and based on such experience, he decided to propose the 
implementation of the new ERP system as a solution to the reporting pressures 
he faced, especially after the partnership with the Canadian company.  
Accordingly, the previously formed institutionalisation explained to some extent 
why resistance to the new rules that were introduced with the introduction of the 
ERP system at PackCo was lower compared with the resistance that PackCo’s 
GM faced when the BSC was introduced80. There were also other change 
dynamics that explain how the introduction of SL500 evolved at PackCo as a 
process. The remainder of this section explores how the implementation 
process of a new ERP system evolved within PackCo, and how different 
change dynamics, including existing manual-data-entry institutions, as 
mentioned previously, power, rules, and routines, shaped the change as a 
process by drawing on Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as a process 
framework and Hardy’s (1996) power mobilisation framework. 
Since the current GM joined PackCo in 2004, he has started to change and 
develop the management control system at PackCo. The system that PackCo 
used before the current GM joined was semi-automated and had too many 
limitations. More precisely, data entry was manual, and there was no database 
in the system; the system was not user friendly and was time consuming as 
well. The PackCo Sales Manager described that system thus:  
The computer system was an extreme nightmare for sales people and 
for the accounts department. I don’t remember the name of the 
system, but it was a very basic system; where I have to type the sales 
order and all the details related to the order (ID number, delivery date 
and everything). Then after that, even if I made a mistake during 
typing; I can't rectify it immediately. I have to save the order and then 
                                            
80
 Assuming that the resistance level can be measured.  
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go back to the file and I have to remember which row the mistake was 
in and what the mistake was also. Then I go to that row and re-do it 
again. This system was only to track the orders and order numbers; 
but for everything else we were depending on Excel; 100% Excel: 
invoicing and delivery order everything 
However, in 2004, FOCUS was introduced, as the PackCo GM was unable to 
deal with the old system, since his previous work experience was at a multi-
national company in India, and he had never worked with such a basic system 
before. FOCUS was introduced not only for that reason, but also because the 
old system was time consuming. The PackCo Sales Manager described 
FOCUS:  
Then, after that, when the GM joined, we shifted to FOCUS, which is 
much, much better than the previous one. Everything that I was doing 
in half an hour I was able to do in 2-3 minutes in FOCUS. Even tracking 
the orders and tracking the material, and everything, was much better
       
Although FOCUS was a more powerful system, if compared to the older 
one, on 1st December, 2011, PackCo’s GM proposed a new system, which 
is SL500. As will be detailed below, though there was no fundamental 
change in the nature of reports produced by the new ERP system, there 
were new rules in terms of data processing related to the new ERP 
system. Additionally, there was no change in the existing management 
accounting routines (costing system, budgeting system, etc.) that were 
associated with the implementation of the SL500 ERP system.  Thus, the 
ERP system played a stabilising role in the existing management 
accounting routines, and no new, sophisticated management accounting 
practices were introduced following the implementation of the ERP system 
at PackCo (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Granlund and Malmi, 2002).  
Accordingly, before the implementation of the SL500 ERP system, there were 
different legacy modules for each department in PackCo, and information 
duplication existed. Moreover, for a report to be produced, data was collected 
from different departments; there was no integration between them, because 
there was no properly developed database. The existing reporting routines 
associated with the pre-ERP system were time consuming, as employees at 
PackCo had to pull data from different sources to produce the required reports, 
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and data entry was mostly manual, as mentioned by some interviewees. The 
existing reporting routines thus added more pressure onto the PackCo GM, 
since he was responsible for providing various reports to different higher level 
management, the Dubai HO and the Canadian partner. First, PackCo’s GM had 
to adjust the format of the different reports that were produced by FOCUS so 
that he could upload the reports into the HO system, which was a different 
system. PackCo’s GM described that as:  
Because there are too many reports that are required by the HO. I had 
to import data from FOCUS to Excel and process data according to 
HO requirements; I had to do it manually. That consumes time  
Second, the group company had entered into a partnership with a Canadian 
company in 2011, as mentioned above. The new partner also required from 
each and every unit within the group company, including the head office in 
Dubai, the uploading of reports to the Canadian company’s system directly. The 
performance reports of the different units within the group company were not 
consolidated, so each unit was sending its reports separately. PackCo’s GM 
was responsible for uploading those reports to the Canadian company system 
as well. The reports were similar to those sent to the HO in Dubai, in terms of 
content, but they differed in format. To meet the reporting pressure of the new 
partner and also the Dubai head office’s reporting requirements, in addition to 
the new reports emerging with the BSC’s requirements simultaneously, the 
PackCo GM realised a need for a change and proposed the implementation of 
an ERP system in his unit to the Dubai HO. Hence, unlike other case studies, 
for example, Scapens and Jazayeri’s (2003) and Yazdifar et al.’s (2008), where 
the parent company imposed the implementation of the same ERP system as 
the one used by itself, PackCo GM instead proposed the implementation of an 
ERP system in his unit that was similar to the one used by the head office in 
Dubai. Change in the ownership structure of the group company, thus forced 
the GM to question the existing ways of doing things that were related to MCS, 
which was taken for granted and unquestionable for some time (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). He thus proposed the introduction of the SL500 ERP system 
within his unit. PackCo modelled this implementation on the one at the Dubai 
HO, though such modelling was not the result of an uncertain situation, as 
argued by Powell and DiMaggio (1983). However, introducing this system would 
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facilitate the uploading of reports between PackCo and the Dubai HO with the 
click of a button, which is why PackCo’s GM proposed the SL500 ERP system 
and not another one. That, in turn, would reduce the workload for the PackCo 
GM, at least for the reports provided to the Dubai HO.  
Introducing an ERP system similar to that used by the Dubai HO would 
decrease routine reporting pressures for PackCo’s GM, and his employees as 
well, from different aspects. First, the group company already had previous 
experience with this ERP system. So, instead of going to another system and 
once again having the same problem of different formats for reports, the 
PackCo GM proposed the implementation of this system. Second, the group’s 
previous experience with the same ERP system would make the customisation 
process to meet PackCo’s needs easier, as explained by the GM: 
So what we have done is, instead of going out and searching for a 
different ERP solution, we have selected something already 
implemented in our group. So that is a good advantage for us, as the 
process is already mapped. Thus documentations, data collection, 
activities and all things become easy for us. So that is the reason why 
we went for the SL500 ERP system 
Unlike the GM, current reporting routines for PackCo employees were enacted 
and reacted without questioning, and without their realising the need for 
change, which resulted in employees resisting the implementation of SL500 
when it was introduced, as will be explored below.  
From above, we can conclude that the PackCo GM proposed the 
implementation of the SL500 ERP system within his unit for the following 
reasons: (1) less work pressure for him, in terms of uploading the same reports 
in different formats for different top managers, namely, the HO and the 
Canadian partner company; (2) live updating of reports between PackCo and 
the HO in Dubai; and (3) automation of data processing, development of 
database, and integration of different departments within the unit (sales, 
production, and accounting). 
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7.4.2.1. Mobilising power of meaning over the Dubai HO  
Although the implementation of the SL500 ERP system would reduce reporting 
pressure for PackCo GM and facilitate live reporting between PackCo and the 
Dubai HO, top managers at the Dubai HO were not convinced by the PackCo 
GM’s proposal for introducing and implementing SL500 at his unit. This section 
explores how the PackCo GM mobilised the power of meaning to convince the 
Dubai head office’s top managers to introduce the SL500 ERP system at 
PackCo (Hardy, 1996). 
It took about five months for the PackCo GM to convince HO top management 
of the importance of, and need to implement the SL500 ERP system in his unit. 
As there would be a huge capital investment involved in such an 
implementation, in addition to the yearly licence costs paid to the SL500’s 
vending company. Providing better services to A-grade customers and 
increasing group company size in terms of higher turnover were the arguments 
used by the PackCo GM to convince top management at the Dubai head office 
to implement the new ERP system. PackCo GM’s opinion, in this regard, was, 
“.... you have to change with the time. When FOCUS was in use, there was no 
big turnover, there was no huge competition.”  
According to the PackCo GM, the proposed ERP system would facilitate the 
provision of better services to A-grade customers by prioritising81 their orders, 
which would mean that customer orders were organised based on order value. 
Higher value orders are orders from key customers. This prioritising feature is 
not available with FOCUS, while it is with the SL500 ERP system as the user 
needs only to refresh the system screen and he/she gets all the updates related 
                                            
81
 Now how do we prioritise? Based on the value of the order; I would say the largest order should be 
printed first and that is even if the order is not required by the customer. Because it serves two purposes: 
first, larger orders mean that it is from our key customers and if you serve the top 15 customers better, 
then chances to get better business in the future are secured. And other customers also will get the 
priority, but of course, the more margin and the better relation, and you have volumes here. And before 
Sage, all these things were getting ignored, for example, in the effort to save an  R.O.82 customer, you 
were affecting customers of R.O.1,500 although his delivery is not urgent, but if you serve him better he 
will give you a good volume of business and a recommendation, because these are from big companies 
and that does not mean that we are ignoring customers from small companies; it will be in our list but the 
priority will be given to the top 15 customers. Now production, they don’t know how to prioritize the top 15 
customers and how to serve them. So we made that 48 hours schedule and any order comes in will go to 
the 48 hours schedule based on the idea of prioritizing, and the new ERP helps in doing that for a better 
service provision to A grade customers and that also will depends on the availability of materials as well, 
which will then make the 48-hours printing schedule clearer. But in 48-hours the top 15 customers' orders 
should be printed. (GM, PackCo)  
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to any binding orders, and the prioritising feature will put orders with high values 
before orders with lower values. All staff within the unit would thus focus on 
responding to the higher value orders. This feature in the SL500 ERP system 
facilitates the better utilisation of the 48-hour airport concept to serve A-grade 
customers: 
The company introduced the airport concept and the work of the 
production people improved with the 48 hours’ schedule. To utilise that 
better, the company needed some data on how to prioritise that 48 
hours’ schedule and how to frame it. This idea of prioritising is linked 
to the airport concept, which was introduced earlier by the company, 
but now that idea is supported by on-line data, which makes the 
service provided to A-grade customers better than before 
In addition, PackCo’s GM referred to the future needs of PackCo and the group 
company in order to convince the Dubai HO’s top managers about the 
introduction of the new ERP system to his unit, since, with the new partner, the 
chance to grow faster in the region would be higher: With the CCL merger the 
group is now growing in a much bigger way, and if they are not systematic it will 
be difficult to meet the needs of the new partner. 
PackCo’s GM mobilised the power of meaning to convince top management at 
the Dubai HO to accept his proposal for implementing the SL500 in his unit. He 
referred to providing better services for A-grade customers, and increasing 
company size in terms of turnover to do so. Providing better services to A-grade 
customers may be a better explanation of why the Dubai HO’s top managers 
accepted the proposal. As was discussed above, the BSC was introduced into 
the group company to capture a higher market share of A-grade customers 
through providing better services in terms of on-time delivery. In addition, the 
lock-in of the organisation with different investments in production procedures, 
for example, the airport concept, supported the PackCo GM’s argument with the 
Dubai HO in relation to the introduction of the SL500 ERP system in his unit. 
The SL500 ERP system would support those existing strategies and operating 
systems. Having said that, it is not possible to ignore the effect of the new 
partner on the reporting routines. Eventually, top managers at the Dubai HO 
were convinced, and provided the required capital for investment in the new 
ERP system at PackCo.  
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7.4.2.2. Implementation process of SL500 ERP system, its new rules and 
the routinisation of the new rules 
The previous section explored the mobilisation of the power of meaning by 
PackCo’s GM to convince top management at Dubai HO to introduce SL500 at 
PackCo. This section explores how he imposed such change within his unit by 
mobilising different sources of power, including power over resources and the 
power of meaning (Hardy, 1996). In addition, it demonstrates how the informal 
introduction of the SL500 ERP system facilitated the enactment of SL500-rules 
within PackCo, without any modification when compared with the 
implementation of the BSC-rules (Burns and Scapens, 2000). In contrast to the 
BSC change as a process, the resistance level to the SL500 ERP system was 
lower, and only the CC Leader resisted its introduction initially, as will be 
detailed below. 
After PackCo’s GM convinced top managers in the Dubai HO to invest in the 
new ERP system, he received general training from the SL500 consulting 
company on how to use the ERP system from the Vendor Company of the 
Sageline500 ERP system. Training was provided only for the PackCo GM for 
one week, as training for each and every employee was too costly. However, 
the vending company provided some technical support to PackCo‘s GM when 
that was needed, and there was no direct involvement of the vending company 
during the implementation process of the new ERP system at PackCo. 
After PackCo’s GM received training for the new ERP system, he introduced the 
change to his unit. Not all employees accepted the introduction of the new ERP, 
so PackCo’s GM mobilised different sources of power to impose the 
implementation of the SL500 ERP system. Specifically, he exercised the power 
of resource, in terms of authority backed by his position, to influence the 
implementation of the SL500 ERP system within PackCo in order to put change 
into action (Hardy, 1996). And that power mobilisation was expressed openly by 
PackCo’s GM. He admitted that it was difficult to shift to a new system, but 
employees still had to follow whatever was required by the top managers. He 
stated in this regard: 
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See, when you shift from one thing to another thing, it is not easy. It is 
a sociological thing, if you are comfortable with Hotmail you will not 
shift to Gmail. If you are comfortable with Gmail you will not shift to 
anything else. So when I force you to shift, there is retaliation for some 
time, but then you have to overcome that 
Despite the GM’s mobilising of the power of resources, the CC Leader still 
resisted the introduction of the SL500 ERP system. She explained her 
resistance: 
You know, because I got trained for FOCUS, and it was very easy and 
I didn’t face any problem with it. But with SL500 there are too many 
options to choose from, and there are many steps you must do to 
complete the data entry. And, you know, we were working with FOCUS 
for a while and suddenly the GM told me to work with the new system 
Ontological insecurity thus explains the resistance of the CC Leader to the new 
ERP system-rules that were introduced (Busco, 2009). Although the CC Leader 
persisted in resisting the change, she said: 
I was going back always to the GM and tell him that there is no need 
to implement the new system and we already got used to FOCUS and 
it is easier to deal with. But the GM insisted that I should try the new 
system, and see the results later on 
PackCo’s GM exercised the power of meaning to convince the CC Leader and 
the remaining PackCo staff that implementing SL500 was reasonable and 
desirable in terms of making their working environment comfortable and data 
processing better “by showing her and other employees the advantages in their 
daily life, in terms of automating reports production”; PackCo’s GM.  
Again, with the SL500 ERP system change as a process, the power institution 
embedded within the group company was reflected here, as it was with the BSC 
change as a process. PackCo’s GM utilised the power of resources earned from 
his hierarchical position to impose the change upon his unit’s employees, who 
also have to implement the change, as it is directed from top level 
management—the power institution. In addition, power over meaning to 
convince employees that the change is good and desirable, enforces the power 
of resources institution that existed within the group company.  
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After PackCo’s GM imposed the SL500 onto his unit by mobilising different 
sources of power, he started to provide technical training for his employees. 
Technical training was related to the new ERP system’s rules. The GM 
described that stage, and said: 
I gave training sessions here regarding how to enter the data, how to 
process the data, and, if you are stuck, who you are supposed to 
contact for each module 
The GM provided eight sessions in total for all of the employees within his unit, 
each in his/her area. His main focus during those training sessions was to make 
sure that his employees understood all of the new ERP system’s rules. After 
training was provided to the employees, data transfer between FOCUS and 
SL500 was the next step. It took about two months, and it was a challenge for 
the GM and his team, since there was no previous database that they could 
build from. Instead, the database was created from scratch.  
Although PackCo’s GM focused on the formal introduction of the SL500 ERP 
system-rules, there was about a two-month gap between the end of the 
technical training and the formal introduction of SL500 at PackCo, which helped 
PackCo employees to interact with the system. During that two-month gap, 
PackCo’s GM allowed his employees to explore the new ERP system before 
the system went live. This helped employees to become familiar with the 
interface of the new ERP system and how to enact its new rules, such as how 
to enter data, select different options related to different reports from the 
database, and produce the required reports; i.e., they learned how to enact the 
new rules informally. PackCo’s GM referred to those two months of training as a 
learning period, and stated:  
A demo version was provided to concerned employees to try it and 
make entries and learn from mistakes for another 2 months. So when 
the company goes live the probability of making errors will be less 
Referring to Rutherford (1994), Burns and Scapens (2000) stated that formal 
change “occurs by conscious design, usually through the introduction of new 
rules and/or through the actions of a powerful individual or group” (p. 18). 
However, they also argued that informal change occurs when management tries 
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to change the existing ways of thinking that are embedded in the existing 
routines, as explored in Chapter 3. Based on the quotation above from the 
PackCo GM, the two-month gap thus allowed employees at PackCo to enter 
dummy variables into the SL500. That helped to change employees’ ways of 
thinking, which were embedded in their daily routines, and it facilitated the 
formal introduction of SL500 with minimum resistance when the system went 
live. Though new ERP system-rules that were introduced challenged the 
existing ways of doing things, the informal ERP change as a process that 
preceded the formal ERP change explains why resistance to the ERP system 
was lower. Based on Burns and Scapens (2000) study, “if the processes of 
informal change lag behind the formal change processes, tensions may be 
introduced in the form of anxiety and resistance, possibly leading to the failure 
of the implementation” (p.19). At PackCo, informal change preceded the formal 
change, decreased the level of tension between PackCo’s GM and his 
employees, and helped employees to cope with the different challenges 
associated with the implementation of the SL500 better and with less tension 
and resistance, as will be detailed below. 
As explored above, the FOCUS system was less advanced than the SL500 
ERP system. For example, data entry in FOCUS was mainly done manually. 
The user also had to pull data from different departments in order to produce a 
report. With the implementation of the SL500, new rules were introduced, as 
mentioned by different system users at PackCo. Those new rules challenged 
the existing FOCUS system routines that were embedded in the existing 
manual institution. Though that was the case, resistance to the SL500 was 
minimal, due to previously formed institutionalisation and the informal 
introduction of the SL500 preceding the formal implementation, as previously 
discussed. 
Employees at PackCo were comparing the new ERP system rules with the 
existing FOCUS reporting routines. For example, the CC Leader referred to the 
new SL500 rule regarding selecting data related to transaction details from a 
drop-down menu instead of the existing routine of manually entering data. 
Previously, if the CC Leader needed to develop an invoice, she had to type all 
the details related to the invoice. However, with the SL500’s new rule, all 
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information related to different customers was available in the system, and she 
needed only to select the required detail from a drop-down menu. This new rule 
thus challenged the existing manual ways of doing things in the FOCUS 
system. The new rule represented a challenge for the CC Leader, as according 
to her: 
First in FOCUS anything we enter it manually, but with SL500 
everything is available within the system database and you only have 
to select the right option for each transaction. Before, with FOCUS, if 
there is any extra information associated with the invoice, we enter it 
manually; but with SL500, as I mentioned before, it is a must to select 
from the drop-down menu and we cannot change that manually. And 
this was difficult for me at the beginning 
Moreover, with FOCUS, realising that mistakes had been made and correcting 
such mistakes was time consuming, in terms of the time the FOCUS system 
took to discover such a mistake, and the effort needed to correct it. For 
instance, if an employee made a mistake during the month, the effect of that 
mistake would not show immediately within the system; the employee would 
discover the mistake at the end of the month, when the records did not balance. 
In addition, correcting any mistake meant reviewing the full month’s cycle to find 
where the mistake came from. Employees were used to this way of data 
retrieving and data correcting, i.e., a routine. The process of correcting the 
mistakes in FOCUS also required currency conversion, and FOCUS did not 
cope well with converting Omani Rials (PackCo reports), Canadian dollars 
(Canadian partner reports), and Emirati dirham (Dubai HO reports), as 
PackCo’s CC Leader commented on that: 
See, everything was done manually in FOCUS. For example, if I 
discover a mistake at the end of the month; then I have to take out all 
the billings of the month and make currency change calculations for 
each and every transaction of the month from Omani Rials to UAE 
Dirham and then to US dollars. Thus, any small mistake will affect the 
whole month’s cycle in terms of the difference between the amount 
recorded and the amount received. But now, with SL500, everything 
is done with a press of a button and I get the required information 
immediately, without a need for currency conversion or any of the other 
adjustments I used to do when FOCUS was in operation. 
With the implementation of the SL500 ERP system, a new rule was introduced 
that related to correcting any mistakes that an employee made while entering 
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the data into the system. The new ERP system discovered the mistakes 
immediately, and the user could refer to the database to find the mistake 
without the need to take out the whole month’s bills. In addition, the currency 
conversion was done with a button click, instead of all the manual work that was 
done before with FOCUS. 
Though SL500 discovered a mistake immediately, and rectifying a mistake 
could be done with a click of button, the SL500 had a separate procedure for 
mistake correction, as it was not done in the same window as the one in which 
the original data was entered; this new rule represented a challenge for users of 
the SL500 ERP system at PackCo. The CC Leader described that new rule and 
said:  
The second thing is that when we want to adjust a mistake it was a 
very difficult activity with SL500. And we tried to avoid making 
mistakes, since in this system, any data we uploaded in the system, it 
is not possible to change it. And if there is any mistake in the uploaded 
reports we face too many problems to adjust the mistake before 
sending the reports to the GM as we need to do that in a separate 
system 
That challenge related to mistake correction was also mentioned by the 
Production Manager, and he compared that new SL500-rule with the existing 
data entry routine of FOCUS and how it was easier for the user to correct a 
mistake in FOCUS, regardless of the time consumed. The Production Manager 
stated, comparing the two systems: 
The disadvantage of the new system is that once you enter the data 
you can't go back and rectify the mistake. And to correct the mistake 
there is a lot of procedures to go through as there is a separate 
procedure for correcting mistakes and that one mistake takes long 
time as it could take you around half to one hour to rectify it, while you 
realise that you did a mistake in ten seconds. And because of this 
procedure we suffered a lot at the early stages of implementing the 
new system. In the old system, you can correct any mistake 
immediately, and without any control procedure like this one. 
Moreover, the SL500 ERP system had different features that were not available 
with FOCUS, including customer prioritising and integration between different 
departments. That helped to achieve the organisation’s vision related to 
providing better services to A-grade customers, as referred to by different actors 
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within PackCo. That resulted in eliminating the existing routine of collecting data 
from different departments to produce the required reports, and also helped 
employees to respond to customers’ enquiries faster. The Production Manager 
said:  
Actually it is easier to get the required information from SL500 than 
from FOCUS. Before, I didn’t have a database in the system and not 
only that, I had to collect the data from other departments and enter it 
again in my system. But now there is a database and data is entered 
once only, and with one refresh button I can get updated information 
and reports, and I can respond to different customers’ enquiries better 
In addition, PackCo’s Sales Manager referred to the SL500, particularly the 
integration feature, as a professional system that helped him in providing 
responses to customers’ order enquiries in a better way. With FOCUS, such 
communication between sales and the production department did not exist. 
PackCo’s Sales Manager stated: 
Sage is a professional system and, as I told you, with a click of a button 
I can get what I need. But in FOCUS that was not the case, as with 
FOCUS I can't get information about what we have in stock, if the 
goods are available or not. But with SL500, when I am releasing an 
order there is a link now between the cost sheet in Excel and SL500 
which is telling me I am going to put 60,000 meters of materials so and 
so. And I can check automatically with a click of button if the material 
is available or not. So, for example, it will tell me that, no, this material 
is not available, o.k. what is the alternative? Yes it is more complicated, 
but more outcome information is provided by the new system 
Communication and information flow between different departments at PackCo 
also improved due to integration in the SL500 ERP system. That, in turn, 
facilitated the provision of better services to A-grade customers, as was 
proposed by the PackCo GM to the Dubai HO. This was emphasised by 
different employees at PackCo. The PackCo GM emphasised the importance of 
implementing the SL500 for providing better services to A-grade customers, by 
integrating different departments and aligning their efforts in the direction of 
providing better services to such customers. He said: 
The focus is customer service, and to do that customer service we 
should know what we are doing in production. Are we printing the jobs 
which are related to ‘A-grade’ customers or not? Prioritising job 
printing is important, and SL500 facilitated that by integration, as 
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before the introduction of SL500 production was in a different direction 
and sales was in a different direction and SL500 aligned the two 
departments’ efforts 
Although the new ERP system’s rules challenged existing ways of doing things, 
nine months after the introduction and implementation of the SL500 system at 
PackCo, routinisation of the new imposed ERP system did occur (Burns, 2000). 
That was reflected in the responses of different interviewees at PackCo. 
Despite the fact that the CC Leader faced many challenges when the SL500 
was introduced in January, 2012, nine months later she was describing the 
Omani team as being experts in the system: 
When we changed to SL500, it was a very different system and 
complicated, and such a system was very new to us and we didn't get 
used to working with such a system before; but now I think you can 
call us experts on SL500 
Moreover, the process of enacting and reacting the new ERP rules became 
routine to the CC Leader:  
I had difficulties at earlier stages of SL500 implementation, but now 
after I get use to the system and I learn how to use it and know as well 
how to use it, I found it easier than FOCUS 
Although the Sales Manager said that difficulty would always exist when a 
change—new rules— was introduced, as time passed a person gets used to the 
change, and the new rule becomes part of daily life—routine. He stated:  
See, any system, even a device, or whatever, when you buy 
something new; it is not easy in the beginning to deal with. Then you 
will see the benefits of the new system after some time; the same idea 
applies with me when Sage was introduced 
Moreover, even though the PackCo Production Manager said that it was difficult 
to enact and reproduce the new ERP system rules, nine months later after the 
SL500 was formally introduced to PackCo, such rules were a daily routine for 
him. He stated: 
When we started in January, 2012, we felt that the SL500 system was 
very tough, but today, after 9 months, we are very much online; 
because we changed from another system, which is different from the 
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new system. The work load we feel is more, as in January we were 
entering a lot of new data, but now we don’t face that difficulty and all 
documents are available on-line and updated as well. Plus, as you 
know, it is a new system, and it takes time for us to get used to it 
In spite of all these challenges that the employees at PackCo experienced 
during the ERP system change as a process—and some employees possessed 
some source of power and were able to resist the change—they enacted and 
reproduced all those new ERP rules. Nine months after the formal 
implementation of the new ERP system, such new rules thus became 
organisational routines, as was described above (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Different factors can explain why the SL500 ERP system change as a process, 
at PackCo, evolved in a different way from the implementation of the BSC and 
met less resistance. 
First, as described above in Section 7.5.2., the previously formed 
institutionalisation of automating data entry for the Sales Manager paved the 
way to introducing an automated management control system to replace the 
manual system, and that helped to spread the awareness of how this advanced 
system could assist in data entry and report production. At PackCo, the Sales 
Manager did not resist the implementation of SL500 at all, as he had already 
experienced working with Mac-sales and knew how information technology 
facilitated data entry, information sharing, and report production. Although new 
rules were introduced for the Sales Manager, he stated that it was not easy to 
deal with any new system, but because the new ERP system rules did not 
challenge his existing ways of doing things, in terms of dealing with an 
advanced automated system, he did not resist the new ERP rules (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). 
Second, according to Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005), “organisational 
innovation may be more difficult than technological innovation” as organisational 
innovation, the BSC at PackCo, was linked to employees’ performance and the 
rewards system (p. 56). Moreover, based on the argument by Bonner et al. 
(2000), “financial incentives frequently do not lead to increased performance” 
(p.19). In other words, the introduction of the BSC at PackCo represented an 
organisational innovation, and one of the major factors that explained why the 
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resistance level to the BSC was higher than to the SL500 was because the new 
BSC rules were linked to employees’ performance evaluations and rewards. 
While implementation of the SL500 ERP system represented a technological 
innovation, with the ERP change there was no connection between 
implementation and the employees’ performance evaluations. The absence of a 
connection between enacting and reproducing the new ERP system’s rules, 
performance evaluations and rewards could explain why the resistance level to 
the SL500 ERP system was lower, despite the fact that the ERP rules 
challenged the existing manual ways of doing things (Burns and Scapens, 
2000; Bonner et al., 2000; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). 
Third, the SL500 was building on and supplementing the already existing 
organisational routines, in terms of the nature of the data that was entered into 
the system, but challenged the method of data entry, processing, 
communication, and reports production (Rom and Rohde, 2007). More 
precisely, implementation of the SL500 represented an automation of the 
existing ways of doing things and not a radical change in the existing 
management accounting routines, for instance, introducing a new sophisticated 
management accounting practice (Granlund and Malmi, 2002). The SL500 
implementation, in particular, “facilitated incremental changes to the existing 
ways of working, i.e., evolutionary change, rather than fundamentally 
challenging them, i.e., revolutionary change” (Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003, 
p.229). In line with this argument, and unlike the case study conducted by 
Scapens and Jazayeri (2003), where a plant leader complained about the 
changes introduced into the production schedule with the implementation of 
SAP, at PackCo, the implementation of the SL500 ERP system supported the 
existing production, and the airport concept, instead of challenging it, as 
explained by the PackCo GM:  
With the new system there is a big difference production-wise. Before, 
production people were taking a long time to do the job, then the 
company introduced the airport concept, as discussed before, and the 
work of the production people improved with the 48 hours’ schedule. 
To utilize that better, the company needed some data on how to 
prioritize that 48 hours schedule and how to frame it. This idea of 
prioritizing is linked to the airport concept which was introduced earlier 
by the company, but now that idea is supported by on-line data, which 
makes the service provided to A grade customers better than before 
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Moreover, the group company’s strategy of providing better services to A-grade 
customers was already established through the implementation of the BSC 
before introducing the SL500 ERP system at PackCo. According to the study 
conducted by Scapens and Jazayeri (2003, p.212), “one of the first steps in 
implementing an ERP system is to create a 'To Be' vision of the organization”. 
For PackCo that vision was established earlier, with the implementation of the 
BSC, so the introduction of the SL500 supported the achievement of this vision, 
which facilitated the successful implementation of the ERP system at PackCo. 
Last but not least, as argued in different studies, for example, Aladwani (2001) 
and Scapens and Jazayeri (2003), top management support is important for a 
successful ERP system implementation. The support that the PackCo GM 
provided to his employees during the process of implementing the SL500 ERP 
system thus facilitated its successful implementation at PackCo, as was 
mentioned by several different employees. For example, the CC Leader stated, 
“The biggest training for me was the General Manager. As I told you, I got 
trained, and after training I got top management support with the 
implementation.” 
Moreover, and as Veblen (1899) suggested, the evolutionary paradigm provides 
a basis for encapsulating both continuity and change (Hodgson, 1998, p175). In 
relation to the implementation of the ERP system at PackCo, the continuity of 
the same management accounting practices, and change in the way they were 
carried out, were explored, above, and that confirms Veblen’s theory. There 
was a particular change in the way that data flowed between different 
departments at PackCo, as well as change in the level of detail provided in the 
reports produced by the SL500 ERP system, but there was no change in the 
nature of the management accounting practices used by PackCo, as most 
reports relating to management accounting routines were handled in a 
standalone system. 
In conclusion, it is possible to state the following. The main purposes of 
introducing the SL500 ERP system were the automation of data entry, live 
reporting, and the availability of up-to-date, detailed information for different 
users at PackCo. Implementation of the SL500 did not lead to a change in the 
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management accounting practices adopted by PackCo; there were no new, or 
more sophisticated, management accounting practices that were introduced at 
PackCo as a result of implementing the SL500 ERP system (Scapens and 
Jazayeri, 2003). In short, implementation of the SL500 ERP system only 
automated the data processing at PackCo, and it facilitated the communication 
and data flow between different departments within PackCo. Such a change 
represented a case of stability and of change at the same time (Siti-Nabiha and 
Scapens, 2005): stability, because there was no change in the existing 
management accounting practices and reports, or routines; and change, 
because there was a change in the way such reports were produced, or new 
rules. 
7.5. Conclusion 
In this section, a comparison between the two changes implemented at PackCo 
has been developed. The purpose of this research is to explore the 
management accounting change as a process within the case study company, 
PackCo. Different change dynamics (Burns, 2000), including the existing 
institution, new rules, existing routines, power mobilisation, and reward system 
explain how the management accounting changed as processes—of the BSC 
and the SL500 ERP system—at PackCo evolved (Hardy, 1996; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000).  
The BSC was imposed by the Dubai HO’s top managers—top-down change—
to gain a higher market share of the A-grade customers by mobilising different 
sources of power (Guerreiro et al., 2006; Moilanen, 2008; Jabbour and Abdel-
Kader, 2016). The change as a process was formal in its nature, in the sense 
that top managers focused on delivering the technical knowledge that related to 
the implementation of the new BSC rules, and they ignored the existing ways of 
doing things which was embedded in the daily routines of employees at 
PackCo. As Bums and Scapens (2000) maintain, formal change without 
changes in the ways of thinking can result in resistance and a failure in 
implementation; that is in line with how the BSC change as a process evolved at 
PackCo. 
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On the other hand, the implementation of the new ERP system, SL500, at 
PackCo, which was driven by reporting pressures from the Dubai head office 
and the new Canadian partner, was a bottom-up change, as it was the PackCo 
GM who proposed the change to the Dubai head office (Burns and Scapens, 
2000, Wanderley and Cullen, 2013). In addition, with the ERP system change 
as a process, informal change preceded the formal change. More precisely, the 
informal change was in the form of PackCo’s GM allowing his employees to use 
the new ERP system two months before the company went live with it, thus 
allowing employees to enter dummy variables and to get familiar with the new 
ERP system interface. That, in turn, helped to change the current ways of 
thinking and the manual institution of employees, and it reduced the resistance 
to the new ERP system (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Although the resistance level to the BSC’s new rules was higher than that to the 
ERP system’s new rules, both changes represented evolutionary, and not 
revolutionary, change (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns and Vaivio, 2001; Soin 
et al., 2002). In particular, with both changes, there was only incremental 
change to existing ways of doing things, and change was not radically 
challenging the existing routines. The resistance to both changes (new rules) at 
PackCo could be explained as being a result of conflict between the new rules 
and the existing routines that were embedded within the existing institution 
(Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Granlund, 2001; Lukka, 2007; Ammar, 2014). The 
higher resistance to the BSC’s new rules can be explained by the link between 
the new BSC-rules and employees’ performance evaluations and financial 
rewards, in addition to challenging the existing ways of doing things. With the 
ERP system, previously formed institutionalisation and the absence of a link 
between new ERP rules and employees’ performance evaluations explain why 
the resistance level was lower to the ERP change. 
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CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONTRIBUTION  
8. Introduction  
This chapter summarises this thesis’s research project. The main objective of 
this research, as mentioned in Chapter 1, was to investigate the changing 
nature of MAPs within NOROMCs by exploring the type of MAPs adopted by 
the surveyed NOROMCs, plus understanding in detail how different contextual 
factors affect the nature of the MAPs adopted (or not) by an Omani 
organisation, i.e., PackCo. This chapter is divided into four further sections. 
These are: the research summary, the theoretical and literature contributions, 
the limitations of the study, and future implications.  
8.1. Research summary  
The aim of this thesis is to explain and understand the complexity of MA change 
as a process within a highly-institutionalised organisation, PackCo. Specifically, 
this thesis seeks to obtain: (1) a general overview of MAPs in NOROMCs in 
Oman; and (2) a more in-depth exploration of MAPs adoption and 
implementation in an Omani NOROMC. 
Accordingly, the findings of this research are based on multi-research methods; 
that included a survey, follow-up interviews, and a case study. The survey was 
distributed to NOROMCs operating within the Al-Ruysal Industrial Estate. This 
helped in attaining a breadth of knowledge about the nature of the MAPs 
adopted by the surveyed organisations, and the changing nature of MAPs 
between 2001 and 2010. The follow-up interviews were conducted to secure a 
deeper understanding of the survey results, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
Finally, the case study was conducted at the Omani branch of PackCo, a 
Middle-Eastern based packaging company (HO in Dubai). Two major changes 
were introduced to PackCo during the research time; they are: the introduction 
of BSC and an ERP system.  
This research utilised two theoretical frameworks as lenses for explaining how 
MA as process of change evolved within PackCo; and these are Burns and 
Scapens (2000) MA change as a process framework, and Hardy’s (1996) power 
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dimensions framework. They explained the BSC and ERP system’s 
implementations as a process, in terms of the interplay and conflict between the 
institutionalised pre-BSC accountability system, the institutionalised pre-ERP 
reporting system, and the new BSC- and ERP system-rules, power 
mobilisations at different organisational levels, and contextual pressures. The 
results revealed that resistance to enacting and reacting to the BSC’s new rules 
was due to the conflict between the existing accountability system, in terms of 
financial rewards, and the new BSC rules that were linked with a rewards 
system, which was referred to by various different employees at PackCo. While 
previously formed institutionalisation and the absence of a link between the new 
ERP system’s rules and financial rewards explain the lower resistance level to 
the ERP system’s new rules, as detailed in the previous chapter.  
8.2. Theoretical and literature contributions 
This section reflects upon the contributions of the current research.  
8.2.1. Literature contributions  
First, the findings of this research contribute to the literature addressing the 
changing nature of MAPs and how different socio-economic-contextual factors 
affect the adoption, or non-adoption, of specific MAPs (Al-Omiri and Drury, 
2007; Abdel-Kader and Luther, 2008; ElGammal et al., 2016). This adds to the 
existing literature about the adoption of various MAPs, and what factors affect 
the nature of MAPs adopted by different organisations through using a survey, 
as mentioned above (Hutaibat, 2005; McLellan and Moustafa, 2008; King et al., 
2010; Hansen, 2010; Libby and Lindsay, 2010; Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014; 
ElGammal et al., 2016). 
Second, the current study also contributes to the existing literature relating to 
exploring the complexity and inter-dependency of the various change dynamics 
and how that shapes the unfolding of MA as process of change within an 
organisation (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns, 2000; Kasurinen, 2002; 
Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003; Modell, 2012). In this regard, Burns and Scapens 
(2000) emphasised the importance of the embedded existing ways of doing 
things, i.e., institutions, in shaping how change as a process evolves within 
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organisations (Please see Chapter 3). Precisely, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
stated:  
“institutions are the structural properties which comprise the taken-for-
granted assumptions about the way of doing things, which shape and 
constrain the rules and routines, and determine the meanings, values, 
and also power of the individual actors” (p.11).  
From their argument, they hold the view that institutions are the main change 
dynamic that shapes how MA as process of change unfolds over time within an 
organisation.  
This research’s findings support the argument of Burns and Scapens (2000), as 
mentioned above. Precisely, and as explored in the empirical findings chapter, 
the existing pre-BSC accountability institution was important in shaping how the 
BSC change as a process evolved at PackCo. In Chapter 7 it was explained 
how PackCo’s GM reacted to employees’ BSC resistance and adopted BSC-
rules in accordance with the existing embedded pre-BSC accountability system. 
In addition, in relation to the ERP system’s implementation: although the new 
ERP systems’ rules challenged the existing manual ways of entering and 
producing the required reports; previously formed institutionalisation, informal 
change that preceded formal change, and the absence of a linkage between the 
ERP-system’s rules and financial rewards, explained the lower resistance to the 
ERP-system’s new rules at PackCo.  
Moreover, the results of this research are consistent with Burns (2000), who 
explored the implementation of a financial accountability system and the failure 
to impinge on the change within the chemical laboratory department. Precisely, 
he explained the resistance to the new accountability rules by the adherence of 
employees to an earlier non-financial accountability system, i.e., routines. 
Additionally, the findings of this case study in relation to ERP implementation 
prove that stability and change are not independent-they are both 
simultaneously part of the same ongoing processes (Burns and Scapens, 2000, 
p.18). In other words, and as discussed in Chapter 7, the ERP system changed 
the way reports are produced at PackCo (change) but there is no change 
introduced in terms of management accounting practices or the reports 
produced by PackCo due to the introduction of ERP-System (stability).  
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Additionally, this research also contributes to the management accounting 
literature relating to developing and transitional economies. Specifically, this 
research explored MA change as a process within a Middle-Eastern context, i.e. 
Oman, which is a developing transitional country that has different cultural, 
economic and political structures,82 if compared to developed countries. 
Different studies have called for the conducting of research in such contexts, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2. This helps to understand how advanced MAPs, such 
as BSC, and a developed management control system, such as an ERP 
system, fit in such a context. 
Although the number of studies in this field in developing countries determined 
the importance of power and politics in shaping the MA as process of change; 
the focus was on the importance of external political power in shaping the 
process of change.  While in this present study the empirical findings 
emphasised the importance of power mobilisation within the organisation and 
how it shaped the unfold of the MA change as a process.  
Finally, the majority of the studies that are related to the nature of MAPs within 
developing countries are descriptive, i.e., those studies’ findings reveal the 
adoption rate of various MAPs; and ignore the influential factors which facilitate 
or else hinder, the change of MAPs in those countries. The findings and 
analysis of this research, which was based on multiple research methods, 
survey, follow-up interviews and a case study, as well as an institutional 
theoretical framework; is believed to add to the growing body of literature on the 
changing nature of MAPs within developing countries, as follows. First, as the 
findings are based on multiple research methods, this has helped in securing a 
holistic understanding of the changing nature of MAPs within the Omani 
context, which may apply to other developing countries. Second, as mentioned 
earlier, most of the studies in developing countries are based on contingency 
theory, and the analysis of the changing nature of MAP undertaken here, is 
thought to have made a contribution to the increasing amount of literature on 
the changing nature of MAPs which is based on institutional theories, especially 
that literature which relates to developing counties. 
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The findings of the PackCo case study have demonstrated the importance of 
institutions in shaping MA as process of change, and their ability to constrain 
change, as argued by Burns and Scapens (2000). The evidence from this study 
thus suggests that Burns and Scapens MA as process of change framework, 
which is based on OIE, can be utilised as a theoretical lens through which to 
explore MA change as a process within organisations across different contexts. 
Precisely, this case study’s results provide an analytical generalisation83 of 
Burns’ and Scapens’ (2000) theoretical framework. 
8.2.2. Theoretical contributions  
As already detailed in Chapter 7, power mobilisation was core within PackCo at 
different levels, i.e., top management and employees, to impose and to resist 
changes. Different sources of power, as identified by Hardy (1996), were 
mobilised within PackCo to impose and/ or resist both changes. PackCo’s GM 
combined the power of resources and the power of meanings to impose BSC 
within his unit. On the other hand, employees mobilised the power of resources 
and power that was earned from governmental regulations, to resist BSC.  
Additionally, it was concluded in this research that a rewards system has an 
effect on shaping how MA as process of change evolves within organisations. 
Precisely, the case study’s findings have demonstrated how two changes within 
the same organisation evolved differently due to the effect of the rewards 
system. In other words, as the enacting and reacting of the BSC-rule was linked 
with financial rewards, employees resisted enacting and reacting to the BSC-
rule almost two years after its implementation. However, although the ERP-
systems’ rules challenged existing ways of doing things, the level of resistance 
to the ERP-system was lower, if compared to that to the BSC, and employees 
continued to enact and react to the ERP-system’s rule. This lower resistance 
level was explained by the absence of the financial rewards effect and other 
factors, as mentioned above.  
A variety of research has identified the limitations of Burns and Scapens (2000) 
MA change process framework. For example, Ribeiro and Scapens (2004) 
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found that the rules and routines in the case study organisation were held in 
place by power mobilisation, i.e., circuits of power, rather than by existing 
institutions within the organisation (Scapens, 2006). Precisely, “the case 
illustrates that rules and routines can be kept in place by the explicit use of 
power, as well as by taken-for-granted assumptions” (Scapens, 2006, p.25). 
Similarly, Burns (2000) reported the importance of power in shaping how MA as 
process of change unfolds over time within organisations, as detailed in Chapter 
2. 
Furthermore and as referred to in Chapters 2 and 3, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
focused on the role of organisational taken-for-granted ways of doing things in 
shaping MA change as a process, and ignored some other factors, such as: a 
rewards system (Burns, 2000). It is, however, noted from this research and in 
line with some other studies (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Ferreira and Otley, 
2009) that rewards systems do affect, and may shape, MA change as a process 
differently than had been planned. 
Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as a process framework does not take 
into account the importance of other non-institutional sources of power, nor do 
they examine the role of a rewards system in shaping how MA as process of 
change evolves within an organisation. This case study’s results, though, 
confirm Burns and Scapens (2000) argument about the importance of existing 
ways of thinking and doing things in shaping the management accounting 
change as a process. Still other change dynamics have facilitated the analysis 
of the case study, including power mobilisation, and the link between new rules 
and employees’ performance evaluations; which helped in explaining why the 
management accounting change as a process evolved in the way explored in 
Chapter 7 at PackCo. The findings of the PackCo case study therefore provide 
an extension to Burns’ and Scapens’ MA change as process framework. It is 
claimed here that power and the financial rewards system were also important, 
as was institution, in shaping MA change as a process within PackCo, as was 
developed in Chapter 3, and detailed in Chapter 7. 
8.3. The limitations of the study and future implications  
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Although the research has reached its aims, I acknowledge that it has 
limitations, like other research. This section outlines the research’s limitations. 
First, the literature review of this research focuses on understanding the effect 
of different change dynamics on shaping the change as a process. Precisely, it 
has examined how change dynamics, including: power, institution, routine, and 
rewards; shape how MA as process of change unfolds in a different way than 
had been planned. Future work may examine MA change as a process 
phenomenon by using a different approach. For example, researchers may give 
more attention to a specific change dynamic factor, i.e., routines, and develop 
the notion of that change dynamic, and how it is affecting the unfolding of the 
change as a process (Quinn, 2011; Burns and Quinn, 2011; Scapens, 2012). 
Further study of the issue is still required in order to explore the influence of 
governmental bodies and agencies on shaping management accounting 
change as a process within organisations. Precisely, how do powerful 
governmental bodies frame management accounting practice within 
organisations (Hopper et. al., 2008)  
Second, the analyses of this research’s empirical evidence are based mainly on 
an OIE-informed institutional framework. To be specific, in this study Burns and 
Scapens (2000) MA change as a process framework has been utilised to 
explain and analyse the research findings. However, and similarly to other 
frameworks, this theoretical framework has limitations, as mentioned above. 
Precisely, although Burns and Scapens (2000) MA change as a process 
framework acknowledges the importance of extra-organisational environmental 
factors in shaping the MA change as a process, it mainly explains MA change 
as a process based on the institutional embedded change dynamics within 
organisations. In future research, other researchers could address this issue by 
adopting different theoretical positions. For example, future researchers of 
management accounting change as a process based on NIS would be 
interesting. This would help us to understand the relationship between head-
office (parent) and local branches (subsidiary). It also facilitates our 
understanding of how different institutional isomorphisms make a subsidiary 
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management control system84 organisation look similar to that of the parent 
organisation. Additionally, utilising this theoretical perspective facilitates our 
understanding of how extra-organisational forces, such as: governmental 
agencies, and consulting companies, affects the MAPs that are adopted by an 
organisation.  
Third, this study has explored the process of evolutionary MA change as a 
process by adopting a case study as research method. The findings of this 
research are based on a single case study, and therefore, the research findings 
cannot be generalised to all NOROMCs, or to all packaging organisations. 
However, and as has been reported, it is not possible to generalise one case 
study’s findings, nevertheless, and as argued in the literature, qualitative 
accounting research’s seeks for theoretical generalisations, and not ‘statistical 
generalisations’ (Scapens, 1990). Despite this, future research may adopt 
quantitative research methodology, i.e., questionnaire-based, to produce 
statistical results that can be generalised to NOROMCs.  
Finally, I acknowledge that there is a scope limitation in this research. Namely, 
the research focused only on one industrial sector, that is, the non-oil-related 
sector85. The findings of this research can thus be generalised to include 
organisations that operate in other industrial sectors.  The findings of this study 
may have different conclusions if the case study were conducted in an Omani 
oil-related organisation, and thus future research may be conducted as a similar 
study, but in an Omani oil-related organisation, especially as this type of 
organisation is well developed86 in Oman, and they operate in a violent 
environment. Additionally, the size of the case study organisation in this 
research is relatively small87, and thus, the MA change as a process complexity 
will be less if compared with a change process within a big organisation, with 
more operations levels and more employees. Future research of MA change as 
a process within larger Omani organisations is therefore desirable to extend our 
                                            
84
 That includes information systems as well as management accounting practices adopted by an 
organisation  
85
 Chapter 5 detailed why the focus of this research was on the non-oil related sector 
86
 As such organisations have been in operation for a long time 
87
 According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, records and number of employees within PackCo  
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knowledge of the complexity of MA change as a process in the economy of an 
emerging country context.  
8.4. Practical implications  
The research results have demonstrated that there are several issues which 
managers and/or practitioners need to consider when introducing change within 
their organisations. First, as organisations are operating in different contexts, 
which is considered an important factor in shaping the unfolding of the change 
process, then managers should be aware that there is no prescribed common 
rule to follow in implementing MA change as a process, and there is no 
universal effective practice that is suitable for organisations in the global 
context. Instead, it is the organisation’s needs and the alignment of new 
practice with the existing ways of doing things, which determine the best and 
most effective practice for the organisation (Siti-Nabiha, 2000; Ammar, 2014) 
Second, managers should understand that change as a process is not a linear 
process; where the organisation moves from point A (without the change) to 
point B (with the change) (Hopper and Quattrone, 2001). Instead, there are 
different factors and change dynamics that may shape the change process 
differently than planned. Actually, change as a process is complex and 
simultaneously incorporates different factors (Innes and Mitchell, 1990; Burns 
and Vaivio, 2001; Busco et al., 2007). Change agents, or consulting 
organisations, should thus be aware of the existing ways of doing things within 
an organisation prior to the introduction of any change, in order to minimise 
resistance to the change introduced (Brignall, 2000; Contrafatto, 2014; Powell 
and Tilt, 2017). The findings of the PackCo case study suggested that the 
Dubai-HO can impose and influence change within PackCo, i.e., the 
introduction of the BSC. The Dubai-HO needs thus to consider the existing 
institutionalised embedded ways of doing things in order to integrate the change 
within PackCo successfully, or, at least, with less resistance.  
Organisational actors who mobilise the power of resources are influential and 
can mobilise such sources of power to put plans into actions (Hardy, 1996). 
However, other organisational actors, such as: the Sales Manager and Credit 
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Collection Leader were able to mobilise different sources of power (see Chapter 
7) so as to resist the BSC’s new rules. This suggests the importance of 
involving employees who are subject to change (Ammar, 2014, p.255), and that 
the earlier involvement of employees from different organisational levels that 
are subject to change in the change process, the less the probability that they 
will resist the change. As such, a training programme may help, and may give a 
chance for the change agents to expose the conflict between the existing ways 
of doing things and the new rules that are introduced with change, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, when the ERP system was introduced at PackCo. 
8.5. Final remarks 
This thesis has demonstrated a case study of management accounting change 
as a process, i.e., a BSC and an ERP system, by drawing on an institutional 
framework. The study was conducted within an organisation that is operating in 
an emerging economy context, i.e., Oman. The results indicated that embedded 
ways of doing things are important in the unfolding of the management 
accounting change as a process. Additionally, the research found that there are 
other change dynamic factors which shape the MA change as a process, 
including different sources of power and a rewards system. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX No (1): SURVEY COPY 
SURVEY COPY 
 
Management accounting techniques used by non-oil-related-Omani-
manufacturing companies. 
Dear Participant, 
My name is Sabrina Alasimi, and I am a PhD student at the University of 
Dundee (U.K.), anticipating moving to Exeter University in October, 2010. I am 
conducting a survey to investigate the management accounting techniques 
being used by manufacturing companies in Oman. I shall explore the 
relationships between company characteristics and the management 
accounting techniques used; and also highlight the impacts on the techniques 
used from shifts in the global (and Omani) business environments.  
Your participation in this survey would be much appreciated, and confidentiality 
is assured. It will take no more than 25 minutes to complete.  
Please tick the box if you would like to be sent a summary of the survey 
results, and, if so, please also include your forwarding details below 
 

 
Name: Mr./ Mrs./ Ms.         
Address:           
Telephone:           
E-mail:           
Thank you once again for your cooperation and kind assistance 
Signature:…………………… 
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Section 1: Demographic Information 
This section seeks general information regarding the survey participant and the 
organisation in which s/he works. 
A. Name: ____________________________________________ 
B. Nationality:          
C. Name of organisation:          
D. Age (years):    20-30  31-40  41-50 
more than 50 
Gender:  € Male    € Female 
Your highest academic qualification is: 
 PhD degree  Master degree   Bachelor degree 
 High diploma  Diploma   Other (Please state)    
Present position/ title in your organisation:__________________________ 
How long you have been in your present position? _________ years  
Your total experience in this line of work: (Please tick one box only) 
 Less than 2 years   2-5 years   6-10 years 
 10-15 years   16-20 years   More than 20 years  
Which professional accounting qualification do you hold, if any? 
(You may tick more than one box) 
 American Certified Public Accountant (CPA) 
 British Chartered Certified Accountant (ACCA) 
 Arabic Certified Public Accountant (ACPA) 
 American Certified Management Accountant (CMA) 
 British Chartered Management Accountant (CIMA) 
 None    Others (please state)      
The legal structure of your organisation: 
€ Sole proprietorship  € Partnership € Corporation  
The ownership structure of your organisation: 
 100% Omani public company 
 100% Omani private company 
 100% Foreign Investment (FI) Company (FI type    ) 
 Branch of a multinational company (Company origin    ) 
 Mixed Investment, Omani and Foreign (% Omani_____, %Foreign ) 
Industry sector88 (Please choose one of the following): 
€ Food products and beverages   € Printing and recording tools 
€ Other non-metallic mineral products  € Rubber/ plastic products 
€ Fabricated metal products   € Furniture 
                                            
88
 The classification of the manufacturing companies into these different sectors is in accordance with the 
Omani Ministry of Commerce and Economics. 
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€ Chemicals materials    € Clothing and fur garments 
dyed 
€ Machinery and equipment   € Refined petroleum products 
€ Wood and cork products (except furniture) € Electrical machinery and tools 
€ Paper and paper products   € Basic minerals 
€ Other products, (Please state      ) 
Number of employees: 
  Less than 10  10-40   41-80   81-120  
121-160  
161-200  More than 200   
Average annual sales of your organisation (for the last 3-5 years): ______ 
Omani Riyals  
What is the percentage of your company’s exports in respect of total sales? 
 No exports at all   1%-5%    6%-14% 
 15%-30%    31%-50   51%-70% 
 71%- 90%    More than 90% 
Nature of the factory operation (production) plant: 
€ Manual   € Semi-automated  € Fully automated 
The level of competition which your company faces from other companies is: 
(Please tick one box per row) 
Type of 
competition 
Very low Low  Moderate  High  Very high 
Domestic       
International       
Does your company have the following sections/departments or not? 
(Please tick one box per row) 
The department Yes  No  
Accounting    
Cost/Management 
Accounting 
  
Section 2: Management Accounting Techniques and Tools 
This section seeks to understand the management accounting techniques that 
your organisation uses. 
Which of the following product costing techniques does your organisation use, 
and to what extent are these techniques important to your organisation?  
(You may choose more than one option) 
Costing 
technique 
(*see 
glossary for 
interpretation) 
Does your 
company 
use this 
technique? 
If used, how important is this technique to your 
organisation? (Tick as appropriate) 
Please  
TICK (√)  
If Yes  
Not 
important 
 
Of Below 
average 
importance 
Of 
Average 
importance 
Important 
 
 
Very 
important 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Job order 
costing 
system* 
      
Process 
costing 
system* 
      
Standard 
costing* 
      
Activity based 
costing*  
      
Batch costing 
system* 
      
Absorption 
costing*  
      
Target 
costing* 
      
Back flush 
costing* 
      
Operation 
costing 
      
Variable 
costing* 
      
Other? Please state:      
Which of the following performance evaluation techniques does your 
organisation use? (You may choose more than one option) 
PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
TECHNIQUE 
(*see glossary for 
interpretation) 
Does 
your 
company 
use this 
techniqu
e? 
If used, how important is this technique to your 
organisation? (Tick as appropriate) 
Please  
TICK (√)  
If Yes 
Not 
importa
nt 
 
1 
Of 
Below 
average 
importa
nce 
2 
Of 
Average 
importa
nce 
3 
Importa
nt  
 
 
4 
Very 
importa
nt  
 
5 
Return on investment*        
Residual income*        
Economic value added*       
The market share       
Sales       
The share price       
Division (sub-unit) profit*       
Product quality        
Customer satisfaction 
surveys 
      
Employees’ 
attitude/satisfaction 
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Budget variance 
analysis* 
      
Meeting the budget       
Balanced scorecard*       
Cash flow return on 
investment* 
      
Team performance       
Supplier evaluation       
Product profitability 
analysis* 
      
Cost-volume profit 
analysis* 
      
Customer profitability 
analysis* 
      
Controllable profit*       
Benchmarking of 
product characteristics*  
      
Benchmarking of 
operational processes*  
      
Benchmarking of 
management 
processes* 
      
Benchmarking of 
strategic priorities* 
      
Others (please state):       
Which of the following budgets for decision making and/or controlling purposes 
does your organisation use? (You may choose more than one option) 
BUDGETING 
AND 
CONTROL 
TECHNIQUES 
(*see glossary 
for 
interpretation) 
Does your 
company 
use this 
technique? 
If used, how important is this technique to your 
organisation? (Tick as appropriate) 
Please  
TICK (√)  
If Yes 
Not 
important 
 
1 
Of Below 
average 
importance 
2 
Of 
Average 
importance 
3 
Important 
 
 
4 
Very 
important 
 
5 
Sales budget*       
Production 
budget* 
      
Cash flow 
budget* 
      
Master 
budget* 
      
Flexible 
budget* 
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Activity- based 
budgeting* 
      
Incremental 
budgeting* 
      
Zero-based 
budgeting * 
      
Day-to-day 
operations 
planning 
budget* 
      
Cost control 
budget* 
      
Financial 
position 
planning 
budget* 
      
Managers 
compensations 
budget 
      
Budget system 
for 
coordinating 
activities 
across 
business units  
      
Capital 
budgeting* 
(use of net 
present value, 
internal rate of 
return, 
payback 
period, or 
accounting 
rate of return) 
      
Others (please state):       
Which of the following capital investment appraisal techniques does your 
organisation use? (You may choose more than one option) 
capital investment 
appraisal techniques 
(*see glossary for 
interpretation) 
Does 
your 
company 
use this 
techniqu
e? 
If used, how important is this technique to your 
organisation? (Tick as appropriate) 
Please  
TICK (√)  
If Yes 
Not 
importa
nt 
 
Below 
average 
importa
nce 
Average 
importa
nce 
 
Importa
nt  
 
 
Very 
importa
nt  
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1 2 3 4 5 
Payback period*        
Accounting rate of 
return*  
      
Net present value*        
Internal rate of return*        
Meeting the budget       
Others (please state):      
Section 3: Contemporary Management Accounting Techniques: 
This section seeks to understand the contemporary management accounting 
techniques that your organisation uses 
Contemporary 
management 
accounting techniques 
(*see glossary for 
interpretation) 
Does 
your 
company 
use this 
techniqu
e? 
If used, how important is this technique to your 
organisation? (Tick as appropriate) 
Please  
TICK (√)  
If Yes 
Not 
importa
nt 
 
1 
Of 
Below 
average 
importa
nce 
2 
Of 
Average 
importa
nce 
3 
Importa
nt  
 
 
4 
Very 
importa
nt  
 
5 
Total quality 
management*  
      
Activity-based 
management*  
      
Value-chain analysis*        
Just in time*        
Kaizen costing*       
Target cost planning*       
Life-cycle costing*       
Re-engineering 
approach* 
      
Strategic management 
accounting* 
      
Balanced scorecard*       
Strategic investment 
appraisal* 
      
Throughput accounting*       
Others (please state):       
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Section 4: Management Accounting Change: 
This section explores any changes that your organisation has experienced (or is 
currently experiencing) 
During the last 10 years has your organisation experienced any changes in any 
of the following areas: 
Change introduced  Please TICK (√) if 
Yes 
New product costing system   
Balanced scorecard  
New budgeting system  
World class manufacturing system  
Non-financial performance measurement   
New production technique (e.g., from manual 
to automated) 
 
New management accounting information 
system 
 
New external or internal reporting system   
Others, please state:  
Where you ticked (an) option(s) in 4(A) above, what are the main driver(s) that 
incited this change in your organisation? (You may choose more than one) 
  € Globalisation  
  € Internationalisation 
  € Advanced information technologies 
  € Production technology 
  € Change in organisational structure 
    Environmental and sustainability issues  
   Change in management styles 
   New governmental rule or regulation related to the non-oil manufacturing 
companies 
   Others, please state: _____________________________________ 
Please use the space here to add any comments about relevant issues that 
have not been covered in the survey. 
            
            
            
            
 
Once again thank you for your time and assistance 
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APPENDIX No (2): DETAILED SURVEY RESULTS  
Surveyed companies’ age 
Data related to company age was obtained from the interviews as well as the 
Public Establishment of Industrial Estates website89 (PEIP) website as there 
was no question in the survey related to the company’s age. Obtained data 
showed that the majority 46.15% (n=24) of the surveyed NOROMCs were 
established between the years 1991 and 2000. Of the studied population of 52 
companies, 15 companies (28.85%) started operation between the years 1981 
and 1990; while 9 companies (17.30%) were established during the 10 years 
which ended with the year 2010. Moreover only 4 (7.70%) companies started 
operation between the years 1970 and 1980. 
The majority of NOROMCs were established during the period 1991-2000 and 
this in not abnormal, since in that period there was a drop-in oil prices, and oil  
is the major source of revenue for the Sultanate. That recession in oil prices 
forced the Omani government to look for other alternatives in addition to oil, and 
thus, motivations were given to investors to invest in different industrial sectors, 
including the non-oil-related manufacturing sector (Ministry of the Economy 
website90). 
Product number (product categories) 
The study results show that the majority 44.23% (n=23) of surveyed NOROMCs 
are producing one kind of product. Of the total of 52 surveyed companies, six 
companies (11.54%) are producing 2 major product types, and eight (15.38%) 
companies produce 3 different types of products. While nine companies 
(17.37%) produce four different types of products, and 5 companies (9.62%) 
produce more than five types of products. It is worth noting that though the 
major product number is low, surveyed companies are producing different 
categories of products, which range from 2 categories to more than 100 
                                            
89
 http://portal.peie.om/tabid/655/Default.aspx  
90
 The Ministry was closed later after I started the study and its’ duties were transferred to different 
governmental bodies. 
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categories. Around 50% (n=9) of the interviewed companies mentioned that 
their companies are producing more than 100 product categories. 
Participants’ age and gender 
The results obtained from these two questions are shown in the table below. It 
is apparent from this table that 96.15% (n=50) of chief accountants are male 
and only 3.85% (n=3) are female. 
Moreover, the majority of the participants’ ages range between 31 years to 40 
years-38.46% (n=20), followed by the age range between 41 years to 50 years 
which represented 28.85% (n=15). Then 17.31% (n=9) and 15.38% (n=8) for 
age range 20 to 30 years and more than 50 years, respectively.  
Participants gender Count Participants age Count 
Male  50 20 to 30 9 
Female  2 31 to 40  20 
Total  52 41 – 50 15 
  More than 50  8 
 
 Total  52 
Gender and age of participants 
Participants’ higher education qualification & professional accounting 
qualification  
The analysed data showed that 46.15% (n=24) of the participants hold a 
Master’s degree, 40.38% (n=21) of them hold a Bachelor’s degree, and 13.46% 
(n=7) were holding either a diploma or a high diploma.  
Around 30% of the participants (n=17) hold Indian professional accounting 
certificates, such as, Certified Management Accountant (India), Certified 
Accountant (India), and qualifications from the Institute of Cost and Works 
Accountants of India (ICWAI). Other qualification certificates (such as CPA91, 
ACCA92, ACPA93, CMA94, and CIMA95) were also held by the participants, but 
                                            
91
 American Certified Public Accountant 
92
 British Chartered Certified Accountant  
93
 Arabic Certified Public Accountant  
94
 American Certified Management Accountant 
95
 British Chartered Management Accountant  
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with a lower rate 15.38% (n=8) compared to the Indian qualifications. It is also 
worth noting that around 50% (n=27) of the chief accountants did not hold any 
professional accounting qualification. 
Participants’ experience in present position  
On average, the participants had spent 6 years in their current position with a 
range of 28 years between the participants. The majority 57.7% (n=30) of the 
chief accountants had experience in the present position of four years at the 
most. Of the 52 participants, 13 (25%) had experience in their present position 
for, at the most, 10 years, but at least 4 years. And 17.30% (n=9) of the total 
participants had more than 10 years of experience in their present position. 
Being in the same position for more than 10 years could explain partly why no 
change was introduced in the management accounting system in some of the 
surveyed NOROMCs during the last 10 years (see below); as people get used 
to the way things are done and may resist any change that challenges the 
current status (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
Participants’ experience in the field  
In this question, participants were asked to identify the total experience they 
have had in the accounting field.  
Total experience range Number of participants in the range Percentage 
Less than 2 years 2 3.85 
2-5 years 4 7.69 
6-10 years 8 15.38 
11-15 years 9 17.31 
16-20 years 12 23.08 
More than 20 years 17 32.69 
Total  52 100 
Total experience of participants in the accounting field 
The Table, above, gives a summary of the participants’ total experience in the 
accounting field. It is clear that almost three-quarters (73.08%, n=38) of the 
participants had experience in the field for at least 11 years; and of those 38 
chief accountants, the majority -- 30.36% (n=17) have experience in the field for 
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more than 20 years. While 26.92% (n=14) of the participants have had 
experience in the field for 10 years or less, with the majority, 15.38% (n=8) of 
them, having 6-10 years' experience in the field.   
Product costing practices (techniques) 
Section 2.A of the survey was devoted to product costing techniques. Here, the 
participants were asked to select the different product costing systems that are 
used by their companies, as well as indicating the importance level of the 
technique. Below is a summary of the results related to this section of the 
survey. 
In general, actual costing 51.93% (n=27), job order costing 48.08% (n=25), and 
standard costing 46.15% (n=24), were adopted by around 50% of the surveyed 
NOROMCs and were marked as being an important costing technique.  
These were followed by process costing, which was used as an important 
product costing technique by 34.61% (n=18) of the surveyed companies. Then 
variable, operation, and absorption costing were rated as important product 
costing techniques by 25% (n=13) of surveyed companies.  
On the other hand, activity based costing (ABC), batch costing, target costing, 
and back flush costing, were chosen as being important product costing 
techniques by 19.23%, 19.23%, 13.46%, and 3.85%, respectively.  
The Table, below, summarises the usage and importance level of different 
product costing techniques to the surveyed NOROMCs.  
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Adoption level of product costing techniques by surveyed NOROMCs 
The interviewed chief accountants gave different explanations for using 
traditional product costing techniques, i.e., job order, standard, process, 
absorption, actual product costing techniques. In general, those explanations 
can be summarized into three major categories, as follows:  
First, industry, product type, and the number of products produced were among 
the drivers that influence the adoption of some specific product costing 
techniques instead of others. As the Assistant Executive Director in Company 
41 stated, the nature of the company’s product forces companies to use an 
actual costing system. 
Because our company and production process is labour oriented 
(most of the cost is direct), and fixed costs are very high, basically 
machinery deprecation, no standard costing is required because this 
marble block’s quality differs, as sometimes we get good blocks and 
sometimes bad blocks, and we can’t know that from the outside texture 
of the block. The nature of the company’s operation and the product’s 
nature force the company to use the actual costing 
system      
Product diversity in Company 2 meanwhile forces the company to use more 
than one product costing technique, as stated by its’ Account Manager: 
There are two production lines within the main plant: solid and liquid 
medication; plus that we have also the antibiotic line, and thus the 
company is implementing different costing techniques 
Costing 
technique 
Not 
used 
Used 
 
Total 
Not 
important  
Average 
importance  
Important  
Job order 24 1 2 25 52 
Process 28 4 2 18 52 
Standard 28 0 0 24 52 
ABC 38 2 2 10 52 
Batch 39 2 1 10 52 
Absorption 36 1 2 13 52 
Actual 20 1 4 27 52 
Target 41 1 3 7 52 
Back flush 45 4 1 2 52 
Operation 35 2 2 13 52 
Variable 36 1 2 13 52 
Others 47 0 0 5 52 
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Second, the parent company or top management requirements force other 
companies to use specific product costing techniques; although, in some cases, 
the chief accountant feels that using other product costing techniques would 
give enhanced information which would help in making better decisions. 
Company 19’s Senior Accountant stated: 
All company branches are using the same MAPs, imposed by the 
parent company only, for the data to be similar and the comparison 
process will be easier. Actually, the company is using only the 
weighted average costing method, and it will be good if the company 
uses other product costing systems that are mentioned in the survey, 
as I see batch costing as an important costing system, because we 
produce products in batches.  
Third, getting directions, helping in decision making regarding customers or 
product profitability, and product pricing, were also among the rationales for 
adopting specific product costing techniques. As the Financial Analyst of 
Company 20 said: 
We are using absorption costing as it is observes all the production 
costs and that helps us to make better decisions in terms of product 
pricing. 
Moreover, it is clear from the costing techniques Table, above, that the ABC 
system was rated as being an important product costing technique by only 10 
companies of the 52 surveyed. There were two opposing opinions regarding 
using or not using ABC as a costing technique.  
On one hand, two companies of the 20 that were included in the follow-up 
interviews are using ABC system, and they see that it is the best costing 
practice that should be used by companies in order to get accurate information 
which helps to make better decisions for product costing and pricing, as well as 
decisions about product and customer profitability. The Cost Management 
Accountant of Company 5 stated, in this regard; 
ABC costing to get the total product cost; wherever we do customer 
profitability, we should have total product cost to analyse whether a 
particular customer is profitable or not.   
And the Financial Controller of Company 24 said:   
Basically, implementing ABC helped to generate more information -- 
like profit per customer, and profit per product, and that is helping to 
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identify which customer to deal with, and which products are more 
profitable. 
On the other hand, some chief accountants referred to the complexity of 
implementing the ABC system, as well as the high implementation cost as 
factors that hindered their companies from adopting ABC system as a costing 
system. Despite the fact that, in some cases, the chief accountant is aware of 
the benefits that the company may get by implementing such a system. And the 
chief accountants believe that different product costing techniques give the 
same answer, but just in a different format. The Senior Accountant of Company 
13 commented: 
ABC gives better information in terms of providing accurate cost 
information, and using ABC will enable you to get the exact cost of the 
material, and that may affect your pricing also. But ABC costing is 
complicated and costly to implement. We are not concentrating on 
introducing ABC currently, as SAP was introduced only last year 
(2010) to the company, and we need first to settle down with SAP, and 
when that happens there is an opportunity to implement ABC. 
While the Accounts Manager of Company 14 said:  
Regardless of the costing method you are using, your cost will remain 
the same, and all costing methods will provide you with the same 
costing information, but only in a different way. 
Finally, the Finance Manager of Company 23 added: 
We need too many people to apply ABC, and it consumes too much 
time to do the costing, and, in the end, doing that will not improve the 
company’s performance that much. At this stage, the company is not 
seeing any benefit from implementing ABC, but it could be an option 
in the future if the company expands. Also, the company has some 
ideal capacity and there is no need to add more costs.  
Performance evaluation techniques (PETs)  
The data related to performance evaluation techniques revealed the following 
results. First, measuring company performance based on sales was the 
foremost technique used by about 80% (n=43) of the surveyed companies and 
it was ranked as an important technique. Second, and as the Table, below, 
demonstrates, non-financial performance evaluation techniques, such as, 
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product quality and a customer satisfaction survey, were used by more than 
50% of the surveyed companies. Third, evaluating performance based on 
budgets was also adopted by 61.4% (n=32) and 53.85% (n=28) of companies 
for budget variance analysis and meeting the budget, respectively. 
On the other hand, benchmarking techniques, market based performance 
evaluation techniques, and other performance evaluation techniques, such as, 
BSC, EVA, and residual income (See the table below) were not adopted by 
more than 60% of the companies. Finally, the Table below gives a summary of 
the adoption/non-adoption rates of different performance evaluation techniques 
by the surveyed NOROMCs, as well as the importance levels given them.  
Performance evaluation technique Not used 
Used 
 Total Not 
important  
Average 
importance  
Important  
ROI 19 0 3 30 52 
RI 39 1 2 10 52 
EVA 37 4 2 9 52 
Market share 32 2 5 13 52 
Sales 8 0 1 43 52 
Share price 40 3 2 7 52 
Division profit 34 1 5 12 52 
Product quality  15 0 0 37 52 
Customer satisfaction surveys 22 0 1 29 52 
Employees’ attitude/ satisfaction 23 0 2 27 52 
Budget variance  19 0 1 32 52 
Meeting the budget 22 0 2 28 52 
BSC 40 1 2 9 52 
CF return on investment 26 0 2 24 52 
Team performance 28 2 3 19 52 
Supplier evaluation 27 0 4 21 52 
Product profitability  21 0 3 28 52 
CVP analysis 26 0 3 23 52 
Customer profitability  32 1 3 16 52 
Controllable profit  35 2 2 13 52 
Benchmarking for product 
characteristics 
40 0 1 11 52 
Benchmarking of operational 
processes 
36 2 5 9 52 
Benchmarking of management 
processes  
39 3 3 7 52 
Benchmarking of strategic 
priorities  
40 2 3 7 52 
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Adoption/ non-adoption of surveyed performance evaluation techniques 
The Table above illustrates that of the 24 performance evaluation techniques 
listed on the survey there are 8 techniques that were adopted by at least 50% of 
the surveyed NOROMCs. Those techniques included: ROI, sales, product 
quality, customer satisfaction surveys, employees’ attitudes/ satisfaction, budget 
variance analysis, meeting the budget, and product profitability.  
Besides that, the adoption level of different PETs differs between the surveyed 
companies, as there were companies that adopted few PETs (1 PET/company), 
while others adopted several PETs (23 PETs/company). On average, the 
surveyed NOROMCs adopted about 10 PETs/ company. Different explanations 
were provided by the interviewed chief accountants (CAs) regarding this aspect. 
First, 3 of the 20 (15%) interviewed CAs referred to the availability of advanced 
information technology, like SAP, as a means that facilitated the adoption of 
more PETs. For example, Company 27 Finance and Accounts Assistant 
Manager said: 
It will not take that much time to get the figures related to PETs 
because the company is using an ERP system, so because of that the 
data will be available for us at any point of time and right in front of us. 
At the same time, the unavailability of such advanced IT systems hindered other 
companies from using more PETs, and even, in some cases, there were 
companies that stopped using some PETs for this reason. As the Account 
Manager of Company 2 stated: 
No way to use more than, sales, budget variance analysis, meeting 
the budget and product profitability analysis, because apart from those 
techniques the company was applying other techniques two years 
back, but because the IT infrastructure of the company is not that 
strong, and to prepare those techniques it takes time, then we stopped 
that. 
Second, company size and type of operation were mentioned by 5 of the 20 
(25%) interviewed CAs to explain why their companies adopted specific PETs. 
Some stated that, due to the small company size, there was no need to 
Others  50 0 0 2 52 
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complicate things and adopt many PETs. The Chief Accountant of Company 29 
said:  
When you have ROI, sales, and product quality techniques in place, 
the others would be on the plus side as well. These are the major 
PETs, and instead of going to more details, like if you concentrate on 
these three, then I assume that the remaining ones will be in place. 
And they should be in place if these figures are plus. 
While others referred to their company operation type to explain the non-
adoption of many PETs. As the Deputy Finance Manager of Company 39 said: 
Because our company is not producing too many products where we 
have to know which product is going well it is only one product that we 
are selling on the market. And we know that the strength lies only on 
its uniqueness and the quality of the steel billets. And we are catering 
according to the customer requirements and whatever we produce is 
as per order. So there is not much to be done, it is always like, you 
know, whatever they require we make according to that. And the whole 
operation cycle goes according to the customer’s requirements. 
Third, a quarter of the interviewed CAs (n=5) referred to requirements from the 
parent company or other regulatory bodies as a force encouraging them to 
adopt more than the average number of PETs. The Senior Accountant of 
Company 19 commented: 
As I said, whatever the parent company uses, the whole group has to 
use, but these are good techniques when it comes to performance 
evaluation 
The Finance Manager of Company 23 also said, regarding this issue: 
Some of these reports are required by the Muscat Securities Market 
Authority, and another part is required by the owners of the company. 
Additionally, the external auditor requires some of these PETs so s/he 
can produce the management letter. Which I consider to be an extra 
load for me, as we have to prepare reports based on those PETs, but 
we are not getting any benefit from them 
Finally, the Table above shows that the adoption level of non-financial PETs, 
such as, customer satisfaction, product quality and employees’ satisfaction, is 
quite high, but of the 20 interviewed CAs 3 (15%) stated that the company uses 
these PETs, but in an informal way, as it is costly to carry out those types of 
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measurements in formal ways and also company size, in financial terms, does 
not help in conducting such measurements formally. As Company 16’s 
Accounts Manager stated: 
The non-financial PETs-like product quality, customer satisfaction- are 
done in informal ways, because without customer satisfaction nobody 
can survive; so that is there, but not in a formal way; because the 
company turnover is not that big, so you can have a separate 
department to do all these things  
The same point was reinforced by the Financial Deputy Manager of Company 4, 
when he said: 
Customer and employees’ satisfaction -- the company is not doing it 
formally. It is very important to know the opinions of customers on our 
products, as well as how our employees feel. But doing it in a formal 
way adds cost to the company. On one side we are dealing with non-
professional employees (labour force), they may or may not respond 
to a formal survey. In addition, most of the feedback we get 
immediately from the plant floor; any worker can see managers if there 
is any issue. In addition, customer satisfaction surveys are not that 
reliable and, at the same time, it costs too much to do it. 
Though this was the case with the majority of the surveyed NOROMCs, there 
are companies that have adopted these measurements in a formal way. For 
instance, the Financial Controller of Company 24 commented in this regard: 
The company is carrying some road campaign where they check the 
cars that use the company’s batteries and get feedback from 
customers. For employees, in the annual review report there is a 
section that is related to customer satisfaction, and in that section the 
employee can state if there are any complaints. 
Regardless of whether the non-financial PETs are adopted in an informal or 
formal way, all 20 of the interviewed CAs emphasised the importance of such 
measurements to improve the company’s performance. The Deputy Finance 
Manager in Company 4 said: 
Definitely, you have to use non-financial performance practices. 
Because financial performance measurement practices only tells you 
part of the story. So you have to supplement it with non-financial 
performance measurement practice. That will tell you why your 
financial performance measurements are doing that. 
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And the Chief Accountant in Company 28 stated his opinion, and said: 
They don’t add value in actual terms, but in real terms, yes. You have 
a satisfied customer, then you know the product you have there is a 
ready customer for it. And if employees’ satisfaction is high you know 
even if you have lot of raw material, then the employees will be there 
and put a little bit of extra effort and finish the job. So you can't put this 
in figures, but in real terms, yes, that adds value to the 
company.   
Budgeting and control techniques  
 All types of budgets were used by the surveyed companies, but with different 
adoption rates. Cash flow, sales, and production budgets were adopted by more 
than 70% of the surveyed manufacturing companies, and they were rated as 
important budgeting techniques. Around 50% of the surveyed companies were 
using a master budget and rated it as an important budgeting technique. The 
data also revealed that flexible, activity-based; managers’ compensations, a 
budget system for coordinating activities across business units, incremental, 
and zero based budgets, were implemented by at most 20% of the surveyed 
NOROMCs. 
The Table below gives a summary of the budgeting and control techniques that 
were adopted by the surveyed NOROMCs. 
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Summary of budgeting and control techniques adopted by surveyed 
NOROMCs 
All of the interviewed CAs stated that their companies produce different types of 
budgets to get directions in order to achieve company goals for the budgeted 
period. As Company 19’s Senior Accountant said: 
The company is producing different types of budgets to be able to 
monitor its performance. If we don't have budgets, we don't know 
where we are getting to. When we have budgets, we have a target to 
achieve. So budgets show us if we are going in the correct direction 
and achieving the results, or not 
 
The Chief Accountant of Company 40 enforced the same point: 
Budget is giving the way to where you have to reach and how much 
you need to spend. So budgets are giving us directions toward 
achieving organisational targets 
Despite this, there are some companies that do not prepare budgets because of 
the product nature, and this point was stated clearly by the Chief Accountant of 
Company 28, when he commented on this matter, and said: 
Budgeting & control 
techniques  Not used 
Used 
 
Total 
Not 
important  
Average 
importance  
Important  
Sales budget 10 0 0 42 52 
Production budget 11 0 0 41 52 
Cash flow budget 8 0 0 44 52 
Master budget 24 0 0 28 52 
Flexible budget 38 0 3 11 52 
Activity-based budget  40 2 0 10 52 
Incremental budget 41 3 1 7 52 
Zero-based budget 45 2 1 4 52 
Day-to-day operation 
planning budget 
33 3 2 14 52 
Cost controlling budget 24 0 1 27 52 
Financial position 
planning budget 
24 0 3 25 52 
Managers 
compensations budget 
39 2 3 8 52 
Budget system for 
coordinating activities 
across bus. Units 
40 1 3 8 52 
Capital budgeting 32 1 1 18 52 
Others  52 0 0 0 52 
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Yes, because we deal with a natural product which could be available 
or could not be available. So experience has told us, you could do a 
lot of budgets and forecasting, but if it is not going to happen, so why 
waste time? (and he laughed from the bottom of his heart) 
Capital investment appraisal techniques  
The Table below shows that the payback period was rated as an important 
capital investment appraisal technique by 29 manufacturing companies of 52 
(55.77%). The next most important technique was meeting the budget, with an 
adoption rate of 44.23% (n=23). Net present value, internal rate of return, and 
accounting rate of return were adopted by 34.50%, 32.69%, and 26.93% of the 
surveyed NOROMCs, respectively.  
The Table gives a summary of the adoption rate by the surveyed companies of 
different capital investment appraisal techniques with the importance level if the 
technique were adopted. 
Adoption level of different capital investment appraisal techniques by    surveyed 
NOROMCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital investment 
appraisal techniques Not used 
Used 
 
Total 
Not 
important  
Average 
importance  
Important  
Payback period 22 0 1 29 52 
Accounting rate of 
return  
34 0 4 14 52 
Net present value 32 0 2 18 52 
Internal rate of 
return  
31 0 4 17 52 
Meeting the budget 26 2 1 23 52 
Others  52 0 0 0 52 
270 
 
Contemporary management accounting techniques 
Adoption level of different contemporary MATs by surveyed NOROMCs 
It can be seen from the data in the Table, above, that the adoption level of 
different contemporary management accounting techniques by NOROMCs is, in 
general, poor. Apart from TQM, which was rated as an important technique by 
50% (n=26) of the surveyed NOROMCs; the remaining techniques were hardly 
adopted at all by the surveyed NOROMCs. For example, JIT comes in the 
second place after TQM, with an adoption rate of 25% (n=13). In short, there 
are 14 companies out of the 52 surveyed NOROMCs that are not using any 
contemporary management accounting techniques, and that represents around 
a quarter (26.92%) of the surveyed companies.  
Different explanations were given by interviewed CAs for this low adoption level 
of different contemporary management accounting techniques.  
Firstly, requirement from top authorities, such as top management, head office, 
or parent company, was one of the reasons for using contemporary 
management accounting techniques. The Senior Accountant of Company 19 
stated: 
Contemporary 
MATs Not used 
Used 
 
Total 
Not 
important  
Average 
importance  
Important  
TQM 25 0 1 26 52 
ABM 34 0 1 17 52 
Value-chain analysis 40 1 2 9 52 
JIT 35 2 2 13 52 
Kaizen costing  43 1 1 7 52 
Target cost planning  42 2 0 8 52 
Life-cycle costing 46 2 0 4 52 
Re-engineering 
approach  
46 2 0 4 52 
SMA 42 0 1 9 52 
BSC 44 2 0 6 52 
Strategic investment 
appraisal  
45 0 2 5 52 
TPA 41 2 0 9 52 
Others  51 0 0 1 52 
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No, it is not that the Oman branch applies these techniques by itself, 
you can say that we are going along with the parent company   
Secondly, some CAs stated that the techniques are in use, but companies are 
not using them on a regular basis, but on a case to case basis. As the Deputy 
Financial Manager of Company 4 said: 
When you say contemporary MA practices, people will be using it. But, 
there are certain things which will work in certain situations only. 
Suppose when it starts off with a new product, I have to use target 
costing. I can’t use the absorption costing or cost plus, as you can 
never go into the market in that way. You have to count everything. So 
the company uses target costing when it wants to launch a new 
product, and that is not applicable all the time. 
And the same point was reinforced by Company 24’s Financial Controller: 
These are not regularly done, but on a case by case basis. For Kaizen 
costing, the company is trying always to improve the product quality 
while controlling the cost 
Moreover, there are other different explanations that were given by interviewed 
CAs. For example, company size, company operation nature, importance of 
such techniques in getting access to other things (like getting an ISO 
certificate), information technology availability, and difficulties associated with 
implementing such techniques. The Accounts Manager of Company 16 said: 
I think ABM is more effective in big companies and more applicable, 
rather than in a small company like ours. 
Whereas the Finance Manager in Company 23 said the following about 
implementing contemporary MAPs, like TQM: 
TQM: it is difficult to apply, and also costly. It is used in the production 
department only so our product can get the ISO certificate, as it helps 
in marketing the product, and if that is not the case, the company is 
not going to implement the technique as it is costly to do that.  
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